US embassy cable - 04HARARE401

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MDC PRESIDENT APPEALS TO INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON

Identifier: 04HARARE401
Wikileaks: View 04HARARE401 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Harare
Created: 2004-03-04 15:31:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR ASEC EAID ZI MDC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000401 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER, D. TEITELBAUM 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
DS/OP/AF 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINR, ASEC, EAID, ZI, MDC 
SUBJECT: MDC PRESIDENT APPEALS TO INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Audu Besmer for reasons 1.5 b/d 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On March 3, MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai 
briefed some 30 Harare-based diplomats on the MDC's 
perception of the crisis in Zimbabwe, the status of 
interparty talks, and the party's strategy for upcoming 
elections.  He appealed to the international community to 
continue pressure on the Mugabe regime especially to adhere 
to SADC norms for the March 2005 parliamentary elections. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) Tsvangirai said that Zimbabwe's health and education 
systems were deteriorating, its food deficit was continuing, 
government food aid was politicized, and violence was still 
being perpetrated on MDC supporters.  He said that the 
limited informal constitutional talks between representatives 
of the MDC and ZANU-PF had not progressed to formal 
negotiations.  Tsvangirai reiterated that a negotiated 
settlement of the political situation was necessary.  He 
spoke positively of Mbeki's efforts, but emphasized that they 
had not yet achieved the desired result.  Tsvangirai said the 
party would be preparing for the upcoming general 
parliamentary elections in March 2005 or whenever the GOZ 
might call them.  He said that the current electoral 
conditions would, however, produce a "predetermined outcome", 
i.e. one unfavorable to the MDC. 
 
3. (SBU) The MDC President urged the international community, 
especially SADC countries, to pressure the GOZ to adhere to 
SADC electoral norms to ensure a legitimate outcome. 
Tsvangirai said that the party wanted to participate in the 
 
SIPDIS 
elections, but would reserve a decision to boycott.  He also 
urged that the international community not relax its travel 
bans or other sanctions.  Tsvangirai recognized that 
Mauritius was due to assume chairmanship of SADC in August 
2004 and he hoped that under its leadership SADC might be 
more sympathetic to MDC goals. 
 
4. (SBU) Tsvangirai cautioned that without international 
pressure for a political resolution and electoral reforms, 
chaos might result.  Tsvangirai urged SADC, the Africa Union 
(AU), and the international community not to wait until there 
were "dead bodies" in the streets.  He said that 
implementation of SADC norms was necessary to legitimize the 
March 2005 polls and to preempt conflict that might lead to 
feelings of "helplessness", "despondency" and "adventurism". 
(Comment: We took adventurism to mean violence against the 
regime.  End Comment.) 
 
5. (SBU) Tsvangirai said that the party would soon appeal to 
the UN Secretary General to send a "Human Rights Commission" 
to Zimbabwe, while acknowledging that sympathetic African 
states have thwarted Zimbabwe-related resolutions in UNHRC 
generally.  (Comment: We took this to mean a UN Special 
Rapporteur.  End comment.)  He also speculated about the 
possible utility of UN Security Council action on Zimbabwe, 
but gave no further detail. 
 
6. (SBU) MDC Shadow Minister of Agriculture Renson Gasela 
relayed that he had traveled around the country recently and 
observed dismal prospects for this year's harvest.  He said 
that only 40 percent of seed and inputs had been made 
available to communal farmers and that the country could at 
best expect a harvest of 40 percent of normal.  (Note: This 
figure is lower than that offered by FEWSNET and other 
technical experts.  End Note.)  Gasela said he would issue a 
full report of his findings within 2 weeks.  Consistent with 
reports from other Embassy sources Gasela said the GOZ does 
not intend to request donor food again this year.  He pointed 
out that this would leave the GOZ's Grain Marketing Board 
(GMB) with a monopoly on food distribution going into the 
parliamentary elections in March -- a circumstance it would 
exploit to manipulate the electorate, as it had in the past. 
 
7. (C) A Botswana diplomat told Poloffs after the briefing 
that he did not see SADC altering its group position on 
Zimbabwe or discussing Zimbabwe's election standards at any 
upcoming SADC meeting.  The diplomat listed several SADC 
countries which might be sympathetic to the MDC and political 
reform in Zimbabwe, such as Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, and Angola.  He suggested Tanzania might be 
persuadable, but Namibia and Zambia were firmly alongside the 
GOZ.  He said the DRC might go either way, but would like 
best to ignore the Zimbabwe issue.  Lesotho and Swaziland 
would likely go along with whatever stance South Africa took. 
 He noted that SADC had never pressed a member on elections 
and in any event, members' relations with South Africa and 
respective domestic political considerations would override 
any inclination to press Zimbabwe on elections. 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
8. (C) Urging the international community to assist in 
electoral reform in the run-up to the March 2005 polls speaks 
to the MDC's weakness and growing frustration at home.  That 
reform of the election environment will take a considerable 
commitment of time and resources fuels the MDC's urgency. 
The MDC has been unable to elicit any signal that ZANU-PF 
would consider electoral reform or the direct negotiations 
that would probably have to drive it.  Having recently 
withdrawn its solicitation of UN electoral assistance, the 
GOZ will be unresponsive to Tsvangirai's vague UN appeals 
unless pressed mightily from abroad. 
SULLIVAN 

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