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| Identifier: | 04ANKARA994 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04ANKARA994 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ankara |
| Created: | 2004-02-20 14:35:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV TU |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000994 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2014 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: OPPOSITION LEFT-OF-CENTER CHP LIMPING TOWARD LOCAL ELECTIONS (U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter. Reason: 1.5 (b,d). 1. (C) Summary: Main opposition CHP's chances in March 28 local elections are dim, according to our own extensive contacts with party M.P.s and recent polling data. A few CHP M.P.s are growing more critical of party leadership but have not shown the courage of their convictions by speaking out publicly against chairman Baykal and his cronies for their misguided policies. In addition, internal party dysfunction is compounding the difficulty the party has long had in connecting to a Turkish public grown weary of CHP's negative message and fear-mongering. End summary. --------------------- Out of Touch -- Still --------------------- 2. (C) A broad range of CHP contacts acknowledges that the party is not likely to do well in the March 28 local elections. Some (unconvincingly) blame a media conspiracy, according to which ruling AK Party (AKP) controls the various media cartels by forgiving their debts or through outright blackmail, for the party's ills and are reluctant to engage in self-criticism. Others attribute the party's expected poor performance to (1) the sterility of its public strategy of calling into question GOT intentions and attempting to generate and exploit fears of an AKP-led Islamist threat to the State; and (2) a singular lack of contact with Anatolia in general and the man in the street everywhere. 3. (U) The most recent example of CHP's sterile AKP-bashing was vice chairman for foreign policy and retired Ambassador Onur Oymen's Feb. 18 parliamentary rant against the AKP government's attempt to solve the Cyprus question. Oymen's mephitic speech prompted center-left daily "Radikal"'s editor Ismet Berkan to recall in his Feb. 19 column that Oymen, as then-MFA Undersecretary, had been the one responsible for taking Turkey to the brink of war with Greece over the Kardak/Imia islets in 1995 by withholding vital information from then-FonMin Baykal and PM Ciller. 4. (C) In a recent prominent example of fear-mongering, CHP tried to make hay of a 1995 speech by Prime Ministry Undersecretary Omer Dincer, who at that time argued that the Republic might be better served if Islam played a prominent role in State affairs. In a recent meeting, CHP central committee member and Hatay M.P. Fuat Cay argued to poloff that Dincer's statements are proof that AKP is trying to undermine the "secular" Republic. In addition, Cay asserted without evidence that violence against women who do not wear headscarves is increasing in rural areas. He claimed that women in Fatih and Esenler -- conservative districts in Istanbul -- cannot wear "stylish" clothes without being the subject of scorn. "Fatih and Esenler are like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia," he exclaimed. Cay admitted, however, that he had not been to either district recently. 5. (C) Other M.P.s, however, are critical of CHP's general approach. Istanbul M.P. Damla Gurel, who also serves on the party central committee, told poloff recently that she is disappointed with the party's focus on the AKP as an "Islamist threat" when there are more pressing issues for Turks like jobs, food, and social justice. She claimed to have made a similar argument to Baykal in a Jan. central committee meeting. However, the CHP leader dismissed her arguments, she said, by asserting that "protecting the secularist state is a virtue." Recent public opinion data bear out Gurel's sentiment. According to a January poll by the firm Pollmark, only 22 percent believe that CHP's criticism of Dincer was fair; some 66 percent do not/not believe AKP is trying to establish "a state based on sharia". 6. (C) In the past week CHP'ers Necdet Budak (Edirne), Mehmet Nessar (Denizli), and Esat Canan (a Kurdish tribal leader from Hakkari) have also acknowledged to us various aspects of CHP's structural and policy weaknesses, from Baykal's authoritarianism and the emptiness of CHP's parliamentary opposition to the party's lack of contact with ordinary voters. 