US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO280

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000280 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA 
 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:           DECL:  02/20/14 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, PINS, CE, NO, Political Parties 
SUBJECT:  In meeting, key JVP leader tries to take 
moderate tack, but hard-line views show through 
 
Refs:  (A) Colombo 271; (B) Colombo 109 
 
(U) Classified by James F. Entwistle, Deputy Chief of 
Mission.  Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  Polchief met February 19 with Somawansa 
Amarasinghe, a key leader of the JVP party.  Amarasinghe 
tried to assume a moderate tack on most issues.  Glints 
of a hard-line showed through, however, in his harsh 
views toward the ceasefire accord with the Tigers and 
also toward the governing UNP, which cracked down on the 
JVP insurrection in the late 1980's.  Amarasinghe, who 
indicated that he was back in Sri Lanka for good after 
years of exile, will likely be a baleful influence on 
Sri Lanka's already turbulent political scene.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) MEETING WITH KEY JVP LEADER:  Polchief met 
February 19 with Somawansa Amarasinghe, a key leader of 
the radical Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP - "People's 
Liberation Front") party.  Amarasinghe, who was clearly 
being careful in what he said in his first meeting with 
a USG interlocutor in years (he has been in exile in 
Europe -- see below), tried to assume a moderate tack on 
most issues.  He said, for example, that he strongly 
supported "all ways to bring ethnic reconciliation to 
Sri Lanka."  Brushing off years of criticism that the 
JVP is essentially Sinhalese extremist in ideology, he 
asserted that the party did not support any form of 
"ethnic chauvinism" and was working to bring all 
communities together.  Polchief underlined that it was 
vital that the campaign for the April 2 parliamentary 
elections not be used in such a way that harmed the 
fragile peace process.  In response, Amarasinghe said 
the JVP would be careful on how it dealt with the peace 
process in the campaign because it "did not want this 
important peaceful era to end." 
 
3.  (C) Polchief also noted concerns from the Sri Lankan 
business community and international investors about the 
JVP's economic views.  Amarasinghe replied that the JVP 
supported business investment of all types, noting that 
he had addressed Sri Lanka's Joint Business Forum 
("JBIZ") on February 17 in order "to alleviate all 
concerns." 
 
4.  (C) GLINTS OF A HARD-LINE:  Despite his efforts to 
appear reasonable and restrained, glints of a very real 
hard-line showed through in many of Amarasinghe's 
remarks.  Most particularly, he was quite critical of 
the ceasefire accord reached between the government and 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in February 
2002.  Amarasinghe charged that the accord had been 
reached "secretly" by Prime Minister Wickremesinghe's 
United National Party (UNP) and contained provisions 
which were "very favorable to the LTTE."  Polchief 
countered that the ceasefire accord was the linchpin of 
the peace process and efforts to undermine it would have 
very serious repercussions.  Amarasinghe said the JVP 
had no plans "to throw out" the accord if it won the 
election in league with its Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
(SLFP) allies.  The JVP might well lobby for changes, 
but he said the party realized that the SLFP took a 
different approach on peace track issues (the SLFP is 
skeptical of the GSL's peace process policies, but less 
critical of them than the JVP).  (Also, regarding the 
peace process, Amarasinghe -- as touched on in Ref A -- 
went on to hit out at the Norwegian peace facilitation 
effort, charging that the GoN favored the LTTE.) 
 
5.  (C) ANIMUS TOWARD THE UNP:  Amarasinghe saved much 
of his bile for the UNP.  Amarasinghe, who is the last 
surviving official from the JVP "politburo" that 
launched a bloody 1987-89 insurrection, asserted that 
the UNP had mistreated the opposition "in countless 
ways" since coming to power in December 2001 and had 
proven itself "corrupt."  When asked if any of his 
animus stemmed from the UNP's successful crackdown on 
the JVP's revolt, he said that some of it did inasmuch 
as several of the current UNP leaders had been in power 
at that time, including PM Wickremesinghe. 
(Wickremesinghe was a mid-ranked minister at the time.) 
He said he did not think Wickremesinghe was directly 
responsible for what he characterized as "atrocities" 
committed against the JVP in the 1980's, but he was not 
sure.  In any case, he said, it was a fact that JVP 
founder Rohana Wijeweera had been killed in custody by 
order of the UNP government.  (Wijeweera died in 
mysterious circumstances while under police custody in 
November 1989.  Wijeweera's death effectively ended the 
JVP insurrection.) 
 
6.  (C) Noting a certain wistfulness in Amarasinghe's 
eyes when he discussed Wijeweera (the two were close 
associates), Polchief queried whether the JVP had given 
up on any notion of returning to violence.  Amarasinghe 
said the group had, and indeed had made this commitment 
in public "on countless occasions."  Even if "UNP thugs 
attack us, we will not retaliate," he said.  The party 
"accepted democracy and the ballot" and would "not 
resort to arms again."  He then cited the alliance with 
the SLFP, which he said indicated that the JVP was a 
"mature organization that was committed to peaceful 
change."  Questioned on how the JVP might do in the 
election, Amarasinghe hesitated and then predicted it 
would win about 25 seats (it now has 16). 
 
7.  (C) COMMENT:  Amarasinghe spoke excellent English 
and was quite articulate, even charming during the 
meeting.  He indicated that he was back in Sri Lanka for 
good after years of exile in the UK and other sites in 
Europe.  (Amarasinghe returned to Sri Lanka last month. 
He was out of the country from 1990 until 2004, except 
for one brief trip made during the 2001 parliamentary 
campaign.  See Ref B for additional biographic details.) 
While sophisticated and thoughtful, Amarasinghe appears 
to be a hard-line element in a hard-line party.  His 
influence in the JVP appears considerable, as he is 
considered to be a senior statesman who was close to the 
revered leader Wijeweera (a huge photograph of Wijeweera 
was hung in the room at JVP headquarters where the 
meeting took place).  Given his apparent hard-line 
perspective, which seems to have been solidified by 
years of exile, he is likely to be a baleful influence 
on Sri Lanka's already turbulent political scene.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
8.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
LUNSTEAD