US embassy cable - 04MANAMA283

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000283 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CAIRO FOR U/S GROSSMAN AND DAS ROMANOWSKI 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO PDAS LAROCCO AND DAS DIBBLE, NEA/PI, 
NEA/ARP, AND DRL/PHD 
CAIRO ALSO FOR STEVE BONDY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2029 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, PHUM, BA 
SUBJECT: DEMOCRACY IS HARD WORK ... EVEN IN BAHRAIN 
 
REF: A. MANAMA 268 
 
     B. MANAMA 237 
     C. MANAMA 200 
 
Classified By: CDA Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4(b)(d). 
 
SUMMARY 
 
1.(C)  A democratically inexperienced GOB is learning just 
how messy democracy can be.  Besides dealing with the 
boycotting opposition, both elected and appointed 
parliamentarians are challenging the government over alleged 
scandals and failures.  Sunni Islamists are asserting 
themselves in directions that are beginning to cause 
discomfort among Bahrain's ruling elite.  At least one senior 
official may be contemplating resignation because he doesn't 
enjoy public criticism.  On the other hand, top business 
leaders are beginning to criticize publicly some Islamist 
initiatives that business leaders think could harm business 
prospects.  Manama is a small place, and its crowded 
political circuits are starting to get hot.  Overall, the 
GOB's reaction appears to be one of slowing the pace of 
political reform.  This is having an impact on MEPI programs, 
requiring the Embassy to spend much more time than 
anticipated massaging the system to obtain positive program 
outcomes.  END SUMMARY 
 
GOB JEKYL OR HYDE ... WHICH ONE RULES TODAY? 
 
2.(C) Throughout the last three years of reforms, the GOB has 
often seemed to have a split personality.  The King has 
implemented a new constitution that provides some elements of 
democracy to the Bahraini people.  The Royal Court sponsors 
NDI's work in Bahrain and the King is driving force behind 
Bahrain's negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement with the U.S. 
The King has repeatedly stated that he welcomes proposals to 
amend the new constitution through the system detailed 
therein. The government usually has handled pressures from 
the boycotting opposition with tact and reserve.  The King 
has restrained his security forces, releasing and, when 
necessary, pardoning youths arrested for participating in 
violent demonstrations. 
 
3.(C) On the other hand, the Government has shown in recent 
months a tendency to regress to pre-reform behavior.  The 
government has intimidated meeting hall owners into canceling 
scheduled public political events.  In November, the GOB 
quickly moved to shut down the political satire "Laysh Abu al 
Aysh" (but ultimately failed as the opposition quickly 
erected an outdoor theater on a vacant lot).  Two weeks ago, 
it obstructed the holding a constitutional conference as 
reported ref B.  As we noted in this year's human rights 
report, press censorship and journalist self-censorship 
remain constant problems. 
 
PARLIAMENT, SUNNI ISLAMISTS ALSO CHALLENGE THE GOVERNMENT 
 
4.(C) While trying to muzzle those who boycott the existing 
political system, the government is also grappling with the 
consequences of the political reforms to date.  The 
GOSI/Pension Fund investigation could very well lead to 
parliament's removal of a minister through a vote of 
no-confidence (ref C), and members who successfully uncovered 
the mismanagement of the pension funds have announced new 
investigations of corruption and mismanagement.  Meanwhile, 
Sunni Islamist deputies are spearheading a new effort to 
question the Information Minister about the production in 
Bahrain of a reality TV show in which six young unmarried 
Arab men are living in the same house with six unmarried 
young Arab women (septel).  Even the appointed upper house of 
Parliament, the Shura Council, is getting into the act.  It 
trashed the government's draft press law in favor of a more 
liberal version prepared by one of the Council's members. 
 
5.(C) Government officials, top business leaders, and ruling 
family members are beginning to complain that the GOB may 
have stepped into a real mess with political reform, and some 
are even blaming the USG. A top MFA official and 
well-connected member of the ruling family told Staffdel 
Clark on February 14 that he deeply resented Sunni Islamist 
activities to limit social freedoms saying there was no way 
he would allow religious conservatives to dictate his wife's 
choice of apparel.  A leading resterauteur and tourism 
promoter bitterly complained to P/E Chief about government 
constantly conceding to Islamist demands to restrict alcohol 
sales.  Meanwhile a top Finance Ministry official told Charge 
that the Finance Minister may resign soon because of the 
public criticism he has endured over the Pension Fund 
scandal.  According to our contact, the minister just doesn't 
want to deal with personal public criticism.  Vandals are now 
painting barbs on the walls of the minister's (luxurious) 
villa, this exasperated source exclaimed. 
REFORM PACE SLOWING? 
6.(C) We are seeing signs that the GOB is rethinking the pace 
at which it will implement reform.  Last Spring, PAS began 
actively recruiting a U.S. political scientist Fulbrighter to 
help the University of Bahrain found a new political science 
faculty and program.  When we succeeded and notified the 
university, we discovered that a political science program is 
no longer in the university's near term plans.  It took 
extensive work to obtain university approval to seat the 
Fulbrighter in the business school where he's going to teach 
a course on globalization only.  Similarly, when PAO recently 
previewed to our main reform-minded education ministry 
interlocutor new MEPI programs, he told her point blank that 
Bahrain is not ready for civic education in the schools.  He 
cautioned Bahrain could not move too fast. 
 
7.(C) Meanwhile, both MEPI-funded political program managers 
have reported to us that their GoB contacts are stressing the 
need to go slowly and carefully.  As noted ref A, the Justice 
Minister wants to "low-profile" the ABA technical assistance 
program because he has discovered opposition from Sunni 
Islamists within the ministry to American technical 
assistance to change the judicial system.  He wants to move 
forward, but not at the risk of a flank counterattack. 
Concurrently, the influential Minister of the Royal Court, 
Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa, emphatically told NDI in 
January not to include a representative of the boycotting 
Shi'a opposition party al-Wefaq in NDI's April Muslim 
democracies conference in Istanbul.  The NDI rep has also 
said that Shaikh Khaled would prefer that NDI made developing 
the democratic skills of the government and National Assembly 
NDI's top priority over training opposition political 
activists. 
 
COMMENT 
 
8.(C) The GOB is struggling at multiple levels to manage 
political reform while maintaining the political stability it 
needs to attract investment that creates jobs.  One one side, 
the boycotting opposition's desire for more radical political 
change and its refusal to participate challenge the new 
system's legitimacy.  On the other side, the new political 
system has produced an increasingly aggressive parliament 
intent on proving its relevance (and that of the new system) 
to the Bahraini people by bringing down a minister and 
pushing for more reform.  The Sunni Islamist bloc in the 
parliament is asserting itself in directions that are 
beginning to create discomfort among Bahrain's elite. The GOB 
appears to be responding by slowing the pace of, but not 
altering its commitment to, reform.  The GOB, we sense, wants 
time to find solutions.  As we inject MEPI programs into this 
mix, the GOB is responding more cautiously, and the Embassy 
must spend increasing amounts of time to work with MEPI 
contractors and the GOB to achieve positive program outcomes. 
 END COMMENT. 
 
FORD