US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE282

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) - BRIEFING THE OPCW DIRECTOR-GENERAL FOR HIS TRIP TO LIBYA

Identifier: 04THEHAGUE282
Wikileaks: View 04THEHAGUE282 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2004-02-04 12:42:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PARM PREL LY CWC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000282 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR T, AC, AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD, PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR CHUPA 
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2014 
TAGS: PARM, PREL, LY, CWC 
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) - BRIEFING THE 
OPCW DIRECTOR-GENERAL FOR HIS TRIP TO LIBYA 
 
REF: STATE 22409 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: ERIC M. JAVITS, AMBASSADOR TO THE OPCW.  REASONS: 1.5 (B 
, D). 
 
 This is CWC-13-04. 
 
1.  (C)  In preparation for OPCW Director-General Pfirter's 
February 4-6 trip to Libya, the U.S. and U.K. provided a 
joint briefing to the DG and some of the accompanying staff 
members.  Ambassador Javits utilized the points in reftel, 
and the U.K. provided one of its technical experts who 
recently had been in Libya, accompanied by U.K. Ambassador 
Budd.  The DG expressed appreciation for the information 
provided by both sides, and Verification Director Horst Reeps 
was particularly grateful for the level of detail provided in 
both briefings. 
 
2.  (C)  The DG's office has confirmed that Pfirter will be 
accompanied by Reeps, Rafael Grossi (the DG's chief of 
staff), Don Clagett (industry verification), Peter Kaiser 
(public affairs), and Lisa Tabassi (legal office).  February 
4 and 6 will be completely taken up with travel, and 
Thursday, February 5 will be the full day of meetings with 
Libyan officials.  With regard to the program, Grossi flatly 
admitted that the officials have no idea what meetings with 
Libyan officials have been arranged for Pfirter and his 
delegation.  Grossi told us he had informed the Libyan 
Ambassador in the Hague of the meetings which IAEA Director 
ElBaradei had in Tripoli, but there was no/no request for an 
identical program.  At this point, emphasized Grossi, "we are 
completely in their hands," and the OPCW officials are simply 
hopeful that the Libyans have put together a suitable program. 
 
3.  (C)  DG Pfirter has made clear to Ambassador Javits that 
he intends to utilize the visit to publicly welcome Libya as 
a State Party to the CWC, stress the requirements incumbent 
on Tripoli, and highlight the readiness of the OPCW to assist 
Libya in meeting those requirements.  He also wants to 
introduce to the Libyans his "team" that will be handling the 
detailed work on a myriad of issues, particularly on the key 
questions of inspections and verification.  The DG is fully 
aware that personal relationships with key Libyan officials 
will be important in accomplishing those tasks, and Pfirter 
wants to be sure that Reeps in particular, and other 
important members of his staff meet Libyan counterparts.  The 
DG has promised to provide Ambassadors Javits and Budd with a 
read-out on the visit on February 9. 
 
4.  (C)  Finally, we used the opportunity of the discussion 
with Grossi to emphasize the importance of handling the 
public affairs aspects of the visit properly.  Grossi took 
the point that while the substance discussed on February 5 
will obviously be important, the optics of the visit will be 
just as, if not more, critical.  Indeed, we stressed that for 
an organization like the OPCW, which is not as well known as 
the IAEA, it would be important to make sure that the OPCW 
conveys the image that it is cognizant of its 
responsibilities arising from the Libyan decision, and that 
the OPCW is ready to and will handle those responsibilities. 
 
5.  (U)  Javits sends. 
SOBEL 

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