US embassy cable - 04ANKARA1036

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001036 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2014 
TAGS: ECIN, ECON, EPET, GG, PGOV, PREL, RS, TU 
SUBJECT: GEORGIAN FM JAPARIDZE'S FIRST VISIT TO TURKEY 
 
 
REF: A. TBLISI 0342 
     B. TBLISI 0311 
     C. 2003 ANKARA 6198 
     D. TBLISI 391 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12858, 
reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Georgian FM Japaridze reportedly gave 
Turkish FM Gul a positive readout of President Saakashvili's 
recent Moscow trip but said Saakashvili had emphasized that 
Georgia will remain oriented toward the West, will insist on 
Russian withdrawal from bases in Georgia, and will not agree 
to Russian demands that no foreign forces be deployed in 
Georgian territory.  Japaridze averred that relations between 
Ajaran leader Abashidze and Saakashvili have improved; Gul 
claimed Turkey has worked to tamp down Ajaran separatism. 
Gul pushed for increased contact between Abkhazia and 
Turkey's Abkhaz community and for opening Abkhazia to Turkish 
business.  The two FMs also discussed controls at the 
Georgian-Turkish border, possible increased Turkish 
assistance to Georgia's Interior Ministry, and energy 
pipelines.  In wake of the visit, the Georgian Embassy in 
Ankara continues to have strong reservations about Turkey's 
views regarding Russia's role in Georgia.  End Summary. 
 
 
Japaridze Meets with PM Erdogan, FM Gul 
 
 
2.  (C) Georgian FM Tedo Japaridze visited Ankara for the 
first time Feb. 17-18, meeting with PM Erdogan and FM Gul 
(President Sezer was out of the country).  In a Feb. 18 
telephone readout for the Ambassador, whom Japaridze had 
known well as Georgian Ambassador in Washington, Japaridze 
emphasized how pleased he was with the visit. 
 
 
3. (C) In a subsequent briefing for us, Georgian DCM 
Tabatadze claimed the Turks were "keen" to meet with the GOG 
prior to Gul's February 23-25 visit to Moscow.  According to 
Tabatadze, Japaridze's one-hour meeting with FM Gul focused 
on regional affairs and security.  Japaridze's meeting with 
Erdogan was shorter and focused on economic issues. 
Tabatadze confirmed that Japaridze left pleased with his 
visit and sees Gul as a good interlocutor.  However, both 
Tabatadze and, he said, Georgian Ambassador to Turkey 
Lebanidze found Gul poorly briefed on Caucasian affairs. 
 
 
Georgian-Russian Relations 
 
 
4. (C) Tabatadze said Japaridze gave Gul a positive spin on 
President Saakashvili's February 11-14 visit to Moscow; the 
Georgians' aim was to re-start Georgian-Russian relations 
with a clean slate.  However, Japaridze asserted to Gul that 
Saakashvili told Putin two things are non-negotiable: 
Georgia's pro-Western orientation and the need for Russian 
withdrawal from bases in Georgia.  At the same time Georgia 
is prepared to guarantee Russian security through joint 
patrols along the entire length of the Russia-Georgia border 
(ref A). 
 
 
5.  (C) Gul reportedly expressed interest in the progress of 
the Georgia-Russia Framework Agreement (ref B).  Japaridze 
reportedly answered that Georgia will never agree to Russian 
demands that the GOG guarantee no deployment of foreign 
forces on Georgian territory, but asked Gul to reassure the 
Russians during his upcoming trip that Turkey does not intend 
to establish bases in Georgia. 
 
 
Abkhazia 
 
 
6.  (C) Gul reportedly suggested that increased 
"people-to-people" contacts between Abkhazia and Turkey's 
ethnic Abkhaz community could help reduce Russian influence 
in Abkhazia and reduce tensions between Abkhazia and Tblisi. 
(Comment:  This suggestion appears to run counter to one 
Turkish MFA assessment about Turkey's Abkhaz community:  in 
September, the MFA Caucasus Department Head said that some 
members of Turkey's Abkhaz community, with help from the 
Russian Embassy in Ankara, were smuggling arms and materiel 
into Abkhazia from Turkey (ref C).  End comment.) 
 
