US embassy cable - 04AMMAN1054

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001054 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USNATO SEE PARA 8. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER, EFIN, JO 
SUBJECT: RESULTS OF G-8 COUNTERTERRORISM ACTION GROUP 
MEETING IN AMMAN 
 
REF: SECSTATE 14279 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (SBU)  DCM on February 5 hosted a discussion ref agenda 
items in preparation for the G-8 Counterterrorism Action 
Group (CTAG) meeting in Washington on February 20. 
Participants were counterparts from G-8 missions in Amman, in 
addition to representatives of interested states and 
organizations (Australia, Spain, and the European Union; 
Swiss were unavailable).  They provided snapshots of their 
country's counterterrorism support for Jordan, helped 
identify possible overlaps in training and other assistance, 
and highlighted areas for possible future assistance under 
CTAG auspices.  Participants reacted favorably to the U.S. 
proposal to explore the feasibility of helping Jordan create 
a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) to track and ultimately 
disrupt terrorist and criminal financial flows.  Along this 
vein, Post is arranging a meeting with Central Bank 
authorities to discuss Jordan's current practices and 
identify specific needs in this regard.  End Summary. 
 
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CT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR JORDAN 
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2.  (SBU)  DCM on February 5 convened his counterparts from 
G-8 missions in Amman, in addition to representatives from 
other countries and organizations, for a discussion of ref 
agenda items in advance of the Counterterrorism Action Group 
(CTAG) meeting in Washington on February 20.  The DCM led the 
discussion with a brief summary of U.S. training and 
assistance to support Jordan's counterterrorism program.  He 
noted that U.S. support for Jordan over the last year has 
included training on WMD awareness, mail security, and 
airport security management.  The U.S. is also working to 
help improve Jordan's border patrol operations and its crisis 
response practices.  Other courses during FY2004 include 
International Money Laundering, Post-Bomb Blast Crime Scene 
Investigations, and Public Corruption. 
 
3.  (SBU)  The French DCM noted his country maintains a very 
strong cooperative counterterrorism relationship -- mainly 
operational -- with Jordanian authorities.  The French have 
provided training courses in maritime security as well as 
others for the PSD.  The British also have a strong 
operational cooperative relationship with all three elements 
of Jordan's intelligence apparatus -- PSD, GID, and military 
intelligence -- and the U.K. is looking to expand its 
training program as it expects additional funding in the near 
future for new projects and is working on a aviation security 
assessment, according to the British DCM.  Jordanian 
officials also will participate in an upcoming conference in 
March in Dubai about transportation security. 
 
4.  (SBU)  The British DCM said his mission is struggling to 
get a better handle on Jordanian interagency coordination on 
CT matters, which they assess is poor.  In the end, it works, 
he said, because one of the three agencies usually takes over 
and works a problem to its resolution.  The U.K. has provided 
improvised explosive device disposal training.  It has not 
held a hostage rescue course in the last two years but is 
hoping to renew the program. 
 
5.  (SBU)  The Canadians also maintain a good operational 
relationship and have provided significant technical 
assistance in the past.  Its maritime security assistance 
program has been stalled for the last two years for unrelated 
political reasons but there is discussion about its 
resumption.  He suggested that Canada might be in a good 
position to help create a database for CTAG participants to 
catalogue and update ongoing CT programs, as well as to offer 
technical assistance on the financial side. 
 
6.  (SBU)  The EU representative mentioned that the 
Jordanians had requested assistance in upgrading an 
unspecified system designed to fight corruption and money 
laundering.  The Spanish representative presented the meeting 
with a copy of the Madrid Declaration that recognizes the 
needs of victims of terrorism. 
 
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NO KNOWN ASSESSMENTS OF JORDAN'S CT NEEDS 
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7.  (U)  None of the participants were able to identify any 
assessment conducted by CTAG donor countries, other donor 
countries, or international organizations about Jordan's 
CT-related needs. 
 
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AREAS OF OVERLAP 
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8.  (SBU)  Participants discussed potential areas of 
overlapping assistance, such as in the area of border 
security.  The Japanese DCM noted that his country was in the 
final stages of negotiating an agreement to provide Jordan 
with vehicles for border security.  Noting that several 
colleagues had noted during their presentations programs to 
help improve Jordan's border security, he expressed concern 
of possible duplication of efforts.  The British DCM 
mentioned that NATO had discussed providing assistance based 
on a list of requirements for Jordan, but it does not yet 
have a training budget.  NATO sent a team to Jordan to assess 
Jordan's needs, but because of the slow process perhaps CTAG 
would be a better venue through which to provide such 
assistance.  Post requests that the U.S. NATO mission in 
Brussels inquire about potential NATO assistance in this area. 
 
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FUTURE CT ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS 
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9.  (SBU)  Participants discussed Jordan's CT needs that are 
not being addressed by ongoing or planned CT assistance. 
Participants responded favorably to the U.S. proposal to 
explore the potential feasibility of helping Jordan create a 
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in Jordan to track and 
ultimately disrupt terrorist financial flows.  Post provided 
attendees with background information on FIUs, and offered to 
arrange a meeting with financial experts in Jordan's Central 
Bank to discuss the idea further.  Participants agreed that 
Jordanian involvement in the process is essential, 
particularly given the covert nature of many bilateral 
counterterrorism programs, to identify overlaps as well as 
gaps in assistance.  With regard to the FIU, the group deemed 
it essential to work closely with the Jordanians to 
understand the extent of the problem here in Jordan, 
determine what system is currently in place to detect and 
disrupt terrorist and criminal financial flows, and Jordan,s 
specific needs in this area.  The goal, of course, is to 
avoid creating a duplicate bureaucracy fighting the problem 
in Jordan. 
 
Visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman or access the site 
through the State Department's SIPRNET home page. 
GNEHM