US embassy cable - 04ANKARA1060

S E C R E T ANKARA 001060 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2014 
TAGS: KNNP, MNUC, PARM, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: NONPROLIFERATION CONSULTATIONS: TURKEY WILLING, 
BUT IS IT ABLE? 
 
REF: STATE 38506 
 
 
(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch for reasons 1.4, b/d. 
 
 
1. (S) Because the Ambassador's schedule did not allow for a 
timely delivery of reftel points, DCM delivered them to MFA 
Director General for International Security Affairs Morali on 
February 24.  DCM emphasized that the disarmament of Libya 
has created an opportunity to learn more about how the Khan 
network and other proliferators circumvented export controls. 
 Unfortunately this new information also exposed weaknesses 
in Turkey's export and nonproliferation controls, and A/S 
Wolf would be coming to Ankara later in the week to discuss 
potential cooperation in closing these loopholes.  Morali 
replied that Turkey was a determined partner in attempting to 
create as "leakproof an environment as possible".  He noted 
that the appropriate laws and interagency authorities were in 
place, and therefore its system was sound.  Nevertheless, 
Turkey is a large country with porous borders and 100 percent 
control might be impossible.  Morali reiterated that the GOT 
would listen to Wolf with a "very favorable disposition" and 
would welcome any advice on improving export controls.  In 
response to the DCM's suggestion that sanctions might have to 
be discussed, Morali said the US should not be concerned 
about Turkey's readiness to cooperate.  Morali was not able 
to offer much information about who was responsible for 
investigating and penalizing companies suspected of not 
complying with Turkish export controls.  He suggested those 
questions be posed to the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade. 
The DCM plans to meet with the U/S of Foreign Trade February 
25. 
 
 
2. (S) On February 23, Pol-Mil Counselor spoke to MFA Deputy 
DG for Disarmament Ilicak.  According to Ilicak, the GOT 
received information from the IAEA two weeks previously about 
the Turkish trade with Libya and began investigating, but the 
DDG complained that the IAEA did not provide adequate 
information.  He hoped Ankara might receive a photo of the 
labeling so the Turks could discern whether there was data 
that they could use to trace the shipment.  Also, the company 
names the IAEA provided are Teknoelektrik Ticaret and 3E 
Industria Elektronik ve Ticaret Sirketi.  (Comment: These are 
not same as those we have seen in informal channels, although 
Ilicak who was holding a report from the Turkish Mission in 
Vienna during this meeting, did not appear 100 percent sure 
of the names himself.) 
 
 
3. (S) Comment: In Turkey, there often is a gap between 
policy and implementation.  Chronically short on resources 
and know-how, the GOT takes refuge in the belief that its 
exporters are generally above-board.  Morali speculated that 
Turkish goods and technology found in Libya were probably 
dual-use items purchased prior to existing export controls. 
The DCM told Morali he should not be so sure. 
EDELMAN