US embassy cable - 04TEGUCIGALPA1173

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POST RESPONSE TO INQUIRY INTO APRIL 14, 2003 DOWNING OF DRUG TRAFFICKING PLANE BY HONDURAN AIR FORCE

Identifier: 04TEGUCIGALPA1173
Wikileaks: View 04TEGUCIGALPA1173 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Tegucigalpa
Created: 2004-02-24 14:06:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: SNAR MOPS EAIR PGOV HO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 001173 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL DAS MCCARTHY AND INL/LP 
STATE FOR WHA DAS FISK AND WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2014 
TAGS: SNAR, MOPS, EAIR, PGOV, HO 
SUBJECT: POST RESPONSE TO INQUIRY INTO APRIL 14, 2003 
DOWNING OF DRUG TRAFFICKING PLANE BY HONDURAN AIR FORCE 
 
REF: A. USDAO TEGUCIGALPA 242238Z SEP 02 
 
     B. 03 TEGUCIGALPA 913 
     C. 03 TEGUCIGALPA 924 
     D. CDR USSOUTHCOM 1723949Z APR 03 
     E. USDAO TEGUCIGALPA 211321Z APR 03 
     F. 03 STATE 101059 
     G. 03 TEGUCIGALPA 986 
     H. 03 TEGUCIGALPA 1173 
     I. 03 STATE 144757 
     J. 03 TEGUCIGALPA 1499 
     K. CDR USSOUTHCOM 182214Z JUL 03 
     L. TEGUCIGALPA 80 
     M. DIRJIATFSO 201408Z JAN 04 
     N. USDAO TEGUCIGALPA 211619Z JAN 04 
     O. USDAO TEGUCIGALPA 222221Z JAN 04 
     P. TEGUCIGALPA 179 
     Q. STATE 15961 
     R. TEGUCIGALPA 193 
     S. TEGUCIGALPA 203 
     T. TEGUCIGALPA 209 
     U. TEGUCIGALPA 289 
     V. STATE 35227 
     W. USDAO TEGUCIGALPA 241406Z FEB 04 
     X. TEGUCIGALPA 672 
     Y. STATE 98251 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Larry L. Palmer; 
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (U)  Post appreciates the opportunity to comment on the 
time-line set forth in ref Y.  Answers keyed to ref Y are 
provided in paragraph 4. 
 
2. (S) Post believes the time-line included in ref Y is 
largely accurate but not complete.  Post has conducted an 
exhaustive search of its files in order to provide the 
Department other relevant information that might assist INL 
in formulating a response to the NSC's April 14, 2004 letter. 
 The inclusion of reftels D, E, J, K, N, 0, V, and W are 
intended for that purpose (the additional reftels will mean a 
revision in the cables referenced in the INL timeline). 
 
3. (S) For inclusion to, and modification of, INL time-line: 
 
-- April 17, 2003:  CMDR USSOUTHCOM formally notifies AMB 
that CNIES information sharing with the GOH had been 
suspended pending an investigation into the April 14 downing 
of a narcotrafficking aircraft.  CMDR USSOUTHCOM indicates 
what steps must be taken before information sharing with the 
GOH can resume (ref D). 
 
-- June 25, 2003:  Ambassador responds to CMDR USSOUTHCOM 
regarding substantive actions taken by the Honduran Air Force 
(HAF) to prevent a similar incident from reoccurring (ref J). 
 
-- July 18, 2003:  CMDR USSOUTHCOM informs Post that he has 
accepted the verbal assurances of the President of Honduras, 
based on ref I, that the GOH has a "no shoot down" policy and 
that CNIES information sharing with the GOH would resume July 
18, 2003 (ref K).  CMDR USSOUTHCOM refers to a USSOUTHCOM 
initiative to work toward a Memorandum of Understanding with 
the GOH regarding the sharing of U.S. radar information. 
 
-- February 18, 2004:  INL thanks Post for the hospitality 
shown to the joint Department of State/Department of Defense 
team during the February 2-4 visit to look at the HAF's 
procedures for air interdiction.  INL indicates that it is in 
the early stages of preparing a briefing for Department of 
State principals and the interagency community on a region- 
wide course of action regarding procedures for air 
interdiction operations initiated using information provided 
by the USG (ref V). 
 
-- February 24, 2004:  USDAO Tegucigalpa reports the 
Commander of the HAF expressed his annoyance with the 
State-DOD team's request for a written document outlining 
Honduras' intercept procedures, indicating that the document 
could not be shared with the State-DOD team because it was 
classified secret.  Embassy comments in this report that: "It 
is not clear how widely the HAF has distributed 
comprehensive, fully articulated standard operating 
procedures regarding Honduran intercept procedures" (ref W). 
 
-- March 14, 2004:  Post suggests rewording entry to read: 
"Burned aircraft found on the property of a leading local 
industrialist; no evidence of HAF involvement in this 
incident" (ref Y). 
 
4. (S) The following answers are keyed to ref Y and reflect 
Post's best information. 
 
a. Yes.  The report the Government of Honduras (GOH) provided 
was intended to satisfy the GOH's commitment to conduct an 
investigation into the April 14, 2003 incident.  The GOH does 
not/not intend to conduct any further investigation into that 
incident. 
 
b. Post is unaware of any other GOH investigation into the 
April 14, 2003 incident apart from the one report already 
provided. 
 
c. TAT received a copy of the April 14, 2003 P-3 video.  TAT 
reports that it is in possession of the long and short 
versions of the P-3 video. 
 
d. No. 
 
e. Post notes ref K indicating that on July 18, 2003 General 
James Hill, Commander USSOUTHCOM, accepted the verbal 
assurances of the President of Honduras, based on Post's 
reporting in ref H, that the GOH has a "no shoot down" policy 
and subsequently ordered a resumption of radar sharing with 
the GOH based on that assurance. 
 
f. No.  TAT reports that the GOH told them they did not 
consider the January 10, 2004 event an "incident" and 
therefore no report was ever drafted. 
 
g. It is possible that the GOH has a written policy or other 
operational documents governing intercept procedures and 
sorting criteria that it has not shared with the USG.  GOH 
officials told the interagency fact finding team in February 
that such documents cannot be shared with the USG because 
they are secret. 
 
h. No. Post is not in possession of any GOH documents 
concerning GOH procedures and sorting criteria governing air 
interceptions and the use of warning shots that have not 
already been provided to the Department. 
Palmer 

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