US embassy cable - 04AMMAN1120

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UN REP SAYS UN STAFF TO GO IN AND OUT OF IRAQ FOR NOW

Identifier: 04AMMAN1120
Wikileaks: View 04AMMAN1120 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Amman
Created: 2004-02-12 16:10:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL EAID IZ JO UNSC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

121610Z Feb 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001120 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2014 
TAGS: PREL, EAID, IZ, JO, UNSC 
SUBJECT: UN REP SAYS UN STAFF TO GO IN AND OUT OF IRAQ FOR 
NOW 
 
REF: AMMAN 387 
 
Classified By: Amb. Edward W. Gnehm for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  Special Representative Ross Mountain said 
the UN would re-enter Iraq gradually with "in and out" trips 
from Amman and Kuwait.  He confirmed that major UNAMI 
operations would be based in Amman, while HQ would remain in 
Cyprus.  A February 10 UNAMI donor briefing, co-chaired by 
Mountain, addressed security and the UN's evolving strategic 
planning report. Mountain called for greater cooperation with 
the World Bank and CPA in the UN's strategic plan.  End 
Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
UN SPECIAL REP BRIEFS ON HIS IMMEDIATE IRAQ PLANS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
2. (C) UN Special Representative Ad Interim Ross Mountain 
told DCM and Emboffs January 29 that the UN's top Iraq 
priority was to decide when -- not whether -- to return to 
Iraq.  He added that UNSYG Annan was eager for the UN to 
return, and hoped to return some international staff quickly 
to assist the approximately 1,000 national staff in Iraq. 
Mountain's other goals included establishing closer links 
between the UN and the Jordan-based NGO community and gearing 
up humanitarian and development efforts inside Iraq.  He 
intended to work on linking the World Bank and Iraqi 
ministries to coordinate humanitarian and development efforts 
and was looking forward to the post-Madrid donor conference 
scheduled for Feb. 28-29 in Abu Dhabi. 
 
3. (C) Mountain confirmed that the UN hopes initially to 
return international staff to Iraq on a gradual basis:  "in 
and out" operations with "no mass rush back in."  He 
explained that international staff based in Jordan and Kuwait 
would be flown in during the day and flown out at night. 
Mountain advised that although the UN is planning to house 
its staff at the Canal Hotel and plans were underway to 
renovate it with sleeping capacity for about 30 people, they 
did not want to use the Canal Hotel for an extended period. 
 
------------------- 
SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
------------------- 
 
4. (C) Mountain said the UN had lost its "innocence" in the 
August 19 car bomb attack and that this incident had 
"traumatized" UN security officials in New York.  He confided 
that he prefers to work out of Amman as opposed to Cyprus and 
had received full cooperation from the GOJ (he met with the 
Queen and FM Muasher).  Mountain added that it was "easier to 
do things" from Amman versus Cyprus and expressed stronger 
confidence in Jordan's security services.  However, 
headquarter's security concerns in Jordan needed to be 
carefully addressed.  DCM provided Embassy's security 
overview, and offered the full cooperation of the RSO in 
assessing the security threat and advising on our best 
practices. 
 
------------------------------------ 
UNAMI BRIEFING: HOW AND WHEN TO IRAQ 
------------------------------------ 
 
5. (C) At a February 10 UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) 
donor briefing, Mountain reiterated that the issue of a UN 
return to Iraq was now a question of how and when.  He added 
that plans were underway to return staff to Baghdad, with 
additional plans for Basra (out of Kuwait) and Erbil.  He 
said a Dutch aircraft would be available in the next few days 
to move staff in and out of Iraq on a daily basis.  Plans at 
present, Mountain affirmed, were to have Larnaca as its 
headquarters, with major operations based in Amman. Mountain 
added that he was leaving for Kuwait that same evening to 
iron out details for the UN presence in Kuwait. 
 
-------------------------------- 
SECURITY BRIEFING - AGAIN DISMAL 
-------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) UNSECOORD rep again presented a dismal security 
picture saying that their assessment was based on "bits and 
pieces" of information from various sources.  He said that 
the CPA, citing "security" grounds, did not provide complete 
security information to the UN, and rated the overall 
security situation as unstable.  He cited an increase in the 
efficiency of attacks, an average of 9.5 military fatalities 
per week, and the insurgents were now targeting anyone seen 
cooperating with coalition forces, including university 
professors who received envelopes filled with bullets, 
private contractors, the Dutch Embassy, Baghdad International 
Airport (allegedly attacked with Brazilian-made rockets), and 
unconfirmed reports that Ayatollah Al-Sistani had survived an 
assassination attempt. 
----------------------------------------- 
UN'S STRATEGIC PLANNING REPORT - DRAFT #3 
----------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Mountain told donors the UN's Strategic Planning 
Report needed more work, including more consultations with 
the World Bank and CPA Baghdad.  Mountain encouraged all 
attendees to review the report and offer comments, with 
special emphasis on detailing cash flow projections to 
determine when funds would be needed for each individual 
project.  He was concerned about the "credibility" of the 
final document. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
8. (C) The UN is positioning itself in Amman and Kuwait to 
initiate its gradual, but determined reentry into Iraq. 
Mountain seemed concerned that the UN might wait too long and 
find itself "out of the picture." 
 
9. (U) CPA Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
Visit Embassy Amman's classified website at 
http://www.state.sgov/p/nea/amman/ 
or access the site through the State Department's SIPRNET 
home page. 
GNEHM 

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