US embassy cable - 04BRATISLAVA127

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MFA VIEW ON UKRAINE'S PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

Identifier: 04BRATISLAVA127
Wikileaks: View 04BRATISLAVA127 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Bratislava
Created: 2004-02-06 16:55:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PINR PGOV LO UP SLOVAK
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000127 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PINR, PGOV, LO, UP, SLOVAK-UKRAINE 
SUBJECT: MFA VIEW ON UKRAINE'S PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT 
 
REF: A. BRATISLAVA 101 B. KIEV 129 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR RONALD WEISER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C) POLOFF CALLED ON MFA UKRAINE DESK OFFICER PETER VIZDAL 
    FOR A GENERAL DISCUSSION ON SLOVAK-UKRAINE RELATIONS.  VIZDAL 
POINTED OUT THAT SLOVAKIA SIGNED THE EU DECLARATION 
CRITICIZING A PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO ALLOW 
KUCHMA TO RUN FOR A THIRD TERM (REF B), AS A MATTER OF COMMON 
FOREIGN POLICY LOOKING AHEAD TO EU INTEGRATION.  VIZDAL, WHO 
SPENT THE LAST FOUR YEARS AT THE SLOVAK EMBASSY IN KIEV, 
ADDED THAT SLOVAKIA IS CLOSELY FOLLOWING THE ISSUE AND IS 
TROUBLED BY THE AMENDMENT.  HE PREDICTED THAT THE AMENDMENT 
WOULD PASS TO THE SECOND READING, AND NOTED THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN UKRAINE HAS ALREADY RULED THAT THE 
AMENDMENT WOULD NOT POSE A PROBLEM. 
 
2. (C) VIZDAL EMPHASIZED THAT UKRAINE IS USUALLY UNRESPONSIVE 
TO "DECLARATIONS" AND IN FACT WILL TEND TO DO THE OPPOSITE OF 
WHAT IS ASKED.  AS FOR SLOVAKIA'S INFLUENCE, VIZDAL NOTED 
THAT WHILE SLOVAKIA AND UKRAINE HAVE A GOOD DIALOGUE, UKRAINE 
SEES ITSELF AS A REGIONAL LEADER THAT, WITH ITS POPULATION OF 
50 MILLION, HAS LITTLE REASON TO LISTEN TO SLOVAKIA, A 
COUNTRY ONE-TENTH UKRAINE'S SIZE.  HISTORICALLY AND 
ECONOMICALLY, POLAND HAS BEEN A MUCH CLOSER PARTNER WITH 
UKRAINE.  IF THE UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT DOES APPROVE THE 
AMENDMENT, THERE WILL BE LITTLE SLOVAKIA CAN DO.  VIZDAL ALSO 
OBSERVED THAT THERE APPEARS TO BE NO OTHER CANDIDATE BESIDES 
KUCHMA WHO HAS ENOUGH SUPPORT TO BE ABLE TO GOVERN UKRAINE. 
 
3. (C) COMMENT: MFA OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD US IN THE PAST THAT 
THEY WOULD LIKE TO DEVELOP "NICHE CAPABILITIES" IN FOREIGN 
POLICY, INCLUDING THE BALKANS AND SLOVAKIA'S EASTERN 
NEIGHBORS.  POLICY TOWARD UKRAINE, BELARUS, MOLDOVA AND OTHER 
FORMER STATES OF THE USSR WILL BE A MAJOR THEME OF DISCUSSION 
AT THE MARCH 18-19 BRATISLAVA II CONFERENCE HOSTED BY PM 
    DZURINDA.  WHILE PRESIDENT SCHUSTER'S VIEW OF KUCHMA (REF A) 
IS COLORED BY THEIR FRIENDSHIP, LOWER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT 
ARE PRODUCTIVELY ENGAGING UKRAINIAN COUNTERPARTS ON ISSUES 
SUCH AS BETTER LAW-ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION AT THE BORDER. 
SLOVAKIA CAN'T INFLUENCE UKRAINE SINGLE-HANDEDLY, BUT WOULD 
SUPPORT A V-4, EU, OR U.S. INITIATIVE THAT ENGAGES 
REFORM-ORIENTED UKRAINE LEADERS. 
THAYER 
 
NNNN 

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