US embassy cable - 04ZAGREB363

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ZAGREB 000363 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, HR, Defense Reform (Mil & NATO) 
SUBJECT: CROATIA'S POLITICAL OPPOSITION WOULD BLOCK TROOPS 
TO IRAQ AND ARTICLE 98 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph Frank, reasons 1.5 (b) & (d) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) Ambassador Frank discussed a range of issues February 
24 with former Prime Minister, SDP President and now 
opposition leader Ivica Racan, and thanked him for his 
efforts as Prime Minister to prepare Croatia for future NATO 
membership.  Racan welcomed the thanks but cautioned that his 
now-opposition SDP party would not support sending Croatian 
troops to Iraq or ratification of an Article 98 agreement in 
the current political climate.  Racan's opposition means that 
PM Sanader faces an almost insurmountable challenge to 
assemble the two-thirds majority vote in the Sabor among the 
other, smaller opposition parties, many of which have already 
rejected publicly any support for troops to Iraq or an 
Article 98 agreement. 
 
2. (C) Racan blamed intra-coalition conflict as the major 
cause for the defeat of his center-left coalition, noting 
that while the SDP only lost five seats, the other coalition 
partners were devastated in the polls.  However, he admitted 
some responsibility for his defeat by failing to spend more 
time building up his own party's organization. 
 
3. (C) On February 26, the Ambassador also met Racan's SDP 
colleague, former Defense Minister Zeljka Antunovic.  An 
effective reformer in office, Antunovic warned that steep 
cuts in the defense budget proposed by the ruling HDZ would 
endanger defense reforms and render it difficult for Croatia 
to fulfill its MAP obligations.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Afghanistan Yes, Iraq No 
------------------------ 
 
4. (C) On February 24, Ambassador Frank met with SDP 
President and former Prime Minister Ivica Racan for the first 
time since Racan's party lost tQ November 23 parliamentary 
elections.  The Ambassador thanked Racan for his efforts to 
prepare Croatia to become a member of NATO, noting that the 
visit of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to Croatia on February 
8 was primarily intended to welcome Croatia's progress toward 
NATO and was not meant to send any signals about the change 
in government. 
 
5. (C) Racan thanked the Ambassador, noting that when in 
power, he had done everything possible to bring Croatia 
closer to NATO and the EU.  Racan agreed that U.S.-Croatia 
relations were deeper than how they were frequently depicted 
in the media which have been suggesting that close ties 
depend solely on the issues of troops to Iraq and an Article 
98 agreement.  Racan said he wants what is best for Croatia 
and would not be partisan if the ruling HDZ were able to 
build on his good work to further Croatia's Euro-Atlantic 
integration. 
 
6. (C) The Ambassador said he hoped that Racan could be 
equally non-partisan on the issue of sending troops to Iraq, 
which was in Croatia's interest and would demonstrate the 
GoC's willingness to share the burdens of being part of the 
global coalition against terrorism.  Racan responded that 
sending Croatian troops to Afghanistan to participate in ISAF 
had been his initiative.  He had been able to secure broad 
political support because of the clearer political context 
and general public support.  Racan said he would support an 
expansion of Croatia's efforts in Afghanistan, as it would 
not provoke any strong negative public reaction. 
 
7. (C) On Iraq, Racan said the situation was much more 
complex and public reaction would be much more negative.  He 
said that the SDP was in a delicate political position, and 
that any support for sending troops to Iraq would hurt the 
SDP and benefit the ruling HDZ.  Because the ruling HDZ was 
linked closely in the public mind to the U.S., the HDZ could 
plausibly cite U.S. pressure as the motivating factor for its 
support for sending troops to Iraq.  If the SDP were to 
support such a move, it would be seen as abandoning its 
principles.  Racan added that, when he was in government, he 
wanted to do much more on Iraq, but pressure from the public 
and from President Mesic forced him to retreat.  Therefore, 
any future steps in Iraq would have to be very cautious, 
initially non-military in nature, and not all at once. 
 
No Article 98 Agreement 
----------------------- 
 
8. (C) On an Article 98 agreement, Racan noted that he had 
tried to find a solution to reconcile the U.S. and Croatian 
positions.  While he supported without compromise Croatia's 
cooperation with the ICTY, public opinion still linked an 
Article 98 agreement with ICTY cooperation.  Racan said he 
believed that HDZ party members for the most part were in 
favor of signing an Article 98 agreement with the U.S. only 
 
because they believed it would be part of a deal that could 
get Croatia off the hook from cooperating with the ICTY.  The 
Ambassador made clear that there would be no such deal for an 
Article 98 agreement.  Racan said that while an Article 98 
agreement would be very difficult politically, he hoped that 
negotiations would continue to produce a formula to meet both 
sides' needs. 
 
Defeat Not Racan's Fault 
------------------------ 
 
9. (C) In response to Ambassador Frank's question about how 
he would rebuild his party following the November 23 
elections, Racan said that the elections had clarified the 
political landscape in Croatia.  There was now a strong 
right-wing party in the HDZ, which he hoped would prove to be 
as moderately right-wing as PM Sanader claimed.  Racan 
credited Sanader with initiating reform of the HDZ, but said 
the work was not finished.  Racan believes that Sanader will 
be tied up with the business of governing and will not be 
able to complete reform of the HDZ he was in power. 
 
