US embassy cable - 04TELAVIV1370

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ASSASSINATION OF ARAFAT AIDE IN GAZA CITY -- LAW AND ORDER, GAZA STYLE

Identifier: 04TELAVIV1370
Wikileaks: View 04TELAVIV1370 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Tel Aviv
Created: 2004-03-04 17:03:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: KWBG KPAL KDEM PREL PGOV GZ IS ISRAELI
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001370 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2009 
TAGS: KWBG, KPAL, KDEM, PREL, PGOV, GZ, IS, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS, GAZA DISENGAGEMENT 
SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF ARAFAT AIDE IN GAZA CITY -- LAW 
AND ORDER, GAZA STYLE 
 
REF: TEL AVIV 0776 
 
Classified By: Pol/C Norm Olsen, per 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary: The March 2 assassination of Khalil 
al-Zaban, Yasir Arafat's advisor on human rights and media 
issues, is but the most recent in an ongoing series of events 
that indicates a decline in law and order in the Gaza Strip. 
Neither the killers nor their motives have been identified. 
Somewhat but not wholly indicative of what many perceive to 
be an ongoing jockeying for power among different factions of 
the PA and Fatah, armed militants or gangs are also using 
their muscle to look out for themselves, demanding jobs, land 
and other benefits from what contacts call an increasingly 
fractured Palestinian Authority in Gaza.  Others may be 
simply settling old scores.  Security services shrink from 
challenging the offenders because they are either unwilling 
to confront rivals or are themselves worried about crossing 
someone from whom they themselves might need assistance in 
the future.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------- 
Arafat Advisor Gunned Down 
-------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Khalil al-Zaban, a journalist and advisor to Yasir 
Arafat on human rights and the media, was assassinated in 
Gaza City in the early morning hours of March 2.  Al-Zaban 
headed the PA's government-appointed NGO Council and 
published its monthly newsletter, al-Nashra ("The Bulletin"). 
 Neither the killers nor their motives have been identified. 
A prominent journalist acquainted with al-Zaban called him 
thoughtful and an individual upon whose opinion Arafat relied 
heavily.  A behind-the-scenes type in recent years, al-Zaban 
was at one time noted for his open criticism of Islamic 
militancy and for his support for Palestinian prisoners being 
held in Syrian jails.  Al-Zaban was also known, however, to 
have been aggressive in attacking in print those critical of 
the PA, particularly on human rights.  Both PA police and 
Arafat's Force 17 are investigating the crime, and Arafat 
convened both the cabinet and the National Security Council 
(NSC) March 2 to coordinate the investigation. 
 
-------------------------- 
"Gangsters on the Margins" 
-------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Although al-Zaban had been an Arafat loyalist since 
at least the PLO's days in Tunis, it is not entirely clear to 
what extent al-Zaban's assassination is related to the 
efforts of various Gaza factions and individuals to garner 
power.  Gaza pundits across the spectrum commented on his 
death more in light of the weakening of the PA in Gaza and 
the growing fragmentation of the security situation, than as 
an event with a message in its own right.  Similar to the 
attack on PA Police Chief Ghazi al-Jabali several weeks ago 
(reftel), this attack is being viewed among some Gazans as 
further evidence that personal scores in Gaza can now be 
settled with impunity.  While the lack of a legal penalty for 
violent attacks is hardly new in Gaza, contacts cite an 
increased level of anxiety among the public regarding the 
state of law and order. 
 
4.  (C)  Militants, or "gangsters on the margins" as one 
observer put it, appear increasingly inclined to use force of 
arms to achieve results.  Other recent incidents include the 
forced entry into the Offices of the Lands Authority February 
24 by approximately 20 armed men.  Details of the incident 
remain murky, but the men apparently demanded that the office 
issue them titles to land in the Gaza Strip, an action they 
claimed was authorized by Yasir Arafat.  The PA had 
previously issued such land titles to senior PA security 
officials and these inactive or fired security officers 
reportedly felt that they were entitled to the same benefits. 
 The head of the Lands Authority, Frayh Abu Middayn, told 
Poloff that it was "simply impossible to carry out business 
in such an environment," and the office closed down for a 
week, re-opening only on March 3.  The forced entry February 
28 to the television and radio station in Ma'en by militants 
demanding jobs is another example.  Left unpaid by their 
unidentified patron in Khan Yunis, the men were reportedly 
seeking to be entered on the PA payroll at the station to 
augment or at least ensure their income.  The bottom line in 
all of these incidents, some of which were likely the result 
of personal grudges, is the impunity of the perpetrators. 
 
5.  (C) The security forces, if not complicit, have 
demonstrated little interest in reining in either independent 
actors or their rivals from the militias and possibly 
sparking a wider confrontation.  While the attack on the Gaza 
Police Chief is indeed evidence of the breakdown of law and 
order, those more intimately acquainted with the actual event 
stressed that the score being settled between Jabali and his 
attackers was personal, having to do with reinstating men 
previously dismissed from the police, rather than a larger 
showdown between various security services.  What was 
noteworthy about the attack, contacts say, was that the 
perpetrators felt empowered enough to carry it out in broad 
daylight and that there were no subsequent arrests or 
reprisals. 
 
6.  (C) When asked who was in a position to improve the 
situation, Fatah moderate and Deputy Minister of Housing 
Marwan Abdul Hameed dismissed Muhammad Dahlan's chances of 
exerting a unifying influence over the panoply of security 
services in Gaza, adding that Dahlan was strong enough to be 
a spoiler only.  Warming to his subject, Hameed assessed that 
the man to run security in Gaza is Nasir Yusuf, whom Arafat 
rejected when he was nominated for Interior Minister in Abu 
Ala,a,s government.  Hameed said that Yusuf, whom he said 
is originally from Gaza, has the proper background, the 
Islamic credentials in the eyes of the public to face off 
Hamas, and is a Fatah stalwart.  Hameed opined that it was 
Arafat's fear of Yusuf's possible success in Gaza, and 
subsequent potential to challenge Arafat himself, that 
prevented Arafat from appointing him to the task. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
7.  (C) Perhaps more hopefully than realistically, contacts 
say that al-Zaban's murder may give Arafat pause in a way 
that previous incidents had not, particularly as it comes 
hard on the heels of the Fatah Revolutionary Council meeting 
in which more reform-minded Fatah members such as Hameed were 
openly critical of Arafat's unwillingness to control, among 
other things, the security situation in the territories. 
 
********************************************* ******************** 
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********************************************* ******************** 
KURTZER 

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