US embassy cable - 04MADRID679

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 000679 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2014 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, SP, Spanish Election March 2004 
SUBJECT: SPANISH ELECTIONS: CONCERNS ABOUT AN ETA ATTACK 
 
Classified By: Kathleen Fitzpatrick, Polcouns, per 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C)  Spanish police are concerned that ETA may strike in 
the period before the March 14 national elections.    Juan 
Hidalgo, Senior Advisor to the State Secretary for Security, 
told us February 26 that ETA's recent announcement of a 
"cease-fire" in Catalonia meant that it might seek to strike 
elsewhere in Spain during the electoral campaign to show that 
the Catalonia cease-fire matters.    Senior Popular Party 
(PP) contacts, including an official from the Ministry of 
Public Administration and a campaign strategist, expressed 
similar concerns.   They said that ETA seeks to inject itself 
into electoral campaign and would like to strike to show that 
it is still operational. 
 
2.  (C) Hidalgo confirmed that ETA is in poor operational 
shape.  The arrests of 126 ETA members and collaborators in 
Spain in 2003, combined with dozens of high level arrests in 
France had dealt major blows.   Members of ETA's operation 
terrorist cells now have an active period of only months 
before they are caught, Hidalgo said.    This is causing 
consternation in ETA's ranks.   Hidalgo said that unlike in 
the past, new ETA recruits are often little more than street 
criminals, who are prone to mistakes.    Despite all this, 
Hidalgo underlined that ETA still maintains the capacity to 
strike.    It only takes one functioning cell to plant bombs 
or conduct an assassination.   Hidalgo said police had been 
able to foil attacks, such as suitcase bombs on Spanish 
trains on December 24, which might have proven very bloody ) 
but this could not go on indefinitely. 
 
3.  (C) Hidalgo spends considerable time coordinating ETA 
matters with French police.  He confirmed that cooperation 
with the French is at a high level.    This cooperation had 
been improving steadily since the mid 1990s and has gotten 
better since 9-11.   Hidalgo confirmed that that Mikel Antza 
and Josu Ternera (fugitive Batasuna member of Basque regional 
parliament) are the political heads of ETA.    He said there 
are differing views on who the overall ETA "military command" 
leader is.   It is difficult to know for sure, he said, given 
the arrests over the past year in France of top operational 
leaders.   Hidalgo could not confirm that it was Antza and 
Ternera (rather than other ETA reps) who met with Catalan 
nationalist ERC leader Carod-Rovira in early January in 
France, as has been widely reported. 
 
4.  (C) Hidalgo did not believe that ETA, as its operational 
capacities decline further, would opt for ever bloodier and 
more indiscriminate attacks (as some predict).   Hidalgo felt 
that with over 500 ETA prisoners in Spanish jails, ETA would 
want to keep the possibility open of, under terms of 
surrender, getting GOS agreement to move ETA prisoners to 
prisons in the Basque region so they could be near their 
families.  (The ETA prisoners are currently scattered 
throughout Spain as a security measure). 
 
5.  (C) Comment: The Popular Party and its candidate, Mariano 
Rajoy (a former Interior Minister), have made GOS success in 
the fight against ETA a central issue.   An ETA attack, even 
a serious one, however, would not necessarily harm Rajoy and 
the PP in the elections, as it could underscore the need for 
a continued firm hand against ETA.  ETA's primary goal, 
rather than influencing the election outcome, would appear to 
be to use an attack during the high-profile finale of the 
national election to demonstrate that, despite the police