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| Identifier: | 04LILONGWE179 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04LILONGWE179 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Lilongwe |
| Created: | 2004-03-02 21:09:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |
| Tags: | EFIN ECON PGOV MI Development Economic |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 LILONGWE 000179 SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPT FOR AF/S, AF/EPS, EB/IFD/OMA TREASURY FOR IMF AND WORLD BANK EXEC DIRECTORS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EFIN, ECON, PGOV, MI, Development, Economic SUBJECT: MALAWI: DONORS SPLIT OVER BANK AND FUND PROGRAMS Summary ------- 1. (SBU) Minster of Finance Jumbe made a pitch on March 1 for donors to support Malawi's IMF and World Bank programs. Stating that statistical discrepancies in its submission to the Fund have been largely resolved, Jumbe claimed that Malawi has made progress on its macroeconomic stabilization program and needs assistance to make further progress. Repeated failures to meet targets, foot-dragging on agreed upon goals, and questionable financial submissions by the GOM have depleted donor confidence, and a split has emerged among donors over whether a "tough love" approach is the best way to move forward. Although we are mindful of Malawi's need for assistance and do not wish to scuttle the Bank's Structural Adjustment Credit, we continue to question GOM commitment to its macroeconomic program, and judge that resuming disbursements now without significant fiscal and structural progress would send the wrong signals to those who will be elected in May. End summary. GOM, World Bank Make a Pitch to the Bilateral Donors --------------------------------------------- ------- 2. (U) On March 1, Minister of Finance Jumbe briefed bilateral donors on the GOM's progress with its IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and with the World Bank's proposed $50 million Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC, sometimes referred to as FIMAG) for Malawi. Representatives from Norway, Britain, the EU, Germany, and Canada were present, as was World Bank Country Manger Dunstan Wai and a staff member from the local IMF office. The Ambassador, AID Director, and Econoff attended for the U.S. Mission. 3. (U) Wai opened the meeting by stating that "a pattern of inconsistencies" in the GOM's data submissions to the IMF had led to donor doubts about performance under the PRGF. Wai noted that the World Bank was seeking a "comfort letter" from the IMF regarding Malawi's macroeconomic performance before going forward with the SAC, and, given that linkage, that bilateral donor doubts had the potential to affect the timing and substance of the SAC. He suggested that the meeting be used to clarify recent GOM actions. 4. (SBU) In response, Minister Jumbe stated that statistical discrepancies in the GOM's submissions to the IMF came from a succession of estimates and "tentative figures," rather than actual returns. He stated that the GOM had repeatedly corrected errors, that there "was nothing funny" in the numbers, and that, after a verification exercise, the discrepancy had been reduced from 3.2 billion Malawi Kwacha ($29 million) to MK 227 million ($2 million). (Note: The fact that the IMF has not given a quantitative evaluation locally for months, and the continuing absence of an IMF Resident Representative, has not helped matters. We would suggest that it would be in the IMF's, and the GOM's, best interests to place a temporary representative in Malawi during this crucial time for the PRGF.) 5. (SBU) Outlining overall performance, Jumbe acknowledged that the GOM had spent beyond its fiscal targets as of December, but stated that factors "beyond our control," such as higher-than-expected interest payments, had caused the overexpenditure. He placed ultimate blame squarely on the donors, stating that "if we had received donor funds, we would have lowered interest rates and made our budget." On the GOM's performance toward PRGF "prior actions" and structural criteria, Jumbe claimed that significant progress is being made. 6. (SBU) Jumbe also stated that the proposed Supplemental Budget was at an advanced stage, and that it would be submitted to Parliament within the next three weeks. He stated that, despite a MK 6 billion in extra domestic revenue, the budget would call for authorization of a MK 11 billion ($100 million) deficit, a significant change from the MK 3 billion surplus targeted for FY 2003/04. He cited MK 7 billion in missing donor support, unbudgeted interest expenses, and MK 3 billion in new development budget expenses as the primary components of the spending swing. (Comment: While we will have to wait to see the complete budget for a proper evaluation, the spending swing and enormous proposed deficit cast doubt on both fiscal discipline and the program's overall effectiveness.) 