7. (C) Offering a further view of CHP's shortcomings, Agri M.P. Cemal Kaya (a prominent Kurd), who broke with the party following CHP's failure to support the GOT repentance bill for PKK terrorists last summer and later joined AKP, affirmed to poloff Feb. 9 that CHP has become the protector of a State that is out of touch with Turkish realities. Kaya was dismissive of CHP's reliance on the educated chattering class as its voter base, saying "Anatolia is growing up, becoming more modern, expecting more from the State, but CHP is not changing with the rest of Turkey." -------------------------- Party Dysfunction -- Still -------------------------- 8. (C) Internal party troubles are compounding CHP's policy missteps. Gurel noted, for example, that the party does not have a clear set of criteria for selecting candidates for local elections. All decision making is concentrated in the hands of Baykal and a couple of close advisors. Budak similarly confided to us that he would never have been chosen as a candidate if the selection process for the 2002 general elections had been as tightly controlled by Baykal as it is now. Asked if her status as central committee member afforded her access to Baykal's inner circle, Gurel laughed, saying "My position brings additional expectations from voters but no new authority to do anything." Noting that none of the committee members or party vice chairmen has a job description or portfolio, Gurel added that "if I could copy AKP's organization and paste it onto CHP, I'd do it." 9. (C) Former State Minister and CHP M.P. Kemal Dervis echoed Gurel in a recent meeting with poloff, acknowledging that AKP had far superior local party offices. Dervis, who has made few public statements since becoming a party vice chairman last fall, disclosed that he is staying out of party decision making on local elections. "I wouldn't have much influence on picking candidates anyway," he said. A clearly frustrated Dervis said that many CHP members truly believe the party will do well March 28, claiming that even if 50 percent support AKP, the remaining 50 percent is likely to support CHP, since the party is the only viable opposition. Dismissing this as false logic, Dervis said he believes Turks will prefer not to vote than to cast their lot with CHP. -------------------------- Down in the Polls -- Still -------------------------- 10. (C) CHP's troubles are apparent in recent polling data. For months CHP has been polling well below the 19 percent the party received in the Nov. 2002 national elections. According to Pollmark, whose methodology appears sound to us, CHP has consistently received 12-15 percent support from those Turks who are asked "If there were Parliamentary elections today, to whom would you give your vote?" In contrast, support for ruling AKP in hypothetical national elections has climbed to between 54-57 percent over the same period, according to Pollmark. 11. (C) The Pollmark surveys also indicate that Turks are dissatisfied with CHP: in the January poll, for example, 66 percent of respondents said CHP has performed poorly. In addition, party leader Deniz Baykal ranks well below AKP chairman/P.M. Erdogan for the most liked politician in Turkey. Erdogan received 26.6 percent of the vote, while Baykal received only 4 percent, ranking him below his arch-rival on the left Bulent Ecevit (6.5 percent). 12. (C) Pollmark director Ozer Sencar asserted to poloff recently that CHP is in danger of losing almost all of the election races in Turkey's big cities, including in Izmir, a bastion of the political left. Sencar asserted that AKP had pulled ahead of CHP in Izmir (23 percent to 21 percent), even though the CHP candidate, incumbent mayor Ahmet Piristina, is respected, suggesting that CHP's inadequate performance at the national level is spilling over into local politics. Sencar also noted that according to his own analysis of the survey data, Alevis (heterodox Muslims) are no longer blindly supporting CHP but are dividing their votes among all parties, including AKP. We had heard the same analysis from other contacts prior to the Nov. 2002 elections. ------------------------- Note on Polling in Turkey ------------------------- 13. (C) Sencar related to poloff that security forces in the Southeast routinely incarcerate his firm's pollsters, despite the lifting of emergency rule and the slow spread of reform in the region. Security forces -- police and jandarma -- and the judiciary argue that the pollsters have to register with the State before conducting surveys, something the Pollmark employees are not legally bound to do. Sencar said he has had to call the Interior Ministry, local Governors' offices, and even AKP headquarters to get his employees released. He also noted that some questions -- particularly about the military and Kurdish DEHAP -- still make Turkish citizens uncomfortable, particularly in the Southeast, leading to false answers and thus distorted data on attitudes toward either issue. EDELMAN
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