US embassy cable - 04AMMAN832

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 AMMAN 000832 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2014 
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, IS, IZ, JO, KTER 
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN FM DISCUSSES PEACE PROCESS, RELATIONS 
WITH ISRAEL AND SYRIA, AND OTHER ISSUES WITH NEA DAS 
SATTERFIELD 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm for Reasons 1.5 (b), (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) Jordanian FM Marwan Muasher told visiting NEA DAS 
Satterfield on February 1 that he was pushing for an Arab 
League resolution to help bolster the peace process, 
including a provision that would specifically condemn suicide 
bombings.  He said it remained unclear whether the Arab 
League summit would take place as scheduled in Tunis. 
Muasher spoke January 30 with Syrian Foreign Minister Shara 
on strengthening Syrian-Jordanian relations and discussed 
King Abdullah's upcoming trip to Syria.  The King is wary of 
undertaking travel to Syria beyond a planned opening of the 
Unity Dam on the border without a pledge for a return visit 
by Syrian President Asad to Amman.  Muasher was very 
concerned about Jordan's relations with Israel and complained 
that the Israelis had given Hizbollah a far better prisoner 
release deal than they were willing to give Jordan.  Given 
this disparity of treatment, Muasher said he would not 
receive Israeli FM Shalom until an agreement was reached that 
included release of the four long-time prisoners convicted of 
murder.  Muasher assured Satterfield that Jordan's recent 
filing with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against 
the Israeli security wall was strictly legal in its approach 
and did not stray into final-status issues.  He pledged to 
continue negotiations with the U.S. over an Article 98 
agreement.  End Summary. 
 
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ISRAEL-PALESTINIAN UPDATE 
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2.  (C) NEA DAS David Satterfield and the Ambassador met 
February 1 with Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher. 
Satterfield briefed Muasher on his recent conversations with 
both Palestinians and Israelis during his visit to the region 
and said that both sides, driven in large part by domestic 
pressures and reasons, are seriously talking about taking 
steps needed for sustainable progress.  Muasher remarked that 
he had recently talked with Abu Mazen, who told him that the 
time may now be right to strike a deal with Arafat whereby 
Arafat would be granted freedom of movement within the West 
Bank/Gaza in exchange for meeting all the stringent 
conditions that we have asked for.  Muasher did not comment 
on the merits of this suggestion, but said he was merely 
passing it along for U.S. consideration.  (Separately, Abu 
Mazen had lamented that Arafat "would never change.") 
 
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SOMETHING POSITIVE FOR THE ARAB LEAGUE? 
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3.  (C) Asked about plans for Arab League summit action on 
the peace process, Muasher said that he spoke with Amre 
Moussa and other Arab leaders at Davos about this subject. 
Muasher opined that Arab states need to play a constructive 
role and that, if a summit is held, he was going to push for 
an Arab League resolution consisting of four parts, which he 
had already drafted.  First, a condemnation of the killing of 
civilians by both sides, with a specific denouncement of 
suicide bombings.  According to Muasher, this would help 
provide "Arab cover" for the Palestinians to take action 
against the organizers of suicide operations.  Second, a 
statement supporting efforts to reach a comprehensive and 
permanent hudna, to be followed by "significant steps" to 
restart peace negotiations.  Third, a call on Israel to state 
its acceptance of the roadmap without conditions.  Fourth, a 
reaffirmation of the Arab League's peace initiative from the 
Beirut summit. 
 
4.  (C) Muasher acknowledged that he was unsure if he could 
persuade Arab League members to support such a resolution. 
He had already spoken to Saudi FM Saud about his plan, but 
got only a lukewarm reaction.  While Saud wasn't opposed to 
the idea, he instead was focused on legalistic actions, such 
as "registering" the language of the Beirut initiative with 
the UN, a move which Muasher and Satterfield agreed was 
irrelevant given numerous UNSC endorsements of the Beirut 
document.  Muasher intended to pursue his resolution idea 
with Saud and others at the February 14 meeting of 
"neighboring states (to Iraq)" in Kuwait. 
 