10. (C) More importantly, the elections had shattered the 
illusion that there was political space for a democratic 
center between the moderate right and the moderate left.  The 
challenge was for the SDP to become the strong moderate left 
party.  The SDP could agree on strategic issues with the HDZ 
like NATO and EU membership, but still sharply differentiate 
itself on issues of taxation, abortion, human rights, and 
social welfare. 
 
11. (C) Racan said that he would be focusing his efforts on 
rebuilding his party now that he had the time.  While in 
government, he had to focus his attention on maintaining the 
coalition and admitted that he had made a strategic error in 
neglecting party-building work while Prime Minister. 
However, Racan would not accept the notion that his party had 
lost the elections.  He noted that the SDP had only lost five 
seats, while being the only party to campaign on the basis of 
the work of the governing coalition.  The other coalition 
parties had effectively run against the coalition and been 
devastated in the polls. 
 
12. (C) Racan claimed that the election defeat was the result 
of rising public expectations that the very success of his 
government's policies had engendered.  He blamed 
intra-coalition squabbling for souring the public's appetite 
for continued coalition government and accused the media of 
being more interested in scandal-mongering than in reporting 
on the coalition's successes.  Racan also accused 
conservative elements of the Catholic Church, upset at the 
coalition's liberal social policies, of playing a worse role 
than in the previous election. 
 
Defense Reform Stalled 
---------------------- 
 
13. (C) The Ambassador followed up the Racan meeting with a 
separate meeting on February 26 with former defense minister 
(and current SDP Vice President and MP) Zeljka Antunovic to 
thank her for her work in moving the Croatian military to 
prepare for possible NATO membership.  Antunovic thanked the 
Ambassador for U.S. support for her efforts.  She said that 
now it was time for a strong public relations campaign to 
explain why it was in Croatia's interest to join NATO.  Such 
a campaign should also be open and direct about what were the 
obligations NATO membership would entail. 
 
14. (C) Antunovic said she was deeply concerned that the 
Defense budget proposed by the ruling HDZ would prove to be a 
costly mistake.  The cuts proposed were too deep to allow 
further work on reforming the military to meet its NATO 
obligations.  Croatia had promised NATO it would spend 2.2 
percent of GDP on the military, but the new budget was less 
than last year.  Worse, Antunovic feared that the new budget 
indicated that the HDZ leadership did not understand that 
further defense reform is not just for NATO but also in 
Croatia's own best defense interests. 
 
15. (C) Antunovic said she was also concerned about the new 
defense minister's ability to assert leadership over a balky 
bureaucracy and general staff.  She said she understood that 
leadership change always slows progress on reforms.  She 
feared that while staff work on reforms that she set in 
motion would continue, implementation could be blocked by a 
reluctant bureaucracy.  She feared that the Defense Minister 
Roncevic would not be able to reach the same modus vivendi 
she had with the defense leadership, that she would accept 
all comments and criticism but expected the military to carry 
out her decisions. 
 
16. (C) Antunovic said that President Mesic was very engaged 
on military reform issues and that she had a productive 
working relationship with him.  She said that she had agreed 
 
 
with Mesic to keep any disagreements out of the public eye 
and work together to resolve them.  Her problems had come 
more from the President's staff than from the President 
himself. 
 
Not Ready for Coast Guard Decision 
---------------------------------- 
 
17. (C) In response to our question, Antunovic said she had 
not made taking a decision on a Coast Guard a priority as 
Mininster.  She said the issue was in need of further 
internal discussion, as all the relevant ministries have 
different ideas on the issue.  That said, she had set in 
motion a long-term planning process at the Ministry of 
Defense, but cautioned that few people in Croatia think 
seriously about the need for inter-ministerial cooperation on 
this or any issue. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
18. (C) The hesitancy that Racan expressed to the Ambassador 
to take on public opinion or President Mesic on difficult 
issues sounded to us like deja vu all over again.  Racan's 
failure to assert leadership on Iraq and Article 98 was an 
important reason movement on those issues stalled under his 
tenure as prime minister.  With his SDP's 34 seats in the 
Sabor, Racan could have made it easier for the HDZ to gain 
the two-thirds majority of 101 (of 152) deputies needed to 
approve sending troops to Iraq or an Article 98 agreement. 
 
19. (C) It will be virtually impossible for PM Sanader to 
find the necessary votes without the SDP.  He would have to 
cobble together support from the smaller parties on the left 
and right extremes, most of which have previously come out 
against such moves.  Sanader has proved that in bringing his 
party to power he knows how to cut a political deal. 
However, we are not sanguine that even Sanader could make 
either troops to Iraq or an Article 98 agreement happen when 
a large portion of his own party base is already set against 
it.  Adding to that President Mesic's strong opposition to 
both initiatives, we conclude that faced with these 
considerable obstacles there is little likelihood that the 
Sanader government will be able to move forward on either 
issue in the near term. 
 
FRANK 
 
 
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