US embassy cable - 04ANKARA1360

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001360 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT. FOR P, EUR/SE AND NEA/NGA 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: IRAQ: TURKEY SLAMS TAL 
 
 
(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch.  Reasons 1.4 (a) and 
(b). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary:  GOT reacts harshly to the terms of the TAL. 
It views the process as undemocractic; the result as a pure 
ethnic federation dividing Iraq; and the treatment of the 
Turkomen as belittling.  The result is inconsistent with the 
presentation to date by the U.S. including in the recent 
letter from the President to PM Erdogan.  Turkey believes it 
has been frozen out of US Iraq operations and treated in a 
manner unbecoming an Ally.  If the TAL becomes final, Turkey 
believes it will have difficulty continuing its cooperation 
on Iraq.  We request guidance for a response in Paragraph 8 
 
 
2. (C) DCM was convoked evening of March 5 to Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs by Director General for Middle East Tahsin 
Burcuoglu concerning the Iraq Transitional Law.  Burucuoglu 
speaking, on the instruction of the Minister he said, wanted 
to inform the U.S. of its analysis and reaction to the Iraqi 
TAL.  According to Burcuoglu, Turkey obtained a copy of the 
final text several days ago.  It was disappointed that the 
U.S. didn,t share the text or consult with Turkey on it. 
Turkey felt shut out, disappointed and violated by the 
result.  The U.S. had not treated Turkey in a manner 
befitting an Ally 
 
 
3. (C) While the U.S. had consistently stated that the future 
of Iraq would be decided by the Iraqis and was intended to be 
a step toward democracy, he said, in fact the text of the TAL 
had been kept secret, and even some members of the IGC were 
unaware of the developments.  A Turkomen Minister in Ankara 
said he was unaware of the thrust of the TAL.  When informed 
by the Turks of its content, he told them he would resign his 
position.  There was a complete lack of transparency with the 
international community, as well, Burcuoglu added.  The IGC 
was an entity picked by the U.S. it lacked legitimacy and had 
significant representations deficits.  The text in many areas 
determined the future of Iraq not only for the Transitional 
period, but for the indefinite future since significant parts 
of the text could not realistically be amended even by a 
fully elected assembly.  This text prepared by 25 individuals 
picked by the US and the CPA was not compatible with 
democracy and if it became final, the GOT would be obliged to 
pronounce it as such, he stated. 
 
 
4. (C) The system established in the TAL, Burcuoglu said, was 
also objectionable.  It established definitively a federal 
system in Iraq, and that federation was a pure ethnic one, he 
added.  The terms of that system, despite the commitments 
made even recently in the letter from the President to PM 
Erdogan, would clearly result in a division of Iraq into at 
least two parts, one Kurdish segment and one other large 
segment, as yet nameless. The latter part might be further 
divided.  The Kurdish language was an official language 
throughout Iraq and that would be a provocation to violence 
in Arab areas.  The Kurdish Regional Government divided 
Turkey from an Iraq that would no longer be a neighbor.  The 
difficulties in maintaining a relationship between Turkey and 
Iraq already evident would grow because of the new status of 
the KRG.  While the status of the Kurdish region could 
change, the TAL created an &acquis8 and the IGC,s 
decisions would in fact rule Iraq well beyond its extinction, 
he noted. 
 
 
5.  (C) Burcuoglu also said that we had reduced the Turkomen 
to the status of a negligible minority.  The Turkomen who are 
2.5 million strong in Turkey,s view are given the same 
administrative and cultural rights as the Chaldeans, 
Assyrians and Armenians (a few hundred in Iraq).  Their 
language right, established in the 1932 constitution 
disappeared.  We had chosen to treat the Turkomen as they had 
been under Saddam,s laws rather than in Iraq,s founding act 
of the 1932 Constitution.  The Turkomen had been completely 
excluded from writing the TAL which determined their fate, 
since the Turkomen representative on the IGC was mediocre and 
did not understand the implications of the effort. 
 
 
6. (C) if this text became final, Burucuoglu added, it would 
really create problems in Iraq and in the neighboring 
countries which would make the difficulties experienced to 
date seem unimportant.  Speaking personally, Burcuoglu added 
that he hoped the Shia representatives continued to refuse to 
sign the text because if it was brought out in public it 
would create a much greater reaction. 
 
 
7. (C) For Turkey,s part, the GOT was planning to release a 
public statement reflecting its analysis shortly, he noted. 
If the law became final, it would result in a text that 
clearly embodied elements that were denied in the Presidents. 
 Turkey would have to take measures and it would have a 
problem continuing its cooperation with the U.S. on Iraq. 
 
 
8. (C) Comment and Action Requested:  Burcuoglu reflected 
consistent themes in Turkey,s view of Iraqi developments. 
Our attempts to respond, based on the general guidance 
concerning the TAL we have available did not deter his onward 
thrust.  Nonetheless he spoke in conclusive terms with the 
clear instructions from his superiors.  If this view of 
developments on the TAL remains, it will in fact complicate 
our activities.  We request a copy of the TAL and 
instructions that would allow us to rebut the GOT analysis. 
EDELMAN