US embassy cable - 04BRATISLAVA161

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THE SDKU DIVORCE

Identifier: 04BRATISLAVA161
Wikileaks: View 04BRATISLAVA161 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Bratislava
Created: 2004-02-17 13:33:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PINR LO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  BRATISLAVA 000161 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, LO 
SUBJECT: THE SDKU DIVORCE 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Weiser for reason 1.4b. 
 
1. (C) Summary: Former Defense Minister Ivan Simko's new 
"Free Forum" party is the product of both a personality 
conflict and a struggle for power with PM Dzurinda.  However, 
Simko's indecision about making a complete break from the 
SDKU and its government program lost him momentum.  Coalition 
parties were ready to accept him as a partner, but he threw 
away the opportunity with his demand that Dzurinda step down. 
 Simko is no longer a strong competitor on the political 
scene. 
 
2. (C) Dzurinda did not extend an olive branch to Simko. 
This political calculation was clever in one way, but 
counterproductive in another.  Simko is no longer a threat to 
Dzurinda within the SDKU, nor is Simko with his fledgling 
party a threat to Dzurinda on the larger political scene. 
However, Dzurinda now leads a minority government, and it 
will be much harder to get legislation passed through 
parliament.  Dzurinda made political mistakes in late 2003, 
but seems to have learned from his errors.  The coalition 
government will likely stay in office to the end of its term, 
and continue to push through its aggressive reform agenda. 
End summary. 
 
A Brief History of the SDKU and Recent Events 
--------------------------------------------- - 
3. (C) As told to P/E Chief by SDKU insider Frantisek Stano 
(who managed the 2002 parliamentary election campaign and has 
known Simko and Dzurinda for a decade since they were in KDH 
together), the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU) 
party was the brainchild of Ivan Simko.  Dissatisfied under 
the leadership of the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) in 
the mid-1990's, he envisioned an enlightened modern party 
that would meld strong values with modern business 
principles.  Simko's intellectual capacity and organizational 
ability were matched by Mikulas Dzurinda's charisma, and when 
the group split from KDH, it was clear that Dzurinda would be 
the public face and billboard "leader," and Simko would run 
the party behind the scenes.  This arrangement worked well 
for several years.  According to Kamil Homola (Director of 
SDKU's central office, presidential campaign manager for FM 
Kukan, and 25-year old nominee for "young politicians" IV 
program in 2004), the trouble between Dzurinda and Simko 
began at the 2002 party congress, when Simko "shocked" 
Dzurinda by tossing his hat into the ring for leadership of 
the SDKU.  Dzurinda won, but was miffed, and there has been 
tension ever since. 
 
4. (C) Simko told DCM and P/E chief that the trouble began 
only in the fall of 2003.  He said Dzurinda's announcement of 
the "skupinka" or little group harming Slovakia's interests 
made clear his misuse of the Slovak Information Service 
(SIS).  Furthermore, Dzurinda's decision to fire National 
Security Office (NBU) chief Jan Mojzis without consulting 
cabinet members and party leaders showed a new leadership 
style unpalatable to many in the SDKU.  To summarize four 
months of press stories, Simko refused to support the sacking 
of Mojzis, was fired as Defense Minister and Deputy SDKU 
chairman, formed the "Free Forum Platform" as a movement for 
a "return to values" within the SDKU, and in January 
finalized the divorce with Dzurinda by registering "Free 
Forum" as a new political party with 7 MPs.  He was invited 
to join the coalition, but refused to do so as long as 
Dzurinda remained Prime Minister.  However, he vowed to 
support the government program of reform. 
 
What Motivates Simko? 
--------------------- 
5. (C) Both Stano and Homola characterized Simko as a 
respected politician who had a grand vision, but was growing 
frustrated with his relative lack of power in what he viewed 
as "his" party.  Stano said that Simko can't stand to be 
number two, but doesn't have the stamina or charisma to be 
number one.  He has good ideas, but doesn't know how to work 
hard, for example pounding the pavement for votes.  Homola 
professed admiration for Simko, his former political science 
professor who got him his SDKU job, but said his ego blocked 
his judgment in this case.  Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) 
Secretary General Peter Voros and SMK Spokesperson Livia 
 
SIPDIS 
Pokstaller lamented that Simko's primary motivation at this 
point is his personal feud with Dzurinda, which he puts ahead 
of national interests. 
 
6. (C) Simko's indecision on how cleanly to make the break 
lost him momentum.  He astounded leaders of the KDH, SMK, and 
ANO, who were fully prepared to offer him a seat as the fifth 
member of the governing coalition, by refusing to join as 
long as Dzurinda remains prime minister.  On the other hand, 
he has said both publicly and privately that he will support 
the government's reform agenda.  (He recently back-tracked by 
opposing the coalition's proposed education reforms.)  He 
disappointed Smer and other opposition parties by refusing to 
support early elections.  Politicians and the public are left 
scratching their heads and asking, "What does Simko want?" 
 
