US embassy cable - 04AMMAN1214

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 AMMAN 001214 
 
SIPDIS 
 
TREASURY FOR ZARATE AND LINARDI 
CPA FOR TRENT 
CPA FOR CASTLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2009 
TAGS: EAIR, ETTC, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: FALCON-50 AIR CREW ON JET'S IRAQI OWNERSHIP 
 
REF: BERN 83 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: In a series of meetings, crew members of a 
Jordan-based Falcon-50 executive jet described their version 
of the history and current condition of thE aircraft and its 
substantial links to the government of Iraq (Reftel).  They 
turned over to the Embassy documents relating to activities 
of the Falcon-50 prior to regime change in Iraq, and gave 
their impressions of steps that should be taken if and when 
the aircraft is released to the government of Iraq.  These 
steps include the refurbishment of the aircraft (which would 
likely cost US$100,000), the re-certification of two Iraqi 
pilots of the aircraft, and the re-issuance of previously 
expired Jordanian passports to these two Iraqi pilots.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) Between February 9-12, Econoff conducted a series of 
meetings with Capt. Adel Ahmad and Capt. Mu,ayyed Kamil 
Al-Jarrah, former pilots of a Falcon-50 executive jet serial 
number 061, and with Ahmed Sultan, engineer of that Falcon-50 
airplane (hereafter &0618).  All of these men are 
long-standing employees of Iraqi Airways.  Sultan was 
assigned to work on the airplane in 1981, prior to its 
delivery to Iraq in 1982.  In this capacity, he has been in 
contact with both Dassault and with Jet Aviation since 061 
was delivered.  Al-Jarrah was assigned in 1982 to fly 061, 
but did not operate the aircraft until a couple of years 
later, and Ahmad was assigned to this job in 1998, though he 
did not begin operating the aircraft until 2000. 
 
------------------ 
The History of 061 
------------------ 
 
3. (SBU) Ahmed Sultan, who has been employed by Iraqi Airways 
since 1977, had the most knowledge of 061 of the three.  He 
was assigned to serve as mechanic for 061 in the summer of 
1981, when the aircraft was under negotiations for purchase. 
061 was one of a batch of five Falcon-50 executive jets whose 
purchase was negotiated simultaneously by the Iraqi Ministry 
of Communications (which included transportation in its 
portfolio).  While the Ministry (hereafter &IMOC8) was to 
receive the five aircraft, Sultan said the Iraqi Air Force 
had funded their purchase. 
 
4. (SBU) Sultan was sent by the IMOC in November 1981 to a 
one-month maintenance course conducted by Dassault, for which 
the IMOC paid Dassault.  Other students funded by the IMOC 
who were receiving Dassault training on Falcon-50 maintenance 
at that time included Mu,ayyed Ibrahim Muslah, who was in 
training to work on 061 as well, and four members of the 
Iraqi air force, who were in training to work on the other 
four Falcon-50 jets in the batch.  In January 1982, Capt. 
Rizal (possibly Rezal), a Swiss pilot, flew Sultan (along 
with the rest of 061,s prospective crew) on 061 from France 
to Switzerland, in order for the crew to receive Swiss 
licenses to operate 061, which was already registered in 
Switzerland by the Iraqi front company Logarcheo.  The 
government of Iraq had previously taken the decision to 
register the aircraft in Switzerland in order to make it 
easier for 061 to receive flight clearances to Europe.  Capt. 
Rizal then delivered 061 to Baghdad on January 15, 1982. 
 
5. (SBU) The Swiss aircraft operating company Jet Aviation 
served as operator for 061 from the time of its delivery.  In 
this capacity, Jet Aviation had full responsibility for 
keeping 061 maintained and in compliance with applicable 
safety standards and licensing, filing of flight clearance 
requests, payment of overflight and landing/airport fees, and 
all other operational facilitation necessary to keep 061 in 
the air.  With the exception of a 6-month period 1985-6 
during which Unijet acted as operator, Jet Aviation continued 
to operate 061 until it was recently deregistered by 
Switzerland.  Jet Aviation also acted as primary maintenance 
provider for 061 from the time of its delivery until 2000. At 
that time, the Ministry decided to contract with Dassault as 
primary maintenance provider, in order to lower costs. 
 
6. (SBU) 061 was the first of the batch of five aircraft to 
be delivered, according to the predetermined arrangement 
between the Ministry and Dassault.  The second of the batch, 
serial number 071, was delivered to Baghdad in late 
March/early April 1982, and was later given as a gift to the 
government of Djibouti, which has since sold that airplane. 
The remaining aircraft, serial numbers 101, 120, and 122, 
were delivered in sequence until all had been received, by 
the middle of 1983. 
 
