US embassy cable - 04ANKARA749

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000749 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, TU 
SUBJECT: AK GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPT TO BROADEN ACCESS TO KORAN 
COURSES: A HELP OR A HINDRANCE TO OPEN SOCIETY? 
 
Classified by Polcouns John Kunstadter; reasons 1.5 (b, d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: The GOT in December withdrew new regulations 
that would have made it easier to open Koran courses after 
opponents called them a threat to the "secular" State.  An 
official from the Religious Affairs Directorate acknowledged 
political mistakes in the handling of the regulation, but 
defended its content as a much-needed response to public 
demand.  He said the regulation will be reintroduced later 
this year.  The controversy reflects both a distrust across 
the political spectrum of the ruling AK party's motives on 
religious matters and deep-rooted public dissatisfaction with 
official limits on Islamic expression.  End Summary. 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
Diyanet Issues, Withdraws Regulation 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
2. (U) Turkey's Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), 
attached to the Prime Ministry and responsible for overseeing 
Islamic education and all mosques in Turkey, amended 
regulations in Nov. 2002 to ease access to organized study of 
the Koran through opening of new Koran courses.  Key elements 
of the amendments included: 
 
 
-- Night Courses: Night Koran courses could be opened for 
working adults. 
 
 
-- Minimum Class Size: A minimum of 10 students would be 
required to open a Koran course; currently, a minimum of 15 
students is required. 
 
 
-- Teachers: In cases where permanent teachers are not 
available, Koran courses could be taught temporarily by 
qualified civil servants from the Ministry of education or 
graduates of imam hatip (preacher) high schools. 
 
 
-- Location: In addition to mosques, Koran courses could be 
taught in empty dormitories or boarding houses. 
 
 
-- Summer Courses: The current regulations specify that 
summer Koran courses can operate for two months, meeting up 
to three days per week; the amended regulations would have 
removed any such limits. 
 
 
3. (U) Opponents of the amendments -- including 
left-of-center/statist main opposition CHP, main elements of 
the State Establishment, and much of the media -- asserted 
that implementation would threaten Turkey's "secular" State. 
Opponents also accused ruling AK party of trying to evade 
public scrutiny by issuing the amendments on the eve of the 
end-of-Ramazan week-long Sugar Holiday.  In December the 
Diyanet withdrew the amendments for further work. 
 
 
4. (U) This tug of war is not a new phenomenon.  It comes in 
the context of a century-long, unresolved and often bitter 
debate about the place of Islam in Turkish society.  Within 
that debate lies an equally fierce struggle among the Diyanet 
and administration of theology faculties, which are 
encumbered by a positivist, bureaucratic approach to teaching 
Islam; scores of brotherhoods (tarikat) and lodges (cemaat), 
which compete to impose restrictive visions of how to 
interpret Islam in the Turkish context; and those 
commentators and theologians who would use critical thinking 
to refine both the understanding of Islam in the contemporary 
world and how to teach it. 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Diyanet: Public Demand for More Courses 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 
5. (C) Mehmet Gormez, Diyanet vice president and an Ankara U. 
assistant professor of theology, conceded to us that the 
Diyanet mishandled the amendment launch.  Saying that he and 
his colleagues are scholars, not politicians, and 
acknowledging that they had not taken into account political 
factors, Gormez nonetheless expressed puzzlement that the 
Diyanet's seemingly positive soundings with nodes of the 
Kemalist State (NSC, TGS, main opposition CHP) them 
boomeranged.  He sought an explanation in bad timing -- the 
amendments were introduced just days after Islamic terrorists 
conducted bombings in Istanbul.  He seemed puzzled when we 
asked why the Diyanet had not coordinated its plans with the 
Cabinet (Istanbul M.P. and Erdogan advisor Bagis told us 
Erdogan had had no idea the amendments were coming) or 
launched a public relations campaign to prepare the ground 
with the public through ministers' appearances on 
broadly-watched talk shows. 
 
 
6. (C) In dismissing the idea that one should have an open 
public debate on such questions (e.g., through raising public 
awareness), Gormez revealed how much he and his colleagues 
suffer from the same elitist perspective as opponents of 
broader religious education.  But he insists that opponents 
are distorting the content of the regulation.  Following the 
February 28 process (the February 1997 memorandum from the 
military calling on the then-Erbakan government to halt 
Islamist policies and leading to the post-modern coup against 
Erbakan), the GOT closed many Koran courses, cutting the 
total number from 6,000 to about 3,000.  Ever since, there 
has been a large, unmet demand, particularly among adults, 
Gormez said.  Under the regulation, empty dormitories and 
other alternative facilities would only be used in situations 
where there was no appropriate space in the local mosque. 
Without such legislation, he maintained, the demand will 
continue to be met by illegal Koran courses outside State 
control. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
CHP: Regulation Would Expand "Poor Education" 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
 
7. (C) Oya Arasli, an MP from main opposition, "secularist" 
CHP , asserted to us the Koran courses provide poor 
education, and argued that any attempt to expand them 
represents a potential threat to the "secular" State.  She 
said students in the courses learn only to memorize the Koran 
in Arabic.  They don't learn the meaning of the Koran, and 
the courses don't help them become better Muslims.  (Note: we 
have heard the same criticism from pious critically-thinking 
Turks and give it great weight.  End note.)  Arasli 
acknowledged that the regulation stated that the courses 
would include instruction on the meaning of the Koran and the 
moral lessons to be learned from the life of Mohammed.  But 
she averred that in practice the regulation would just expand 
the existing practice of teaching rote memorization.  Arasli 
criticized the article allowing imam hatip graduates to teach 
the courses.  Teenagers fresh out of high school, she argued, 
are not qualified to teach children, nor to explain the 
meaning of the Koran.  Although the regulation would allow 
imam hatip graduates to teach only temporarily, Arasli said 
in practice many such assignments would become permanent. 
 
