US embassy cable - 04KATHMANDU310

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000310 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, NP, PHUM UN 
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  UN OFFICIAL SEES LITTLE IMMEDIATE HOPE FOR 
CEASEFIRE 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 0280 
 
     B. KATHMANDU 0279 
 
Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) In a February 12 meeting with the Ambassador, Tamrat 
Samuel, Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General for 
Political Affairs at the UN, said that the UN stands ready to 
assist in mediation efforts between the Government of Nepal 
(GON) and Maoists if asked by both sides, but indicated that 
he saw little immediate prospect of that offer being 
accepted.  Despite maintaining contact with Maoist ideologue 
Baburam Bhattarai, the UN finds it difficult to discern 
whether Bhattarai's "forward looking" representations are 
accurate reflections of the Maoist leadership's thinking. 
Absent reconciliation between the parties and the Palace, the 
GON will find it difficult to resume dialogue with the 
insurgents from a position of strength, Samuel said.  The 
Ambassador and Samuel agreed that the National Human Rights 
Commission, despite its deficiencies, should be provided 
technical assistance to help it perform its constitutional 
mandate.  End summary. 
 
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DESPITE OFFER, UN FORESEES 
NO MEDIATION ROLE SOON 
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2.  (U)  On February 12 Tamrat Samuel, Assistant to the 
Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs at the UN, 
called on the Ambassador to exchange views on the domestic 
political situation and the ongoing Maoist insurgency. 
Samuel was accompanied by Matthew Kahane, UNDP Resident 
Representative. 
 
3.  (C)  The Ambassador described the security picture as 
"mixed."  On one hand, the Maoists have been unable since the 
end of the ceasefire in August to mount a major successful 
attack against the security forces.  On the other hand, the 
Royal Nepal Army (RNA) remains unable to reclaim territory 
under Maoist influence.  In addition, the Maoist presence has 
expanded significantly into the previously unaffected lowland 
southern Terai area along the Indian border.  Maoist 
extortion has skyrocketed, he noted.  Government of Nepal 
(GON) intelligence capabilities remain insufficient.  The 
Indian government's arrest of two high-ranking Maoists on 
February 8 is a hopeful sign (Ref A), the Ambassador 
observed, speculating that it may have been sparked by Indian 
anger over Maoist publicity of a rally planned to be held in 
New Delhi on Feb. 15.  Although RNA ranks are swelling to 
79,000 (up from 55,000 during the same time last year), the 
growth has been primarily among the lower ranks, he said, 
with no commensurate increase at the middle and upper levels. 
 This rapid growth has strained RNA command and control 
capacity in many respects, he noted, including in the area of 
ensuring respect for human rights. 
 
4.  (C)  Samuel said he found the lack of movement back 
toward dialogue "very worrying."  It appears that since the 
end of the ceasefire the GON has decided to focus on 
military, rather than diplomatic, efforts to bring the 
Maoists back to negotiations.  The GON "seems to be thinking 
what to do next," he opined, and might be persuaded that, 
having achieved some military strength, now could be the 
right moment to reconsider talks with the Maoists.  If so, it 
is important that the international community support that 
inclination, he stressed.  The UN stands ready to help to 
mediate if asked, he asserted. 
 
5.  (C) As for the Maoists, Prachanda's statement of February 
4 that the insurgents are willing to accept UN mediation is 
"a little encouraging," Samuel said, but it remains difficult 
to determine their sincerity and readiness for negotiations. 
He indicated that the UN is in contact with Maoist ideologue 
Baburam Bhattarai, who "always seems forward looking," but 
without a clearer picture of the "internal dynamics and lines 
of hierarchy" within the Maoist organization, it is hard to 
tell if Bhattarai's comments represent accurately the 
leadership's thinking, Samuel acknowledged.  Based on some 
exchanges with him, the UN believes that the Maoists may have 
softened their insistence on the constituent assembly, Samuel 
suggested, but added that their answers to direct questions 
on this topic remain "vague."  Maoist contacts have indicated 
recently to UN interlocutors that while their bottom line 
remains that the form of government must be decided by the 
people, "the methodology (by which that decision is reached) 
is not important."  That possible shift in position offers 
fresh ground for discussion and compromise if negotiations 
resume, Samuel said, adding "these issues can be bridged if 
there is good will" to reach an agreement. 
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HUMAN RIGHTS 
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6.  (C)  The human rights situation also is a cause for 
concern, Samuel said.  Human rights abuses continue by the 
Maiosts and GON security forces, the Ambassador agreed, 
adding that the Embassy has often counseled the RNA on the 
need to improve its record.  UN efforts to persuade the GON 
to sign a proposed human rights accord and agree to human 
rights monitoring will likely fail, he warned, unless the 
Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) makes 
greater effort to convince the RNA of the merits of the 
proposal.  The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) must 
be strengthened in every sense, Samuel replied, including its 
impartiality.  The Ambassador replied that neither the 
Maoists or the RNA view the NHRC as impartial.  That said, 
the NHRC is the constitutionally appointed body with a 
mandate to monitor GON compliance with human rights 
standards, he acknowledged; if the NHRC is falling short, 
donors have a responsibility to improve its capacity. 
 
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POLITICAL PARALYSIS 
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7. (C)  There remains no clear progress toward reconciliation 
between the political parties and the Palace, the Ambassador 
said.  He noted that he and other envoys have made frequent 
representations to the King urging him to make peace with the 
parties, but there is "always some excuse" for the continued 
lack of progress.  The parties, meanwhile, rather than taking 
the initiative themselves, are waiting for the King to make 
the first move.  The King's public address of February 8 (Ref 
B) seemed only to have aggravated the polarization, he 
observed; instead of imparting a message of conciliation, the 
King used the opportunity to criticize the parties. 
Nonetheless, the Ambassador said he does not believe the King 
plans to reconsolidate royal power, as the parties allege. 
Even if he wanted to do so, the King is well aware that 
neither the international community or the Nepali people 
would tolerate such a step, the Ambassador concluded.  While 
the King always reiterates his commitment to the 
constitutional monarchy, some people find his interpretation 
of that concept "questionable," Samuel observed.  The 
question now seems to be on which side falls the onus for 
reconciliation: the parties or the Palace?  Whatever the 
answer, it will remain difficult for the GON to resume 
negotiations with the insurgents without first achieving a 
resolution of the deadlock between the parties and the King, 
Samuel noted. 
 
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COMMENT 
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8.  (C) Periodically over the past three years the Maoists 
have announced their willingness to accept UN mediation in 
the conflict; Prachanda's Feburary 4 press release is only 
the latest installment.  In our experience, these statements 
are not followed by other, more tangible indications of 
Maoist readiness for peace, e.g., an abatement in killings, 
bombings, abductions, etc.  This last statement seems to be 
no exception.  It seems to us that the Maoists' episodic 
endorsement of a UN role is motivated by a self-serving 
desire to appear more peace-loving and more palatable to the 
international community, as well as by a cynical realization 
that the GON, under Indian pressure, is unlikely to accept 
third-party mediation. 
MALINOWSKI