7. (SBU) 061 continued to be based in Baghdad from its 
delivery in 1982.  During that time, it was used to fly 
official missions on behalf of the government of Iraq.  In 
late 1990, it was flown to Amman.  (Before the beginning of 
the Gulf War, the three remaining, Iraqi-registered, 
Falcon-50s were flown to Iran, where the crew of 061 believes 
the aircraft remain.)  061 was not flown at all until late 
1993-early 1994, at which time Tariq Aziz decided that the 
Iraqi government should begin to use the airplane again.  The 
Foreign Ministry at that time designated three pilots 
(including Al-Jarrah) to fly 061, and 061 was sent to Basel 
for an overhaul, performed by Dassault.  After this time, 061 
was used on a periodic basis to fly Foreign Ministry 
officials on official missions.  In 1998, ownership of the 
airplane was transferred by the government of Iraq to 
Aviatrans, a corporation that had been established in that 
year. 
 
8. (SBU) In the same year, Capt. Ahmad, a pilot at Iraqi 
Airways since 1976 who had primarily flown 727s, 737s, and 
747s for the regular airline, was assigned by the Ministry to 
061.  In February 1999, Ahmad participated in a two-week 
training course offered by Flight Safety in Paris in order to 
become certified to fly 061.  The training course was paid 
for by Jet Aviation.  Ahmad began operating the aircraft in 
late December 1999, and continued to operate it until March 
2003.  He stated that 061 had made the below flights (taken 
from 061,s flight log book beginning in 2000, which Sultan 
was finally able to produce) in order to transport members of 
the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, whom he was extremely unwilling 
to identify by name. 
 
2000 
April 9           Amman-Tunis 
April 11          Tunis-Amman 
April 24          Amman-Geneva 
May 21            Amman-Damascus 
May 21            Damascus-San,a 
May 24            San,a-Damascus 
May 24            Damascus-Amman 
July 25           Amman-Moscow 
July 29           Moscow-Amman 
November 1        Amman-Tripoli 
November 2        Tripoli-Tunis 
November 3        Tunis-San,a 
November 4        San,a-Aden 
November 4        Aden-Cairo 
November 5        Cairo-Sharm al-Sheikh 
November 5        Sharm al-Sheikh-Cairo 
November 5        Cairo-Amman 
November 24       Amman-Damascus 
November 25       Damascus-Moscow 
November 25       Moscow-Amman 
November 27       Amman-Delhi 
December 1        Delhi-Damascus 
December 1        Damascus-Amman 
December 13       Amman-Karachi 
December 14       Karachi-Kuala Lumpur 
December 16       Kuala Lumpur-Hanoi 
December 19       Hanoi-Karachi 
December 20       Karachi-Amman 
 
2002 
January 14        Amman-Bahrain 
January 16        Bahrain-Damascus 
January 16        Damascus-Amman 
January 22        Amman-Damascus 
January 23        Damascus-Moscow 
January 24        Moscow-Amman 
January 30        Amman-Moscow 
January 31        Moscow-Damascus 
January 31        Damascus-Amman 
February 4        Amman-Tunis 
February 6        Tunis-Amman 
February 11       Amman-Damascus 
February 11       Damascus-Istanbul 
February 13       Istanbul-Damascus 
February 13       Damascus-Amman 
March 15          Amman-Damascus 
March 16          Damascus-Tripoli 
March 17          Tripoli-Tunis 
March 18          Tunis-Algiers 
March 19          Algiers-Rabat 
March 20          Rabat-Marrakech 
March 20          Marrakech-Rabat 
March 21          Rabat-Damascus 
March 22          Damascus-Amman 
May 12            Amman-Damascus 
May 12            Damascus-Ankara 
May 14            Ankara-Istanbul 
May 15            Istanbul-Damascus 
May 15            Damascus-Amman 
June 24           Amman-Khartoum 
June 27           Khartoum-Damascus 
June 28           Damascus-Amman 
July 2            Amman-Damascus 
July 3            Damascus-Khartoum 
July 3            Khartoum-Johannesburg 
July 9            Johannesburg-Khartoum 
July 9            Khartoum-Damascus 
July 10           Damascus-Amman 
July 18           Amman-Damascus 
July 19           Damascus-Algiers 
July 21           Algiers-Brussels 
July 23           Brussels-Damascus 
July 24           Damascus-Amman 
August 2          Amman-Damascus 
August 3          Damascus-Delhi 
August 8          Delhi-Damascus 
August 8          Damascus-Amman 
August 24         Amman-Damascus 
August 25         Damascus-Delhi 
August 25         Delhi-Shanghai 
August 27         Shanghai-Beijing 
August 29         Beijing-Delhi 
August 29         Delhi-Damascus 
August 29         Damascus-Amman 
September 5       Amman-Damascus 
September 6       Damascus-Algiers 
September 7       Algiers-Tripoli 
September 8       Tripoli-Tunis 
September 11      Tunis-Damascus 
September 11      Damascus-Amman 
 
9. (SBU)  The operational gaps shown in the above list of 
official flights generally reflected times at which 061 was 
undergoing maintenance or the pilots were training ) usually 
in France or Switzerland.  The especially long gap throughout 
2001 was due to a change of Swiss regulations, which required 
the use of a new flight management system (FMS) and suspended 
the license for 061 until such time as that FMS had been 
acquired.  Dassault was not ready to acquire the new FMS 
until the latter half of 2001, and the installation, 
training, and testing occupied almost six months. 
 
