US embassy cable - 04AMMAN1333

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001333 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PREF, EAID, IZ, JO, UNSC 
SUBJECT: UN ACTING SRSG ROSS MOUNTAIN DISCUSSES IRAQ WITH 
PRM PDAS GREENE 
 
REF: AMMAN 1120 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Doug Silliman per 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary and comment:  In a February 16 meeting, UN 
SRSG, a.i. Ross Mountain told PRM PDAS Greene that Special 
Advisor Brahimi's "good" visit to Iraq, a February 14 
security mission to Basra and "a change of mood in CPA" were 
helpful for the UN's reentry to Iraq.  Mountain hopes to 
resume UN operations in Basra soon and believes that UN 
Headquarters' security concerns include both real and 
perceived threats.  Mountain believes greater consultation 
with Iraqi authorities is required for development of the 
UN's strategic plan.  The UN will present detailed funding 
needs at the Feb. 28-29 Iraq Fund meeting but is unlikely to 
issue a new appeal.  With USD 300 million on-hand, the UN's 
real challenge is to implement programs under current 
security conditions.  Mountain's forward-leaning position on 
UN reentry to Iraq does not match the pessimistic assessments 
provided by UNSECOORD and we are not confident that his 
arguments will outweigh UN NY's security concerns.  End 
summary and comment. 
 
2.  (U) PRM PDAS Richard Greene met UN SRSG, a.i. for Iraq 
Ross Mountain on February 16, on the margins of a UNHCR 
meeting on Iraqi refugees, returnees and IDPs (UNHCR meeting 
reported septel).  UNAMI Senior Adviser for IDPs John Pace, 
UN strategic planning officer Michael Dalton and UNAMI 
humanitarian affairs officer Maura Lynch also attended the 
meeting, as did USAID Assistant Administrator Bill Garvelink, 
PRM/ANE officials Larry Bartlett and Andy Wyllie and Regional 
Refcoord Joan Polaschik (notetaker). 
 
----------------------------- 
Current UN Operations in Iraq 
----------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Repeating a familiar refrain, Mountain told Greene it 
is now a question of when, not if, the United Nations will 
return to Iraq.  With UN Special Advisor Brahimi's "good" 
visit to Iraq, a February 14 security mission to Basra, 
agreement for the UN plane to fly into Iraq and a "change of 
mood in CPA," Mountain characterized recent events as 
"helpful" for the UN's reentry to Iraq.  Based on the 
February 14 security mission, Mountain hopes that the UN will 
be able resume operations in Basra "soon."  The UN has a 
significant number of staff prepositioned in Kuwait and Amman 
who could conduct "in and out" missions to Iraq once security 
conditions improve.  Mountain (who had just spent three weeks 
in Amman and Kuwait) said he expects to spend the majority of 
his time in the region although UNAMI headquarters will 
remain in Cyprus. 
 
------------------------------- 
UN Role in Political Transition 
------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Noting that UN Special Advisor Brahimi was scheduled 
to brief UNSYG Annan in a few days, Mountain told Greene that 
"some accommodation had been reached" during Brahimi's recent 
mission to assess elections prospects in Iraq.  Because "it 
is clear that elections will not be held before the transfer 
of sovereignty," Mountain said the real question is how to 
deal with the transition period between July 1 and elections. 
 While the transition period before elections could be 
difficult, Mountain doubted that the Iraqi people or Iraq's 
neighbors would support a delay in the transfer of 
sovereignty. 
 
-------------------- 
UN Security Concerns 
-------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Mountain commented that UN security concerns include 
both real and perceived security threats; his biggest 
challenge is to change perceptions in New York.  He predicted 
that the UN would be able to reestablish operations in Basra 
and Irbil "soon" although the February 1 attack on Kurdish 
party offices in Irbil delayed UN plans for a security 
assessment there.  Security in Baghdad, he said, remains "a 
real problem."  Mountain also expressed concern that the 
security situation could worsen after the June 30 transfer of 
authority in Iraq. 
 
6.  (C) Mountain acknowledged that the UN was not making 
adequate use of its national staff under the current security 
restrictions.  While some UN agencies follow the spirit 
rather than the letter of the security regulations, other UN 
agencies have ordered their staff not to leave home.  Greene 
urged Mountain to make maximum use of UN national staff, 
especially in capacity building for Iraqi ministries before 
the June 30 transition. 
 
----------------- 
UN Strategic Plan 
----------------- 
7.  (C) Mountain said that further work needs to be done on 
the UN's strategic plan for Iraq, particularly in the areas 
of coordination with Iraqi authorities and cash-flow 
analysis.  While the UN had already begun formal 
consultations with the Iraqi Ministry of Planning, Mountain 
believes the UN must expand its strategic planning to line 
ministries and also build on existing consultations with CPA. 
 Pressed by Greene to identify immediate funding needs, 
Mountain responded that the UN has roughly USD 300 million in 
cash on-hand but will require USD 900 million for food 
assistance in the coming year, as well as a "good chunk" of 
funds for up-front program needs such as software and other 
crucial support purchases.  Mountain pledged that the UN 
would have more precise figures ready by the February 28-29 
Iraq Trust Fund meeting in Abu Dhabi.  However, the UN was 
unlikely to issue a new appeal for Iraq as it has sufficient 
funds on-hand.  The real question, according to Mountain, is 
the UN's ability to implement programs. 
----------------------- 
Humanitarian Priorities 
----------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Noting that the lack of solid information makes it 
difficult to prioritize humanitarian needs in Iraq, Mountain 
said that health services, electricity output, and food 
basket distributions remain problematic.  In the longer term, 
Mountain is concerned that an appropriate social safety net 
is constructed along with efforts to monetize the Iraqi 
economy. 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (C) Mountain's forward-leaning position on UN plans to 
return to Iraq and resume assistance activities does not 
match the more pessimistic security assessments presented by 
Amman-based UNSECOORD officials (ref).  While we appreciate 
his enthusiastic advocacy for an early return to Iraq, we are 
not confident that his arguments will outweigh security 
concerns. 
 
10.  (U) PDAS Greene cleared this message. 
 
11.  (U) CPA Baghdad minimize considered. 
GNEHM