US embassy cable - 04HARARE268

C O N F I D E N T I A L HARARE 000268 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/S, SCOTT DELISI AND MIKE RAYNOR 
NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR FRAZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2008 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ZI, MDC 
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH MDC'S MORGAN TSVANGIRAI AND 
WELSHMAN NCUBE 
 
 
Classified By: DCM REWHITEHEAD DUE TO 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
1.  (c) Summary.  Ambassador and DCM dined with MDC President 
Morgan Tsvangirai and Secretary General Welshman Ncube on 
February 12.  The MDC leaders commented on Tsvangirai's 
ongoing treason trial.  Ncube and Tsvangirai both confirmed 
that putative talks with ZANU-PF are going nowhere despite 
what South African President Mbeki continues to say.  They 
termed Mugabe's recent cabinet shuffle as meaningless.  On 
inner party rifts within MDC, they admitted that the 
MDC-controlled Harare Municipal Council had become an 
embarrassment and admitted that they were hard pressed to 
mobilize their supporters to mass action.  They said that a 
UNDP team will be in Zimbabwe from March 3 to 13 to assess 
conditions for the 2005 elections but expressed some 
skepticism about the UN's ability to play a meaningful role. 
End summary. 
 
2.  (c) A relaxed Morgan Tsvangirai spoke briefly about his 
ongoing treason trial and new evidence that further tarnished 
the credibility of the prosecution's star witness, Ari Ben 
Menashe.  Tsvangirai recounted a number of missteps by 
prosecuting attorneys but noted that it mattered little 
anyway -- he was convinced that the GOZ would drag out the 
trial as long as it suited their purposes. 
 
3.  (c) Ncube commented that the putative talks between him 
and Minister of Justice Patrick Chinamasa were at a complete 
standstill.  Chinamasa, who had just come off vacation, had 
thus far offered no comment on proposed revisions to AIPPA 
POSA, and the Elections Act that Ncube had supplied. 
Chinamasa's only communication had been that he would get in 
touch in the future -- don't call me, I'll call you -- and in 
light of this South African President Mbeki's recent claim 
that talks were ongoing was a falsehood.  Ncube stressed that 
Mbeki was well briefed and questioned why he continued to hew 
to the same line. 
 
4.  (c) Both men agreed that the recent cabinet reshuffle 
represented no change.  It was simply another effort by 
Mugabe to keep all ZANU-PF factions under "his big tent." 
They noted that there were some factional issues within the 
MDC as well, the most notable the abysmal performance of the 
MDC-dominated Harare Municipal Council.  Ncube said that the 
best solution would be mass resignation of the Council and 
new elections, which the MDC would dominate.  However, they 
were uncertain that the MDC councilors would agree to resign. 
 This played directly into the hands of Local Government 
Minister Chombo, who had intimidated/co-opted the councilors 
to the point that they were allowing Town Clerk Chideya, 
Chombo's front man, to run the Council.  This put MDC 
leadership in the embarrassing position of having to remain 
mum on the poor performance of its own Council. 
 
5.  (c) Queried on when the MDC might consider mass action, 
if ZANU-PF refused to engage in talks, Tsvangirai and Ncube 
both appeared uncomfortable.  Ncube said that he was unable 
to predict this, and Tsvangirai admitted that it had been 
difficult to mobilize the population to mass action.  He 
added that this could backfire anyway, since it would give 
the South Africans an excuse to claim that just as a 
breakthrough appeared imminent, intemperate MDC actions had 
scuttled the opening. 
 
6.  (c) On the subject of elections, Tsvangirai claimed that 
massive voter transfers in the Gutu by-election had tipped 
the scales in favor of ZANU-PF.  While there had been less 
overt violence than in the past, intimidation continued, 
especially of traditional leaders.  GOZ threats to strip the 
leaders of their status had worked -- they had fallen in line 
behind ZANU-PF.  Ncube said that he had learned that a UNDP 
team would be in Zimbabwe in early March to do an election 
assessment.  He said that the GOZ had requested assistance to 
the tune of 27 billion Zimbabwe dollars.  Both Ncube and 
Tsvangirai questioned how deep UN commitment to pressing for 
 
SIPDIS 
a free and fair election might be.  Nonetheless, they had 
encouraged the UN assessment mission as a means to press for 
the massive overhaul of Zimbabwe's election process needed to 
make elections free and fair.  Should the GOZ reject UN 
recommendations for election system changes, this would 
expose the GOZ's unwillingness to organize fair elections. 
 
7.  (c) Comment.  ZANU-PF and the GOZ-controlled press have 
recently sought to create the impression that there is a 
growing rift between the two most senior MDC leaders.  Our 
assessment is that this is little more than 
propaganda/wishful thinking on the part of ZANU-PF, and that 
Tsvangirai and Ncube continue to see eye to eye. 
 
SIPDIS 
SULLIVAN