10. (C) NOTE: A second period, from Oct. 10, 2002 until March 
14, 2003, lacks any activity records at all.  This may call 
into doubt the authenticity of the log book, as that period 
saw considerable diplomatic activity by the government of 
Iraq.  It is possible that during this period of time, the 
government of Jordan may have clamped down on GOI use of 
Jordanian facilities, including their airports, and Iraqis 
may therefore used assets based elsewhere to aid their 
travel.  If the log book is not authentic, however, the crew 
probably would have needed professional help to create a 
forgery of such quality. END NOTE. 
 
11. (SBU) According to the log and to their own accounts, 
Ahmad and Al-Jarrah spent the first part of 2003 training on 
061 in Switzerland.  At the beginning of the war, their 
funding dried up, and they flew 061 back to Marka Airport, 
where they parked it and left, taking the key and the flight 
log book, which they still retain.  061 has remained on the 
tarmac at Marka airport since that time. 
 
-------------- 
Moving Forward 
-------------- 
 
12. (SBU) Sultan, who has continued to monitor the condition 
of 061 since March 2003, believes that the airplane is in 
perfect condition except for the engines, two of which belong 
to Dassault and all of which will need to be overhauled or 
replaced due to lack of use.  Dassault is currently holding 
two of 061,s original engines (#1 and #3), which Dassault 
had refurbished prior to March 2003.  He estimates the cost 
of engine replacement and of rent and fees for degradation of 
Dassault,s engine at US$60,000.  In addition to this amount, 
there are outstanding balances associated with the aircraft 
at Dassault ($30,000) and at Jet Aviation ($10,000). 
Demurrage/parking charges for the airplane, according to 
Jordan CAA Director-General Hanna Najjar, will be approx. 
$23,940.  On the other hand, Sultan is confident that if the 
money is found for the long-term repairs and other charges, 
he and his men will be able to get 061 in working order at 
least temporarily, so that it can be safely flown to France 
to have its engines replaced. 
 
13. (SBU) Al-Jarrah and Ahmad, who currently are without work 
and likely not being paid above subsistence by Iraqi Airways, 
want to fly 061 again.  They have three concerns, however. 
First, their certification to fly the Falcon-50 has expired. 
Second, they worry that 061 has somehow been exposed to 
radiological material.  They base this fear on the fact that 
two of the three pilots who were assigned to 061 in 1993-4 
have died of cancer.  Al-Jarrah, the third of these pilots, 
appears to suffer from a muscular disorder of some type. 
Iraqi Airways contacted the Jordanian Royal Scientific 
Society (RSS) to carry out radiation testing on 061 in 
December 2003, and the head of the Iraqi Airways office in 
Amman claims that the RSS gave 061 a clean bill of health. 
 
14. (C) The third concern of the pilots regarded the 
expiration of the Jordanian passports that they had held ever 
since they were assigned to the Falcon-50.  Ahmad,s initial 
passport and Al-Jarrah,s most recent renewal had both been 
issued, with five years' validity, in fall 1998.  As the 
passports expired last fall, both men were very anxious that 
new Jordanian passports be issued them, because "the people 
we dealt with used to know us as Jordanians." NOTE: It is not 
clear to us on what basis the Jordanian passports were 
initially issued. END NOTE. 
 
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Comment 
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15. (C) Assuming that the account of the crew of the 061 is 
basically truthful, the Government of Iraq is clearly the 
beneficial owner of 061.  While the account would not 
constitute proof in a legal sense of actual ownership of the 
aircraft, the evidentiary standard imposed by the government 
of Liechtenstein in the case appears to be rather lower. 
Post also stands ready to provide upon request, to all other 
interested parties within the U.S. government, a variety of 
documents turned over to post by Iraqi Airways.  These 
include photocopies of the flight log, a certificate of Swiss 
registry for 061, a sample invoice sent from Jet Aviation to 
Iraqi Airways for operating services provided by Jet 
Aviation, and signed statements from Ahmad and from Sultan 
attesting to the veracity of information (spelled out in the 
statements) provided by them on the history of 061 and of its 
links to the GOI. 
 
17. (C) It should be noted that the credibility of this 
source remains at issue.  The crew members were by their own 
admission working for the Iraqi regime prior to regime 
change, though they claim that they were not Ba,athists. 
However, they may have substantial reason to distort the 
truth of the history of 061 in order to protect themselves. 
If this extended to sanitizing the log book of 061, as seems 
possible, they would have likely needed outside assistance to 
do so.  While the preceding account of the history of 061 may 
serve as the necessary evidence to arrange the transfer of an 
asset that everyone agrees is Iraqi, it should not be 
regarded as necessarily accurate in its particulars. 
GNEHM