US embassy cable - 04ANKARA943

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000943 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SE, EUR/RPM 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2014 
TAGS: PREL, GR, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKS CAUTIOUS ABOUT PAPANDREOU'S PROPOSAL FOR 
MUTUAL DEFENSE CUTS 
 
REF: ATHENS 227 
 
 
(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch, reasons 1.5, b/d. 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: In response to Greek PASOK candidate 
Papandreou's proposal that both Greece and Turkey cut their 
defense budgets to allow for more spending on education and 
other social programs (reftel), Turkish officials at MFA and 
TGS voiced skeptical openness to the idea.  While they 
acknowledged that the idea was worth considering, several 
themes emerged: 
 
 
-- The proposal was an election tactic by Papandreou and has 
not been formally proposed to Turkey; 
 
 
-- Even if it were proposed, Turkey has other strategic 
considerations besides Greece that influence its defense 
expenditures, including Iran, Iraq, and Syria; 
 
 
--Both countries were planning to cut defense expenditures 
anyway. 
 
 
Meanwhile, the Turkish and Greek general staffs have decided 
to implement five previously agreed CSBMs involving 
exchanging visits between the militaries.  These will occur 
after upcoming elections in both countries.  End Summary. 
 
 
---------------------- 
Mil Budget Cuts: Maybe 
---------------------- 
 
 
2. (C) MFA DDG for Northeastern Mediterranean Affairs Necip 
Eguz told Pol-Mil Counselor and PolMilOff January 22 that 
Papandreou's idea sounded constructive, but the proposal had 
not been formally proposed to the GOT and therefore was not 
actively being considered at this time.  When unexpectedly 
compelled to respond publicly, FM Gul welcomed the proposal 
as a positive step.  Eguz caveated this optimism by noting 
that Papandreou's suggestion should be taken in the context 
of his election campaign, intended to burnish his image as a 
progressive and attract votes from the Turkish minority in 
Thrace.  Eguz acknowledged that mutual defense reductions had 
been raised periodically over the last 3-4 years and were a 
positive sign of rapprochement between Turkey and Greece, 
indicating a less threatening climate.  In the meantime both 
sides seemed to have the political will to "deepen and 
enlarge" the process of rapprochement.  However, Turkey had 
much different geopolitical concerns than Greece, which may 
prevent it from dramatically reducing its defense budget. 
 
 
3. (C) MFA DDG for NATO Affairs Fatih Ceylan echoed Eguz's 
comment that, because the proposal had not been formally 
made, it was not being considered.  He noted that Greece was 
planning to reduce its defense budget after 2005 anyway and 
acknowledged that Turkey was reducing its as well. 
 
 
4. (C) TGS/J-5 Greece and Cyprus Department Chief RADM (LH) 
Sislioglu repeated to Pol-Mil Counselor and PolMilOff 
February 12 that the proposal had not been made formally.  He 
emphasized that the GOT was not working the issue yet but 
believed the initiate would become more concrete if PASOK and 
Papandreou were to win the Greek elections, as Papandreou 
seemed to be "a sincere person."  Nevertheless, Sislioglu 
noted that, while Greece's main security concern was Turkey, 
Turkey has more serious defense considerations to its east, 
namely Iran, Iraq and Syria.  Relations with these countries 
were very "fragile" and could change from good to bad in a 
day, implying that Turkey could not lower its guard towards 
them.  Sislioglu admitted candidly that, because of economic 
considerations, Turkey's defense budget was being reduced 
anyway, so Ankara could at least use such an initiative to 
leverage goodwill from Greece and the international 
community.  He speculated that Greece was likely doing the 
same.  Sislioglu then explained that only cuts in Greece's 
navy and air force would be meaningful to Turkey, as Greece's 
army is not considered a large threat in a potential conflict 
between the two countries.  In addition, Turkey's navy is 
stretched along the Mediterranean, Aegean and Black Sea 
Coasts, Greece's was concentrated in the Aegean.  Thus, equal 
percentage reductions in Greece's and Turkey's navy would 
have consequences beyond the Aegean. 
 
 
----------------------- 
Other CSBMs: Definitely 
----------------------- 
 
 
5. (C) Sislioglu said that both Greece and Turkey are now 
focused on implementing the CSBMs to which they had agreed in 
the past.  There were 11 on paper, but TGS had only recently 
drafted action plans for five of these for both sides' 
consideration.  Senior MFA officials for both sides agreed 
that the militaries could move forward on these during their 
"secret" consultations in London earlier this month.  The 
Greek military had agreed to the TGS proposals the week of 
February 2. 
 
 
6. (C) Once the level of confidence had been increased, 
Sislioglu hoped that more progress would be made in the talks 
on the Aegean and airspace.  He added that if the ruling 
parties in both countries were to win in their respective 
forthcoming elections, they would have more authority and 
flexibility to "take dramatic steps."  The five that both 
sides had agreed to implement involved exchanging visits 
between militaries.  None of these visits were scheduled 
before April (i.e., not before Greek or Turkish elections). 
He did not expect anything dramatic before the Greek national 
and Turkish local elections. 
 
 
7. (C) Comment: The Turks are clearly waiting for the outcome 
of the Greek elections before taking Papandreou's initiative 
seriously.  Even then, they seem well armed to counter that 
Turkey's complicated strategic situation makes such cuts 
difficult.  But budget cuts appear inevitable for the Turkish 
military, as GOT economic (and IMF) officials tell us that 
the ten-percent cut in discretionary spending that Turkey is 
making because of budget constraints will include military 
spending.  In the meantime, all of our Turkish interlocutors 
seemed positive about the future of Greek-Turkish relations. 
EDELMAN