US embassy cable - 04DJIBOUTI291

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2ND REQUEST FOR REACTIVATION OF A MARINE SECURITY GUARD DETACHMENT IN DJIBOUTI

Identifier: 04DJIBOUTI291
Wikileaks: View 04DJIBOUTI291 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Djibouti
Created: 2004-03-02 14:09:00
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Tags: ASEC PTER DJ
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T DJIBOUTI 000291 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR AF/EX, AF/E, DS/DSS/IP, DS/IP/AF, DS/SPC/MSG, 
DS/IP/MSG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: EXEMPT 1.6 X1 AND X8 
TAGS: ASEC, PTER, DJ 
SUBJECT: 2ND REQUEST FOR REACTIVATION OF A MARINE SECURITY 
GUARD DETACHMENT IN DJIBOUTI 
 
REF: 03 DJIBOUTI 988 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MARGUERITA RAGSDALE FOR REASON 1.5 
(C)AND (G) 
 
1. (U) Ambassador Ragsdale supports REFTEL request that a 
Marine Security Guard Detachment (MSG DET) be re-activated at 
American Embassy Djibouti.  Embassy Djibouti submitted REFTEL 
in May of 2003 and, to date, has not received an official 
reply.  The following justification for an MSG DET is 
resubmitted. 
 
2. (S/NF) The establishment of the only U.S. Military base in 
Sub-Saharan Africa has placed numerous demands for resources 
and information on the Embassy that has resulted in an 
increase in the processing, storage and dissemination of 
classified material at the highest levels.  ORCA has 
established a permanent Station at the Embassy and with it 
the ability to receive and disseminate information at a 
TS/SCI level. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
3. (S/NF) The security of the Station and its classified 
material is of great concern to Post management as well as to 
the RSO and COS.  Recent activity, outlined in intelligence 
reporting, clearly indicates that the capability of foreign 
intelligence services to mount a technical intelligence 
attack exists within Djibouti.  RSO, ORCA and U.S. MIL/INTEL 
all agree that it is a matter of time before a HUMINT/TECHINT 
attack is carried out by several intelligence sources in 
country.  The presence of the Chinese, Libyan, Russian, 
French and other nations, with a long history of hostile 
intelligence operations, is a clear indicator that the 
probability for such an attack to be carried out is greater 
now than ever before.  The existing threat, coupled with a 
lock and leave facility plagued with constant technical 
difficulties, is a simple formula for the compromise of 
national security information. 
 
4. (S/NF) Due to the sensitivity of intelligence operations 
at Post, COS supports the reactivation of an MSG DET and has 
indicated this through separate channels.  The COS's report 
underscores Post's deep concerns and the critical need for an 
MSG DET.  In addition, Djibouti's status as a front-line 
country in the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) makes it 
extremely difficult for Post to have an effective walk-in 
program absent the presence of an MSG DET. 
 
5. (SBU) Post is cognizant of the large cost that goes 
hand-in-hand with establishing an MSG DET.  Post points out 
however, that the former MSG DET in Djibouti was deactivated 
in 1997 and that much of the physical infrastructure required 
to begin operations currently exists.  Post One is complete 
and fully operational with upgraded equipment.  Although the 
former Marine house has been converted into office space, 
adequate housing exists in the City of Djibouti that can 
easily accommodate 5 watch standers and still meet the 
security and social needs of the Detachment.  In addition, 
the Ambassador has indicated her willingness to release the 
current CMR, located on the compound, for use of the MSG 
Detachment, should OBO and DS concur on an off compound CMR. 
The current CMR can be easily renovated to meet the standards 
of an MSGR.  Office space for a Detachment Commander and a 
react room for the Marines can be converted from existing 
space. 
 
6. (S) Ambassador Ragsdale request the Department give strong 
consideration to raising Djibouti's priority level for 
receiving an MSG DET.  The Ambassador feels that the security 
situation in Djibouti will continue to be highly fluid and 
without an MSG DET to help protect our National Security 
Information, Embassy Djibouti will be vulnerable to an attack 
on several levels.  Should the Embassy suffer a catastrophic 
event Post will be unable to provide adequately the proper 
amount of resources needed to secure the facility while 
dealing with numerous problems an emergency action will 
generate. 
 
7. (U) POC is RSO Marc Ramos at 253-35-39-95 ext. 2307 or 
253-35-26-73 (secure). 
RAGSDALE 

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