US embassy cable - 04RANGOON252

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000252 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, BM 
SUBJECT: EU REPS MEET WITH BURMESE PM IN RANGOON 
 
 
Classified By: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.5 (B/D). 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  EU ambassadors resident in Rangoon and 
Bangkok met recently with the Burmese Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister.  The EU ambassadors assured COM that the 
meeting was not for the purpose of delivering any new EU 
policy message.  COM cautioned them that they needed to be 
extremely careful of letting the regime think it could expand 
the comfort zone that it has been steadily building with 
ASEAN, China, and India, into the EU, and urged them not to 
let the regime spin the meeting as a public show of EU 
support for the road map or as a follow-on to the "Bangkok 
Process."  The EU reps said that unless there was some 
significant change in the political circumstances before 
April 2004 there was no initiative afoot to either soften or 
harden the EU Common Position.  It seems that the EU 
assemblage was careful not to send the signal that the 
regime's current "democratization" efforts are being viewed 
through the same rose-colored glasses worn by ASEAN, China 
and India.  The non-resident EU ambassadors seemed more 
frustrated with the slow progress and lack of time frame for 
the road map than those who are resident and used to "SPDC 
time", especially when it comes to any commitment to the 
release of ASSK.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) On Monday, February 23, EU ambassadors resident in 
Rangoon and Bangkok met with Prime Minister Khin Nyunt and 
Foreign Minister Win Aung.  As the FonMin emphasized during 
the meeting, this was the first time that the PM had met with 
a group of ambassadors since taking over his new position on 
August 30 (FYI: in fact, for most, if not all, of the EU 
ambassadors at the meeting, even those resident in Rangoon, 
it was the first time they had met with Khin Nyunt in his 
guise as Secretary 1 or as Prime Minister, except for those 
few who had met him in a cursory protocol encounter when they 
presented their credentials.  End FYI.) 
 
3. (C) The COM met with the EU ambassadors just prior to 
their meeting with the PM.  The COM urged the assembled group 
to be very careful not to let the regime spin the meeting 
with the PM as a show of EU support for the road map or as a 
follow-on to the "Bangkok Process."  The EU reps assured the 
COM that the meeting was not for the purpose of delivering 
any new EU policy message.  The COM also cautioned them to be 
extremely careful of letting the regime think it could expand 
the comfort zone that it has been steadily building with 
ASEAN, China, and India into the EU.  The EU reps also said 
that, unless there was some significant change in the 
political circumstances before April 2004, there was no 
initiative afoot to either soften or harden the EU Common 
Position. 
 
4. (C)  The EU reps said they were taking advantage of the 
presence of the assembled group to discuss the possibility of 
establishing an office of the European Commission for 
Humanitarian Assistance (ECHO) in Rangoon to oversee EU 
funded humanitarian projects that are already underway in 
Burma (FYI: It seems that many EU Ambassadors are unhappy 
with the lack of input they have on project 
funding/management as it is all managed, in a somewhat 
high-handed manner, by the head of the European Commission in 
Bangkok. End FYI).  When the opportunity to meet with the PM 
came up, of course they had to take advantage of it. 
 
5. (C) The hour long meeting was mainly taken up with a 55 
minute monologue by the PM on the cultural and political 
history of Burma.  However, as the PM arrived at "current 
events" he did say that "everybody, and I mean everybody" 
will be included in the National Convention.  However, the 
FonMin, in an unusually bold (for the FonMin) intervention, 
corrected the PM to say that "everybody that is eligible to 
participate will participate."  The PM also said that the 
National Convention would probably be convened in fall 2004. 
 
6. (C)  As the PM brought the meeting to a close, the Dutch 
ambassador (the EU rep in Bangkok) was able to claim five 
minutes to make a few points.  He stated that the EU was 
waiting to see what results the road map brings before 
passing judgment.  He also expressed EU support for Special 
Envoy Razali and urged that the regime allow Razali to return 
and carry out his mandate soon.  He emphasized that the 
National Convention could only be viable with the 
participation of the democratic opposition and the ethnic 
groups. 
 
7.  (C) The Dutch ambassador also asked the PM to clarify a 
recent statement attributed to Thai Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra that Aung San Suu Kyi would be released from house 
arrest in October, 2004.  The PM did not give a definitive 
response, saying instead "I am doing everything possible." 
EU reps commented that at least the PM did not try to 
continue the regime's farce that ASSK is not under house 
arrest. 
 
8. (C)  COM was able to corroborate much of the readout of 
the meeting later that evening in a conversation with the 
FonMin at the Brunei National Day Reception.  The FonMin, in 
fact, gave COM a very slightly condensed version of the 
history monologue and repeated that "everybody that is 
eligible to participate will participate." 
 
9. (C) Participating in the meeting with the PM were 
ambassadors of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain, and the Delegation of the 
European Commission (all eight resident in Bangkok), along 
with the ambassadors of Germany, France, Italy, and the 
United Kingdom (resident in Rangoon).  The Irish 
ambassador-designate (accredited and resident in Malaysia) 
was also present for the EU meeting on ECHO operations and 
for the COM's meeting with EU reps.  However, as Ireland has 
not formalized diplomatic relations with the GOB he did not 
attend the meeting with the PM (FYI: Irish ambassador told 
COM he was excluded due to some bumbling but was told the 
following day, at his meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister 
Khin Maung Win, that the PM had been "expecting him" along 
with the other EU reps.  End FYI.) 
 
10. (C) Comment: It seems that the EU assemblage was careful 
not to send the signal that the regime's current 
"democratization" efforts are being viewed through the same 
rose-colored glasses worn by ASEAN, China and India.  The 
regime has not tried to reap any particular PR benefits from 
this meeting as press coverage has been minimal.  The 
non-resident EU ambassadors seemed more frustrated with the 
slow progress and lack of time frame for the road map than 
those who are resident and used to "SPDC time", especially 
when it comes to any commitment to the release of ASSK.  End 
Comment. 
Martinez