 
8. (C) Necdet Budak, also an MP from CHP, told us he does not 
believe the regulation is a major issue.  Still, he wondered 
why the AK government is concerning itself with Koran courses 
while facing urgent challenges in areas like Cyprus, EU 
accession, and the economy.  Repeating the CHP mantra -- 
which is unusual for Budak, a sharp critic of the CHP 
leadership -- he said one can never be sure of AK's ultimate 
intentions on religious matters. 
 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Some Support Principle, Criticize Details 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
9. (C) Tayyar Altikulac, AK MP and head of the parliamentary 
Education Committee, told us the regulation was 
well-intentioned, but suffered from several "technical 
mistakes."  There is a demand for more Koran courses, 
especially night classes for working adults.  But there is no 
reason to allow for the use of empty dormitories and boarding 
houses; such facilities are not needed, and the measure 
raised suspicions among AK's critics by falsely creating the 
impression that there would be a dramatic increase in the 
number of classes.  In addition, classes held outside of 
mosques would be beyond the direct control of the Diyanet, 
making it possible for radical elements to exploit the 
courses for their own ends.  Altikulac also said the Diyanet 
should have consulted with him on the regulation, given his 
broad experience as a teacher and former Diyanet president. 
 
 
10. (C) Mualla Selcuk, dean of the Ankara University Theology 
Faculty, raised similar concerns about the regulation.  If 
the Diyanet had first consulted experts, she argued, it could 
have drafted a regulation better designed to improve the 
Koran courses, rather than simply increase their number.  She 
said the regulation seemed to be motivated by politics more 
than religion -- an attempt to curry favor with the AK 
grassroots by increasing the number of classes. 
 
 
---------------------- 
Regulation Will Return 
---------------------- 
 
 
11. (U) Gormez claimed the Diyanet will reintroduce the 
regulation later this year, after consulting with various 
parties and building support.  The regulation will form one 
small element of a broad reform of Diyanet policies.  The 
principle aim of the reform measures will be to raise the 
standards for imam training.  Currently, anyone with an imam 
hatip high school degree can become an imam.  The Diyanet 
plans to require all imams to have a four-year college degree 
by 2007 or 2008. 
 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
AK MP: Improve Religion Education in Schools 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
 
12. (C) As far as Altikulac is concerned, the whole 
controversy over Koran courses would be nullified if the 
State would simply provide proper religious education in 
schools.  He believes all schools should offer an optional 
religion course providing more extensive Islamic education 
than what is now available.  If this were done, the demand 
for Koran courses would shrink dramatically.  In addition, 
the imam hatip schools, which have become a magnet for pious 
families dissatisfied with religious education in traditional 
schools, would revert to their ostensible purpose -- 
educating future imams.  "If the schools don't fulfill the 
demand for religious education, the debate will never end," 
he said. 
 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
 
13. (C) This controversy is yet another example where (1) the 
Kemalist State has held in contempt the aspirations of a 
broad sector of the citizenry (one contact, involved in the 
February 28 process, recalled for us recently how a general 
summoned him and said, "Hey pal, why don't you just go and 
write a new Koran"); (2) many of those pushing for expanded 
religious education, influenced by a secretive and sectarian 
lodge mentality, have failed to clarify their intentions; and 
(3) both Kemalists and sectarians have drowned out more 
reasonable voices in the middle.  This is not the first time 
the AK government has pulled back a proposal after opponents 
raised accusations of Islamist motives -- we last saw this 
when the GOT shelved a plan that would have enabled imam 
hatip graduates to enroll in university programs other than 
theology.  Bad timing and a lack of consultation may have 
helped undermine the Koran course regulation.  However, 
opposition to the measure is fueled both by a general 
distrust of AK's motives on religious matters and by concern 
that the new regulations contained loopholes which would 
weaken the ability to ensure both quality and a spirit of 
tolerance in the teaching. 
 
 
14. (C) In Turkey distrust and concern are all too often 
expressions of fear and prejudice rather than reasoned 
argument.  In this case, we take seriously the reservations 
expressed by MPs Arasli, Budak and Altikulac as well as by 
leading voices of more pious Turkey such as journalist 
Bedreddin Habiboglu.  In the end, however, we should keep in 
mind that Turks tend to be relatively pious, and a large 
majority of the public bridles at the rigid State 
interpretation of "secularism."  As long as the debate over 
the definition of secularism, the place of the State in 
religion, and limits of Islamic expression in a secular state 
remains unresolved, these types of conflicts will continue. 
EDELMAN