 
7.  (C) In reporting Gul's strong request to Japaridze that 
Tblisi formally open Abkhazia to Turkish business, DCM 
Tabatadze claimed some Turkish companies are already doing 
business there.  Gul reportedly asserted to Japaridze that 
the CIS embargo of Abkhazia is not working:  Russian 
companies are doing business there and some Russian officials 
have visited.  More Turkish business in Abkhazia, Gul argued, 
will reduce Russian influence.  Downplaying the idea that 
Turkish access will promote Abkhazian separatism, Gul 
predicted most Turkish businesspeople would not be from 
Turkey's Abkhaz community.  According to Tabatadze, FM 
Japaridze told Gul he will consider this proposal. 
 
 
Ajara 
 
 
8.  (C) Japaridze asserted to Gul there is now a "good 
understanding" between Ajaran leader Abashidze and President 
Saakashvili (ref D).  DCM Tabatadze added that he expects 
Abashidze to visit Saakashvili in Tblisi within the next 
several days.   Gul reportedly welcomed the news, telling 
Japaridze that the Turkish Consul General in Batumi has been 
pressing Abashidze to "play by the rules" and avoid 
separatism.  Japaridze "highly appreciated" Gul's message. 
 
 
Border Controls 
 
 
9.  (C) Gul reportedly pressed Japaridze to relax the visa 
regime for Turkish truckers entering Georgia.  Japaridze 
promised to consider this.  However, later in the meeting, 
Japaridze noted Russian pressure to tighten visa controls on 
Turks entering Georgia:  the Russians point to cases of 
Turkish fighters killed in Chechnya who bore passports with 
Georgian entry visas.  Gul reportedly also complained about 
corruption at the border; Japaridze replied that the new 
government is determined to fight corruption. 
 
 
10.  (C) The two FMs also discussed the possibility of 
opening a third border crossing between Georgia and Turkey. 
Tabatadze noted that one possible location is near a 
now-closed Russian base, and might help replace the economic 
activity lost when the base closed. 
 
 
Turkish Assistance to Georgian Ministry of Interior 
 
 
11.  (C) Tabatadze said Gul also proposed expanded Turkish 
assistance to Georgia's Ministry of Interior, including 
grants, officer training and Turkish advisors.  The Turks 
proposed helping the GOG reconfigure Ministry of Interior 
security forces to look more like Turkey's jandarma, which is 
in charge of security outside Turkey's urban areas. 
Japaridze said he would consider it. 
 
 
Pipelines 
 
 
12.  (C) Both FMs agreed on the importance of BTC in 
fostering regional security and prosperity, and agreed that 
any delay in construction is in neither Georgia's nor 
Turkey's interest.  Japaridze raised the possibility of a 
pipeline from Novorossiysk to parallel BTC in Turkey and 
reduce the amount of Russian oil shipped through the 
Bosphorus.  According to Tabatadze, the Turkish side 
expressed interest, but wanted to know the Russians' 
reaction; the Georgians replied that Putin has formed a group 
to study the proposal. 
 
 
13.  (C) Comment:  DCM Tabatadze said the visit left him with 
the clear impression that Turkey wants to expand its role in 
Georgia.  At the same time Tabatadze, who has been a reliable 
interlocutor for the past two years, reiterated his concern 
that, despite training programs and other assistance, Turkey 
is searching for ways to work with Russia on the Georgia 
question rather than concentrating on helping Georgia extract 
itself from Russia's shadow.  As just one example, he cited 
Japaridze's interlocutors as consistently emphasizing 
Russia's role in the region, arguing that Turkey, the U.S. 
and Georgia should find ways to make Russian involvement 
constructive.  End Comment. 
EDELMAN