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| Identifier: | 04ISTANBUL295 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04ISTANBUL295 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Consulate Istanbul |
| Created: | 2004-02-26 12:18:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV CY TU Istanbul |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ISTANBUL 000295 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2014 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, CY, TU, Istanbul SUBJECT: TURKISH FIRST ARMY COMMANDER ON US/TURKEY RELATIONS, CYPRUS, GME Classified By: Consul General David Arnett for Reasons 1.5(b&d) 1. (u) Summary: During the course of a February 26 courtesy call by the Ambassador, First Army Commander General Buyukanit offered his views on U.S.-Turkish military-to-military relations, the ongoing Cyprus negotiations, and the Greater Middle East. End Summary. Mil-Mil Relations ----------------- 2. (c) Buyukanit noted that the March 1, 2003, vote in the Turkish Parliament had been a major setback to relations. As the then-Deputy Chairman of the Turkish General Staff (TGS), he recalled having worked around the clock for several days in the lead-up to the vote. As a result, Buyukanit took it personally when Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz later "criticized" the Turkish military in a CNN Turk interview for not demonstrating sufficient leadership. Buyukanit defended the TGS, but concluded that he saw the whole incident as a "black spot" on his career. The Ambassador reassured the General that we understand there were many factors which contributed to the parliamentary vote and that Wolfowitz remains one of Turkey's strongest supporters. 3. (c) The Ambassador added that much of the damage to the relationship has already been repaired with renewed contacts and a resumption of the High-Level Planning Group (HLPG) meetings. Buyukanit expressed his satisfaction with the resumption of the HLPG meetings and suggested that such meetings adopt the broad, "strategic" focus that characterized the bilateral exchanges in the 1980s. The Ambassador agreed and noted that the November HLPG had included such a discussion on Iraq. Following up on these talks with other discussions between regular HLPG meetings would also be important to maintaining a healthy dialogue. The upcoming visit of DOD Jim Townsend to Turkey would be one such useful opportunity. The June NATO Summit in Istanbul would be yet another opportunity for high-level discussions. Cyprus ------ 4. (c) Initially reluctant to comment on the ongoing negotiations in Cyprus (an issue on which he had spent "years" and had "hundreds" of meetings), Buyukanit did note that he sees the island as "strategically" important only as it relates to Turkey's EU membership. "What will happen if (there is a solution and) Turkey does not join the EU?," he asked. As for the ongoing talks, Buyukanit urged caution to ensure that "today's solutions not become tomorrow's problems." With a few "necessary modifications" (nfi), the plan could work. Moreover, Buyukanit added, "I know" that when UNSYG Annan sits down to "fill in the blanks" on the plan, that it is "really the U.S. and the U.K." that will be calling the shots. The Ambassador expressed confidence that Turkey will eventually be an EU member and that a durable Cyprus settlement can be found. The U.S. has a role, the Ambassador admitted, but it would be UNSYG Annan who makes the final decisions on the details of unresolved elements of the plan. Greater Middle East ------------------- 5. (c) The Ambassador sketched the background and thinking that underlies a new USG focus and commitment to support democratic and economic reform in the Greater Middle East (GME). Buyukanit agreed that Turkey would be one of the prime beneficiaries of greater stability and democracy in this region. Disavowing the much-discussed notion that Turkey can be a "model," Buyukanit argued that if the U.S. succeeds there, Iraq itself could be the model for Saudi Arabia, Syria, and other countries in the region. Buyukanit singled out the Israeli-Palestinian dispute as particularly intractable and commented that the U.S. would have a critical role to play here and in the whole region. ARNETT
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