US embassy cable - 04ABUJA177

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 000177 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NP/CBM 
AF/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2014 
TAGS: PARM, PREL, ETTC, KSCA, MNUC, KNNP, KN, NI, MTCRE 
SUBJECT: PREVENTING NIGERIAN MISSILE-RELATED COOPERATION 
WITH NORTH KOREA 
 
REF: A. STATE 19874 
     B. ABUJA 149 
 
Classified By: CDA RICK L. ROBERTS FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) February 4, CDA delivered demarche (REF A) on Nigerian 
missile-related cooperation with North Korea to President 
Obasanjo's National Security Advisor, LTG (ret.) Aliyu 
Mohammed Gusau.  CDA explained the seriousness with which the 
USG views North Korean missile and WMD programs, and asked 
the NSA to clarify statements made by Vice President Atiku's 
spokesman January 28 referring to the transfer of ballistic 
missiles or missile technology to Nigeria. 
 
2. (C) The NSA denied, in the strongest terms, any Nigerian 
interest in acquiring missiles and/or missile technology from 
North Korea.  He claimed North Korea had offered to sell 
missiles and/or missile technology, but the GON had turned 
the offer down.  The NSA commented that Nigeria's strategic 
interests are mainly in the West African sub-region and 
ballistic missiles were simply not necessary to further those 
interests.  He went on to say that Nigeria was at peace with 
its neighbors in the sub-region and pointed out that even the 
long-festering border dispute with Cameroon was now being 
settled amicably under the auspices of the United Nations. 
The NSA commented the GON had better things to spend its 
money on than ballistic missiles. 
 
3. (C) COMMENT:  The NSA's statements track with what other 
senior GON officials have told us, but not necessarily with 
what the Nigerians are telling the North Koreans (Ref B). 
North Korea will likely continue to attempt to expand its 
relationship with Nigeria in the near term and Nigeria will 
probably be all too happy to accept any free assistance 
(economic or military) that North Korea doles out. 
 
4. (C) Other countries have tasked their missions here to 
make similar demarches, including at least the UK, France and 
China.  Like us, they are hearing strong denials from their 
Nigerian interlocutors.  Like us (Ref B), they believe 
Nigeria deliberately left the MOU open to North Korean 
missile ties -- without necessarily wanting to follow through 
on purchases -- in order to keep that option and in the 
meantime get as much else as it can from the North Koreans. 
END COMMENT. 
 
Roberts