US embassy cable - 04BOGOTA1980

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

NOTES FROM THE FIELD: MEDELLIN

Identifier: 04BOGOTA1980
Wikileaks: View 04BOGOTA1980 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Bogota
Created: 2004-02-25 21:42:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PTER PHUM KJUS EAID CO UN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 001980 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PHUM, KJUS, EAID, CO, UN 
SUBJECT: NOTES FROM THE FIELD: MEDELLIN 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, Reasons: 1.5 B & D. 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Poloff visited Colombia's vibrant second 
city, Medellin, February 11-12.  National Police commander 
Ruben Carrillo noted a continued downward trend in violent 
crime and a lack of recidivism on the part of reinserted 
former paramilitary fighters.  Mayor Sergio Fajardo 
complained that the GOC lacked a coordinated plan to 
effectively implement reinsertions and did not provide 
Medellin with adequate resources for the task.  Archbishop 
Alberto Giraldo was cautiously optimistic about an accord 
with the ELN guerrilla group but was pessimistic about 
negotiating with the FARC.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) National Police (CNP) Brigadier General Ruben 
Carrillo, who assumed the post of Medellin division commander 
in November 2003, highlighted that February 10 had been the 
first day under his watch that no homicide had occurred in 
the metropolitan area.  He said that virtually all forms of 
violent crime--with the exception of armed robberies of small 
businesses--continued to decline on a monthly basis. 
Carrillo cited excellent police-military cooperation and 
ongoing joint sweeps (large scale arrests) as keys in the 
dismantling of local guerrilla and paramilitary networks. 
Regarding the nearly 900 locally "reinserted" former fighters 
of the AUC paramilitary group's Cacique Nutibara Bloc, 
Carrillo stated that to date only four had been arrested on 
charges of carrying an illegal weapon. 
 
3.  (C) Archbishop Alberto Giraldo, a member of the Church's 
National Conciliation Commission (CCN), expressed cautious 
optimism about the potential for a peace accord with the ELN 
guerrilla group.  He was skeptical, however, with regard to 
dialogue with the FARC.  Giraldo noted that UN Special Envoy 
James LeMoyne had been unable to start discussions with the 
FARC, claiming that LeMoyne felt "used" by the guerrilla 
group.  Giraldo called attention to the final statement of 
the early February annual meeting of the Colombian Episcopal 
Conference.  The bishops announced that all individual Church 
contacts with illegal groups were undertaken in the name of 
the Church as a whole.  Giraldo expressed satisfaction that 
violence against church officials and lay workers was down 
substantially in the past year, with the notable exception of 
the dioceses of Arauca (Arauca) and Tibu (Norte de Santander). 
 
4.  (C) Medellin Mayor Sergio Fajardo, a University of 
Wisconsin mathematics Ph.D. and a relative political novice, 
said the first reinsertion of former paramilitary fighters 
had been a success, but worried that the national government 
did not have a coordinated plan to organize and finance 
additional demobilizations.  Regarding national peace process 
issues, Fajardo felt that the conditional parole bill 
currently in the Congress was likely to pass.  When asked how 
local residents viewed negotiations with former fighters, 
Fajardo opined that the vast majority of Medellin residents 
would accept less on the punishment scale were it to 
guarantee an end to the conflict.  He stressed, however, that 
he did not plan to speak out nationally on peace process 
issues.  (Comment:  Nevertheless, on February 15, Fajardo's 
government secretary, Alonso Salazar, publicly called for 
truth commissions and reparations by former fighters involved 
in the Medellin process.  GOC Peace Commissioner Restrepo 
dismissed the call for truth commissions as "populist" and 
urged the Medellin government to work more closely with the 
GOC to implement a community-based reparation program.  End 
Comment.) 
 
5.  (C) Fajardo planned to focus on job creation and 
improving education and infrastructure.  He worried, however, 
that Medellin's traditional political elite would attempt to 
stymie his social agenda.  Fajardo hails from a well-known 
local family, and was education secretary during part of 
then-Antioquia governor Alvaro Uribe's administration.  He 
ran his mayoral campaign, however, as a political outsider by 
using the leftist "Indigenous Social Alliance" banner. 
Fajardo expressed respect for and friendship with Bogota 
Mayor Luis Eduardo Garzon, but stressed that he was not a 
member of Garzon's Polo Democratico Independiente 
(Independent Democratic Party).  He was appreciative of 
ongoing USAID-financed democracy, transparency, and human 
rights programs in Medellin. 
 
6.  (C) Antioquia Governor Anibal Gaviria, who has no formal 
involvement in peace process issues, talked up potential 
foreign investment.  He was particularly interested in 
promoting the timber industry.  On the social side, he hoped 
to redouble the department's youth nutrition program, which 
he described as a model for Latin America.  He lamented  that 
in spite of the prosperous picture painted by Medellin, some 
three million of Antioquia's five million residents lived in 
poverty, with one million in extreme poverty.  (Comment: 
Gaviria's brother, Guillermo, the previous governor, was 
kidnapped by the FARC in 2002 and assassinated during a 
botched GOC rescue attempt in May 2003.  Gaviria's rivals 
have launched a legal challenge to his election, arguing that 
Colombian law prevents a blood relative from subsequently 
holding the same office, unless the incumbent steps down one 
year prior to the election.  Our interlocutors are mixed in 
their predictions as to how the courts might rule.  End 
Comment.) 
WOOD 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04