7. (SBU) Jumbe plainly stated that "Malawi needs help" and pitched that "things are not so bad." He asked for donor support for the Fund and Bank programs to help "those of us" behind the macroeconomic stabilization program (a reference we took to exclude President Muluzi). He also made a veiled threat that the collapse of the Bank and Fund programs could compromise the conduct of May's Presidential and Parliamentary elections. Donors Split Over Way Forward ----------------------------- 8. (SBU) In this meeting and in other recent exchanges, divisions have appeared among the donors over how to deal with GOM performance and its Fund and Bank programs. Repeated failures to meet program criteria, foot-dragging on structural reforms requiring primarily political will (i.e., strengthening the Corrupt Practices Act or publishing of a report on last year's maize scandals), questionable data submissions to the IMF and CABS group, and a penchant for blaming the donors for missed targets have contributed to a general deterioration of confidence in the GOM and a willingness to delay or suspend programs while waiting for performance improvements. At the same time, however, it is recognized that Malawi's economy is fragile and that the poor would bear the brunt of aid cuts. Different levels of tolerance for the humanitarian risks involved, and emotional and financial investments in cherished development projects, have split the donors. Nor are the donors in agreement on whether our focus should be on sending the right signals to May's incoming government or salvaging what we can from the current one. 9. (SBU) The breakdown by donors, by tolerance for a "tough love" approach, is as follows: --Norway has shown the least tolerance for a "tough love" approach, and the Norwegian Ambassador showed great frustration during the meeting that more aid was not reaching schools and hospitals. His personal frustration may also reflect the impending visit of Norway's Minister of Development, who is reportedly less sympathetic to Malawi's case than the Ambassador. Norway has made bilateral disbursements since the October PRGF review, and has discussed the idea of basing all of its 2004/05 disbursements on the current CABS review in order to provide "predictability" to GOM aid inflows. --The UK appears to be internally split, with some Department of International Development (DfID) staff wishing to disburse their last 5 million pound tranche of support, and others (including the High Commissioner) taking a tougher line. The High Commissioner told the Ambassador today that while the donors -- including the Fund and the Bank -- "can't walk away" from Malawi, the GOM needs to "bend over backwards" to restore its credibility and open a path forward. The UK is in a particularly difficult spot vis-a-vis the release of its last aid tranche, as its aid is conditioned on the IMF's assessment, but no assessment is likely to be forthcoming before the end-March close of the British fiscal year. --Though not represented on the Fund or Bank Executive Boards, the EU has been relatively forgiving on GOM fiscal performance but has take a tough public and private line regarding GOM failures to implement structural reforms. The EU is funding, for example, the audit of arrears required as a PRGF "prior action," and the GOM's dragging-out of the audit contract's signing (which took approximately eight months of negotiations) have grated on EU sensibilities. So have the GOM's delays in providing reliable fiscal data to the CABS group, which have delayed the formalizing of the CABS group's current assessment by more than two weeks. --To contacts throughout the government, the U.S. Ambassador has stated that for real development to occur, the GOM needs to do what is necessary to energize Malawi's private sector and to reassure investors that sufficient anti-corruption measures are being taken. Keeping fiscal and structural pledges to the IMF would aid that effort, and he has stressed that measures which require primarily political will (like the PRGF structural conditions dealing with corruption) serve as a litmus test for outside observers and potential investors. The aim, he has stated, is to avoid the dynamic fostered by the donors' repeated willingness to "lower the bar" for the GOM -- a dynamic that continues to undercut the Fund program (with negative consequences for growth and poverty reduction) and has sustained donor dependency. He has urged other donors to remember that the signals we send about keeping commitments today will define our relationship with May's new administration. --Canada, as represented by CIDA, has also pushed the message that the donor-GOM dynamic, where the GOM is not held to its commitments, is unhealthy and must be changed. CIDA has reserved its harshest criticism, though, for the Fund and the Bank's unrealistic assumptions and projections, which have been put in place for internal bureaucratic Bank and Fund purposes (and to which the GOM has been complicit in order to keep up funding), but which set up the GOM to fail in succeeding reviews. Comment ------- 10. (SBU) The World Bank clearly engineered the meeting between the Minister of Finance and bilateral donors to resolve lingering questions about GOM performance and to build support for the SAC among Executive Board member countries. With Malwi's case already having been delayed once for the World Bank Executive Board, the effort comes very late, and as one EU contact put it, "Confidence can't be restored by organizing one meeting...." 11. (SBU) Confidence in the GOM indeed remains a key question for us. We continue to question GOM commitment to its macroeconomic stabilization plan, as evinced by repeated failures to meet fiscal and structural criteria. And while we do not seek to scuttle Malawi's Bank and fund programs, resuming disbursements now absent progress on fiscal and structural criteria would undercut our long- term development goals in Malawi. BROWNING
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