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| Identifier: | 04BOGOTA2912 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04BOGOTA2912 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Bogota |
| Created: | 2004-03-02 22:05:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |
| Tags: | ECON EFIN ELAB PGOV CO |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 002912 SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON, EFIN, ELAB, PGOV, CO SUBJECT: COLOMBIA GOES BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD ON PENSION REFORM Sensitive but Unclassified -- please protect accordingly SUMMARY 1. (SBU) Faced with the impending default of the Public Pension Fund (managed by the Institute for Social Security), the GOC is once again attempting to overhaul its public pension system. This marks the Uribe administration's third attempt to fix the problem, after the 2002 pension reform was gutted in the Congress and the referendum's attempt to push through reforms failed in October 2003. The GOC cannot afford its current public system, which covers only 20 percent of all workers and is an odd mix of special regimes educators, petroleum and military) that give the top five percent benefits 180 times greater than the basic levels. Central government pension spending has quadrupled over the past decade and now accounts for about 3.4 percent of GDP. Moreover, pension debt is the second largest contributing factor to the GOC's chronic financial deficits (just behind fiscal transfers to regional and local governments). As a result of the funding imbalance of the public pension system, the GOC's total indebtedness is expected to rise from slightly over 50 percent to almost 60 percent of GDP by 2010 unless serious reforms are enacted. President Uribe has formed a multi-sectoral group that includes businessmen, labor leaders, members of Congress and civil society leaders to develop a comprehensive reform package that he hopes to have approved by the Congress this year. While many recognize the dire pension situation, the necessary reforms are unlikely to be politically viable. End Summary THE CURRENT SITUATION 2. (SBU) Over the past decade, pension spending has drained the budget. The Ministry of Finance and Public Credit reports that 16 percent of the total central government budget and 22 percent of the operational budget is destined to pay pensions. Despite such heavy spending, the public social security system will run out of reserves in 2004. The National Financial Association (ANIF) projects that as a result public debt as a percentage of GDP will grow from 52.7 percent last year to 59.6 percent by 2010. 3. (SBU) The current system evolved from 1993 reforms modeled after the pension system in Chile. It is a two-pillar system where employees can choose to join a private, defined contribution plan, or join the state social security plan. Private pension plans are well-funded, with over USD 8 billion currently invested in the system. The public system, however, has run out of funding. Unlike other countries that adopted such systems, Colombia's system had neither a clear transition mechanism that would induce workers to transfer to a private system nor a final-end date for participation in the public system. Worse yet, lucrative special pension regimes were maintained, making it more beneficial for individuals to remain in these public regimes rather than opting for private systems. As a result, a decade after the initial 1993 reform, the public system still covers 50 percent of the insured. 4. (SBU) In late 2002, the Colombian Congress approved a pension reform plan that will increase the contribution rate to 15.5% in 2006 and will also gradually increase the minimum required for coverage from 500 to 1300 weeks. A critical reform, the elimination of the special pension regimes, was taken out of the 2002 reforms by the Congress and also failed to pass in the October 2003 referendum. These regimes account for approximately 50 percent of the benefits in the public pension system and allow some workers to contribute for less than a year to receive a pension at 55 (50 for women) that is 90 percent of their highest salary. Other reforms required would eliminate the Mesada 14 (an additional allotment given to pensioners as a way to secure their savings against inflation, which prior to the late nineties averaged 20 percent per year) and standardize the minimum benefit at a level below the minimum monthly wage of approximately USD 1500 a year (which represents the current floor for pension benefits). In addition a major element of the proposed reforms would have been to remove the tax exempt status of pension beneficiaries. Had the full reforms sought in the 2002 draft law or in the 2004 referendum vote been approved, the pension system would have significantly moved toward long-term balance. In addition, such reforms would have made the private pension plans, which are adequately funded, more attractive, thereby reducing the number of individuals in the public system. Instead, the GOC will give the Social Security Institute 713 Billion pesos to cover the second half of 2004. CURRENT REFORM PLANS 5. (SBU) Vice Minister of Social Protection, Jairo Nunez, told econoff that the Presidentially-mandated commission to reform the pension system has agreed on four main areas for action. First, the public and private sector agree that Mesada 14 is an exceptional drain. President Uribe disagrees because he understands it is an important political issue and has stated that it can not be completely cut. Second, there is universal agreement that special regimes, especially for some government workers and oil workers, must be cut. The government has said that special regimes for the military will continue, though there are some that believe that these benefits should be reduced. Third, discussions concerning a reduction in the minimum pension will be politically difficult, yet the savings to the system are critical. Finally, there are many workers under special contracts that receive benefits not contained in the basic system, which the commission believes should be cut. 6. (SBU) These excessive benefits are bankrupting the system. For example, 16 percent of pension costs go just to pay Mesada 14, and 60 percent of public-sector pensioners receive the minimum pension which is the same as their last monthly, working wage. Minister of Social Protection Diego Palacio believes that fully reforming the system could reduce the fiscal deficit by about USD 700 million in the short run while also stabilizing the system for 20 to 25 years. According to Minister Palacio, eliminating the Mesada would save the GOC USD 19 million in the first year while minimum salary reforms could save USD 46 million. 7. (SBU) Minister of Finance Carrasquilla, while announcing the goals of the multi-sectoral commission, urged the public to understand the fiscal importance of these reforms. Minister Palacio echoed this and cast the issue as a rational decision for the Congress -- either reform the system or let the government go bankrupt. The administration hopes such arguments, and close cooperation with Congressmen on the multi-sectoral commission, will allow the reforms to go through Congress quickly. Some reforms, such as lowering the minimum level of pensions and taxing pensions, require constitutional amendment which require eight separate votes over two different Congresses. If successful in the March-June congressional session (majority vote by quorum of legislators), the bill would also have to pass by a qualified majority (majority of total members) in the July-December session. According to many observers, the most costly (both politically and fiscally) of the reforms, the elimination of Mesada 14 and, most especially the establishment of a minimum pension, will not pass. Vice Minister Nunez suggested that the next step would be to tax Mesada 14 at such a high rate that it is virtually eliminated (but President Uribe opposes this). In addition, the commission is considering a scaled system where lower pensions would receive a full month's wages and those with higher pensions would receive a lower percentage of their final salary. COMMENT 8. (SBU) Only 20 percent of the population is covered under the current pension system, yet public pensions cost about 3.4 percent of GDP. This number will grow to 6 percent in 2010, in effect consuming all new revenues projected from the 2002/2003 tax reforms. Opinions within government as to the possibility of pension reform are split. An official at the central bank noted that he is not optimistic about passage of any pension reforms while a senior official at the Ministry of Finance noted that pension reforms will face a hard fight, but that they will pass. On March 15, legislators within the multi-sectoral commission formed by President Uribe announced its intention to support legislative reforms which would eliminate special pension regimes and Mesada 14 benefits for new retirees while maintaining them for existing pensioners. Other issues, such as reducing the minimum pension level and taxing pensions, were put on the back burner. Despite government assurances to the contrary, political difficulties will prevent a definitive solution to the problem. At best the politically acceptable reforms are likely to delay the pension system reckoning day. END COMMENT. DRUCKER
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