US embassy cable - 00KINSHASA8538

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KISANGANI OBSERVATIONS AND IMPRESSIONS (II)

Identifier: 00KINSHASA8538
Wikileaks: View 00KINSHASA8538 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kinshasa
Created: 2000-12-26 11:07:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: CG ECON PGOV PINS PREL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 008538 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2010 
TAGS: CG, ECON, PGOV, PINS, PREL 
SUBJECT: KISANGANI OBSERVATIONS AND IMPRESSIONS (II) 
 
REF: KINSHASA 8532 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR WILLIAM LACY SWING FOR REASONS 1.5 
(B) (D) 
 
 
1. (C) Following is the second and final part of a report on 
an Embassy staff member's visit to Kisangani November 
28-December 1.  This message covers the political and 
economic situation in Kisangani. 
 
 
2. (C) Political Situation 
 
 
       Emboff accompanied a Human Rights Law Group 
representative on a courtesy visit to the "Governor" of 
Orientale Province.  Making his case for US assistance, the 
Governor explained how the international community had 
ignored the province.  He stressed full support for Congolese 
territorial integrity and implementation of Lusaka.  Echoing 
a widely-held Kinshasa view, he asserted that the US could 
stop the war with a phone call if it really wanted to.  The 
presence at the meeting of the provincial head of security 
was interpreted by Civil Society officials as evidence that 
the governor is on shaky terms with his Goma mentors. 
(Kisangani Civil Society generally believes that Kisangani 
RCD officials are not completely trusted in Goma.  At any 
rate, they receive meager support from Goma.) 
     By all accounts, the Rwandan-supported occupation of 
Kisangani is somewhat less oppressive than in Bukavu and Goma 
although the population detests the RCD.  Human rights groups 
are strong and continue to have access to private local radio 
and television.  Few felt that there was much attempt to 
control communications.  On the other hand, the RCD is 
installing political "cells" in all businesses and 
institutions.  Emboff had no opportunity to speak with 
Archbishop Monsengwo, who was otherwise occupied the entire 
period of the visit.  The general impression was, however, 
that the bishop's popularity may have suffered somewhat as 
the population seeks greater signs of peaceful resistance to 
RCD occupation. 
     The Hema-Lendu conflict of Bunia in eastern Orientale 
Province has had repercussions in Kisangani, tending as it 
has to polarize the large numbers of the intellectual elite 
of both groups living in the city.  Despite human rights 
organizations' reconciliation efforts, a high level of 
tension remains.  Both Hema and Lendu groups have been 
exciting their membership via use of video footage showing 
the bodies of their respective ethnic group being killed by 
the other. 
     The working environment for national and international 
NGOs in Kisangani is mixed.  There is considerable harassment 
in the form of petty taxes; as a result international NGOs 
recently formed a joint "solidarity" committee in order to 
confront the government with one voice.  The "governor" is 
not highly regarded among NGOs.  E.g., he reportedly tried to 
ensnare MSF/Belgium in a corruption scam.  Other 
international NGOs (ICRC, IRC, MSF/Holland, Oxfam) protested 
via a joint letter in support of MSF/Belgium, threatening to 
take the matter to RCD headquarters in Goma if necessary. 
 
 
3. (C) Isolation and "Balkanization" 
 
 
     Two themes recur in nearly all discussions with Civil 
Society and others in Kisangani: first, that Kisangani is 
isolated, effectively cut off from the rest of the Congo both 
east and west, as well as largely ignored by the rest of the 
world.  From the "governor" on down, everyone in Kisangani 
bemoaned this and expressed appreciation for foreigners who 
now come for more than a same day visit.  Kisangani's pride 
is hurt, as residents have watched the Congo's third largest 
city become something of a backwater village neglected by 
politicians, humanitarian aid workers, development agencies, 
and diplomats.  All pointed out repeatedly that Goma and 
Bukavu get all the attention. Notwithstanding, the visitor 
found Kisangani far from "dead", but rather surprisingly 
vibrant for a community with so few resources and outside 
connections. 
     The second common strain of most conversations in 
Kisangani is the perceived "balkanization" of the province. 
Residents are bitter and resentful that the international 
community seemed to be doing nothing to prevent this.  They 
can no longer travel freely around the province, both because 
of a pre-travel authorization requirement and because of 
security.  (To travel to Buta, for example, one needs to 
leave RCD/Goma territory and enter MLC territory.  To travel 
to Bunia, one needs to enter the "RCD-National" territory of 
Roger Lumbala and then navigate through the territories of 
the three competing rebel groups in the Bunia-Butembo-Beni 
area.)  It is obvious to local residents that Orientale 
province has ceased being a province and deteriorated into a 
number of fiefdoms dominated by various strongmen (including 
Ugandans and Rwandans). 
 
 
4. (C) Economic Situation 
 
 
     As throughout the Congo, these are very hard times 
economically for Kisangani.  Kisangani suffers more from the 
war than do some other areas in that the armed conflict has 
cut off the city from all of its major trade partners.  E.g., 
there has been no river traffic with Mbandaka and Kinshasa to 
the west for two years now, with major economic 
repercussions.  Though the city is commonly thought of as 
being commercially and politically more tied to the east than 
to the west, local traders suggest that this is largely a 
misconception, since all of Kisangani's major commercial 
enterprises traded more with Kinshasa than with the east, 
taking advantage of lower-cost river transportation.  The 
only river traffic now are canoes that come upstream with 
limited agricultural produce.  Even these, however, have 
diminished greatly in number, as the number of "roadblocks" 
for "taxes" on the river has blossomed (fifteen or so between 
Kisangani and Bumba, and three between Yangambi and Kisangani 
alone), making this route no longer profitable for even 
small-time traders.  To the north and east, roads are 
insecure and in poor condition.  There the frequency of 
trucks being ambushed has caused vehicular traffic to 
disappear completely.  This limits Kisangani to dependence 
either on bicycle transporters or aircraft from the east for 
virtually everything but locally-available agricultural 
produce.  Few companies in the east have attempted 
large-scale importing, however, perhaps for lack of large 
aircraft.  As a result, according to an OCHA investigation, 
food prices in Kisangani are considerably higher than in Goma. 
 
 
5. Diamond Trade Moves Away 
 
 
     Interlocuteurs repeatedly pointed out to Emboff that the 
diamond trade which traditionally constituted the city's 
economic base has moved away from Kisangani.  A little-known 
consequence of the Rwanda-Uganda "six-day" war in Kisangani 
and the subsequent withdrawal of the Ugandans is that 
although Kisangani itself remained in the RCD/Goma (i.e. 
Rwandan) sphere of influence, the Ugandans retained control 
of most of the diamond-producing areas, which lie to the 
northeast and northwest of the city.  As diamonds now go out 
directly via northern routes to Kampala, Kisangani is largely 
bereft of the diamond trade.  The Kisangani diamond trader 
who received an RCD monopoly on diamond exports eventually 
gave up and left town because he could not raise enough 
revenue from new diamonds to pay $100,000 in monthly taxes 
required in return for the monopoly.  Many believe that 
Kisangani's inaccessibility to diamond revenue may have been 
the underlying reason that the RCD sent troops into MLC 
territory in mid-November.  As is often reported of areas 
where Rwandan soldiers control diamond-producing areas, 
Ugandan soldiers do not pay appropriate prices for diamonds. 
Diggers are forced to sell only to Ugandans who conspire to 
keep prices low.  Civil Society leaders in Kisangani also 
suspect that coltan and niobium are also being exported in 
significant quantities from Orientale Province directly to 
Uganda and Rwanda. 
SWING 

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