5.  (C) Concerning the status of the Arab League summit in 
Tunis, Muasher commented that Tunis was now uncertain if it 
wanted to host it.  He said that the Tunisians were afraid 
that the summit might be seen as a failure, which would 
reflect badly on President Ben Ali during an election year. 
The Tunisians were also concerned about possible security 
threats.  The summit could be moved to the League's 
headquarters in Cairo, but Egyptian President Mubarak told 
King Abdullah that he was not keen on this since he was not 
planning to go to Tunis, but would be forced to attend the 
summit if it were held in Egypt. 
 
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JORDAN-SYRIA RELATIONS: MOVING AHEAD? 
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6.  (C) During the January 25 visit of Syrian Prime Minister 
Otri to Amman for the signing of a regional gas project, 
Muasher said, both he and Prime Minister Faisal Al-Fayez 
urged Otri for better communication and coordination between 
their two governments to help overcome current "barbs" in 
Jordanian-Syrian relations.  Five days later, Syrian FM Shara 
gave Muasher a "very friendly" call to say that President 
Bashar Asad had been briefed on these remarks, and that Asad 
wants to coordinate more closely with Jordan on issues of 
common concern.  Shara added that Asad was looking forward to 
King Abdullah's upcoming visit to Syria to inaugurate the 
Wahda (Unity) dam. 
 
7.  (C) According to Muasher, the Syrians are proposing that 
King Abdullah continue on to Damascus after the ceremony at 
the dam.  King Abdullah, however, is wary of going to 
Damascus without a commitment by the Syrians that Asad will 
make a return visit to Jordan.  The King has made several 
trips to Syria without any reciprocal travel by Syria's chief 
of state and he feels that it is only fair for Asad to now 
visit him.  While Muasher said he believes recent signs that 
Asad clearly wants to further open up his country, he is 
skeptical whether Asad can pull the old guard and the Syrian 
bureaucracy in line with him. 
 
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JORDAN-ISRAEL RELATIONS: HITTING A SNAG 
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8.  (C) Muasher said he was very worried that 
Jordanian-Israeli relations could "spin out of control."  In 
concluding a prisoners release deal with Hizbollah, he opined 
that the Israelis did everything that they said they could 
not do for Jordan.  Muasher stated that there were 24 
Jordanians being held in Israel for "security-related" 
offenses, including the four long-time prisoners convicted of 
murder prior to the Israel-Jordan peace treaty.  He explained 
that Jordanian officials had met with each of the detainees 
and that seventeen of them wanted to return to Jordan, 
including "the four," while six did not.  Although Israel was 
prepared to release even more Jordanian prisoners, Muasher 
said that these others were "criminals" and that the GOJ 
frankly did not care whether they were freed.  Prior to 
Israel's deal with Hizbollah, Jordan had come very close to a 
prisoner release agreement with Israel except for the issue 
of "the four," which Muasher was prepared at that point to 
defer until later.  However, the Israeli swap with Hizbollah 
transformed the prisoner issue for Jordan. 
 
9.  (C) According to Muasher, while Jordan had wanted Israeli 
FM Shalom to visit Amman as scheduled in January, the 
announcement of the deal with Hizbollah two days before the 
visit "put us in an impossible situation."  That same day, 
the Israeli ambassador to Jordan called Muasher and asked 
about a meeting between Shalom and King Abdullah.  Muasher 
said that this had never been promised and that, in his 
opinion, it was not necessary.  The Israeli ambassador stated 
that Shalom would not come to Amman if he could not see the 
King.  Later, Shalom called Muasher and asked why he was not 
welcome in Jordan.  Muasher responded that he was very 
welcome, to which Shalom said he would "look like a fool" if 
he didn't meet with the King.  Muasher then asked Shalom how 
he thought the King would look if he met with the Israeli FM 
after public disclosure of Israel's agreement with Hizbollah 
and no similar release of Jordanians. 
 