Simko has laudable goals such as legislating reforms in the 
SIS and NBU, strengthening parliamentary oversight, and 
keeping defense reform on track.  However, apart from this 
legislative list, he seems to be drifting without a compass. 
 
7. (C) Fellow MP's view Simko as an introvert who lacks the 
spark to lift his new party off the ground.  It is doubtful 
that he can build yet another political party in Slovakia's 
already-saturated field.  We asked Simko point-blank how he 
planned to win support and differentiate himself from the 
SDKU of Dzurinda.  He answered, "We need a plan." 
 
What Motivates Dzurinda? 
------------------------ 
8. (C) According to Stano, Dzurinda evaluates people as 
individuals, rather than as members of a team.  Individuals 
that he trusts, such as his controversial advisor Sergei 
Michalic, can do anything.  Individual grudges, however, go 
deep and last long.  Stano gave as an example Dzurinda's 
feeling of betrayal when Jan Figel refused to leave the KDH 
with Dzurinda and Simko, which almost cost Figel an 
appointment as Slovakia's EU Commissioner .  Homola described 
Dzurinda's favoritism for youthful energy, saying the first 
question he asked about new employees was, "How old is he?" 
Stano said that Dzurinda resents being told directly what he 
should do, particularly by foreign governments, and sometimes 
does the opposite just to prove he can.  On the flip side, 
Dzurinda advisor and pollster Tatiana Rosova said Dzurinda 
considers his legacy to be integration of Slovakia into NATO 
and the EU, so he obviously cares very much what foreign 
governments think of him. 
 
9. (C) In November, Rosova told P/E chief that Dzurinda 
realized coalition politics were getting out of hand, and he 
was toning down his rhetoric towards other politicians, and 
especially in the press.  Rosova said SDKU's falling numbers 
in the polls did not indicate a defection of voters to other 
parties but to "undecided," due to disenchantment with party 
strife.  Homola said when the going got tough and Bratislava 
looked bleak, Dzurinda started calling SDKU leaders in the 
regions to mobilize support.  Dzurinda's strategy to return 
to his previous "consultative" leadership style, to ignore 
Simko, and to stop public battles seems to have paid off. 
Opinion polls published in January show SDKU's numbers still 
low, but on the rise again. 
 
Coalition Partners Unhappy, but Muddling Through 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
10. (C) All coalition partners are upset to be in a minority 
government.  But they are determined to stick it out through 
the end of their term, with the support of defectors from 
other parties, independent MPs, and the Free Forum.  None 
profess support for early elections.  Voros and Pokstaller of 
the SMK said that Simko is not a real player and he took with 
him only "lackluster MP's."  SMK believes Simko was pushed by 
others within Free Forum to call for Dzurinda's dismissal, 
because he was not so radical in private talks with SMK chair 
Bela Bugar.  KDH MP and presidential candidate Frantisek 
Miklosko gushed to P/E chief, "I like Dzurinda, I really do. 
It's a shame he let things deteriorate so far.  His old style 
of consulting everyone before making a decision was better." 
KDH has refrained from public comment and is watching with 
some pleasure as the former "betrayers" of KDH fight with 
each other.  With party leader Pavol Rusko safely ensconced 
in the Ministry of Economy, ANO sided early with Dzurinda. 
 
Comment 
------- 
11. (C) Constitutionally and under the coalition agreement, 
the PM was in his full right to fire a cabinet minister from 
his party who had lost his trust.  Simko's struggle against 
Dzurinda for power within the SDKU was probably as much a 
factor in his removal as his unwillingness to go along with 
sacking Mojzis.  When Simko first created the "Free Forum 
Platform," said Homola, Dzurinda offered to discuss Free 
Forum's complaints at a May 2004 party congress--essentially 
dismissing Simko for 6 months.  Dzurinda did not hold out an 
olive branch to Simko.  Dzurinda's calculation was clever in 
a way, stupid in another.  Simko is no longer a threat to 
Dzurinda within the SDKU, nor is Simko with his fledgling 
party a threat to Dzurinda on the larger political scene. 
However, it will be much harder work now to get legislation 
passed through parliament.  Dzurinda made political mistakes 
in late 2003, but seems to have learned from his errors.  The 
coalition government will likely stay in office to the end of 
its term, and not only survive, but continue to push through 
one of the most aggressive and successful reform agendas in 
Central Europe. 
WEISER 
 
 
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