10.  (C) Muasher emphasized that Israel must now come up with 
a prisoner release deal for Jordan that includes "the four." 
If such an agreement is reached, Shalom's visit to Amman can 
be rescheduled and the King will receive him.  Otherwise, 
after talking things over with King Abdullah, Muasher said 
that both he and the King would refuse to meet with Shalom. 
While Jordan wants to improve its dialogue with Israel, 
Muasher stated that this was not possible in the current 
environment and that Israel was clearly taking Jordan for 
granted. 
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THE BARRIER 
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11.  (C) The Israeli security wall is a "vital issue" to 
Jordan, Muasher stated, as it affected Jordan's own security. 
 He assured Satterfield and the Ambassador that Jordan's 
filing with the ICJ (a copy of which he offered to provide) 
was "very legal" in its approach and focused on the fact that 
the wall was being built in "occupied territory," as opposed 
to "disputed territory."  As such, Israel had a legal 
obligation to preserve the territory's status/integrity and 
must reverse the wall's construction.  Israel's argument that 
the wall was an act of self-defense, said Muasher, was only 
valid if the wall was built on Israel's own territory. 
 
12.  (C) Muasher also stated that the filing did not go into 
other issues and that Jordan would wait to examine all the 
briefs before deciding whether it would participate in oral 
debate before the court.  Satterfield took note that Jordan's 
filing had stuck to legal questions, rather than final status 
matters, but reiterated that the U.S. had a difference of 
opinion with Jordan on the ICJ case. 
 
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ARTICLE 98 AND ARAB REFORM 
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13.  (C) Muasher said that the GOJ had closely examined the 
most recent U.S. proposal for an Article 98 agreement.  While 
this proposal reflected the real progress achieved by 
negotiations, it still did not resolve Jordan's concerns 
regarding the possible transfer of population.  Jordan's 
latest proposal had "put us in trouble with the ICC," said 
Muasher.  The GOJ was now waiting on the U.S. response and 
ready to reconvene talks in March.  Satterfield responded 
that the U.S. was carefully examining the Jordanian proposal. 
 He assured Muasher that any disagreements on the Article 98 
issue would not harm U.S.-Jordan relations. 
 
14.  (C) Muasher was satisfied with preparations for the 
meeting in Egypt on Arab reform to build upon earlier 
discussions in Aqaba.  According to Muasher, Gamal Mubarak's 
office was doing a good job following-up with NGOs, including 
women's groups, and the invitations it had issued indicated 
that the meeting would cover all the issues that Jordan hoped 
it would address (i.e., political and economic reform items). 
 
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OIL AND IRAQ 
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15.  (C) Both Kuwait and the UAE, Muasher complained, had 
failed to provide any money to Jordan this year to help 
Jordan purchase oil.  He worried that the two Gulf countries 
might not even deliver funds for the last three months of 
2003 as agreed.  The Saudis had kept silent about their 
intentions since King Abdullah's visit, but Muasher was not 
optimistic. 
16.  (C) Turning to Iraq, Muasher said that Jordan was 
opposed to the idea of federalism and that he would discuss 
this issue with Iraqi Foreign Minister Zebari during the 
upcoming "neighboring states" meeting in Kuwait.  Satterfield 
said that the coalition believed it would be able to meet the 
concerns of Shi'a leader Ayatollah Sistani and the U.S. would 
not change its timeline for the creation of a transitional 
government this summer.  Satterfield also welcomed a UN role 
in the transition process. 
 
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COMMENT 
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17.  (C) Muasher was relaxed and cordial during the 
approximately 80 minute meeting at his home.  His statements 
on the prisoner release issue with Israel in the wake of the 
Hizbollah deal are of particular concern.  They represent a 
hardening of Jordan's previous stance. 
 
18.  (U) NEA DAS Satterfield did not have an opportunity to 
clear this cable. 
Visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman or access the site 
through the State Department's SIPRNET home page. 
GNEHM