US embassy cable - 04HARARE188

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000188 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR SDELISI, LAROIAN, MRAYNOR 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR JFRAZER, DTEITELBAUM 
LONDON FOR CGURNEY 
PARIS FOR CNEARY 
NAIROBI FOR TPFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, SA, ZI, MDC 
SUBJECT: MDC UPDATE ON PROGRESS IN TALKS 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 174 (B) HARARE 84 (C) HARARE 73 (D) 
     03 HARARE 2412 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5(b)(d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: MDC Secretary-General Welshman Ncube on 
January 30 told the Ambassador that he expected to engage his 
ruling party interlocutor, Justice Minister Patrick 
Chinamasa, soon on key issues relating to prospective talks. 
A new electoral law would address many issues, while the fate 
of The Daily News and the youth militias loomed as potential 
stumbling blocks.  He intimated that they already had 
discussed the possiblity of a government of national unity in 
hypothetical terms as a vehicle to carry the country toward 
presidential and parliamentary elections, possibly by 2005. 
Ncube said he and Chinamasa envisioned reaching tentative 
agreement on most important issues before the parties 
announced formal talks and began the task of getting the deal 
blessed by key constituencies.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Talks on Talks Substantive 
-------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) During a visit by the Ambassador to his law office, 
Ncube advised that he was scheduled to meet Chinamasa on 
February 3 to resume discussions on issues relating to 
resumption of interparty talks.  He reported that Chinamasa 
had deflected earlier attempts during January to engage on 
grounds of being on official leave, notwithstanding that 
Chinamasa had been playing a high profile role at the 
parliament.  Discussions would revolve in large part around a 
draft Electoral Amendment Act that Ncube shared with the 
Justice Minister two weeks before, and draft amendments to 
the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and Access to 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), which 
Ncube had conveyed in November. 
 
3.  (C) Ncube asserted that Chinamasa shared his desire to 
resolve most important contentious issues before commencing 
formal interparty talks.  The election law would address many 
critical matters.  He said that certain important 
"environmental" issues, such as the status of the youth 
militia and The Daily News, had yet to be addressed.  The 
Daily News problem might resolve itself (ref A), and other 
well-known points of difference, such as the MDC's election 
petition and stand on sanctions, would "fall away" once 
agreement was reached on new elections. 
 
4.  (C) Ncube said Chinamasa "seemed to agree" with his 
proposal to conduct parliamentary and presidential elections, 
as well as urban and rural council elections, at roughly the 
same time so as to reduce the perpetual state of tension 
engendered by rolling elections.  Timing had yet to be 
agreed, although the positions were narrowing: the MDC 
originally wanted elections this year but was now focusing 
more on establishing proper atmospherics and mechanics than 
on immediacy; Chinamasa first argued for presidential 
elections in 2007, but more recently had shifted to 2006. 
(Comment: Parliamentary elections are now scheduled for 2005 
and presidential election for 2008.  End comment.)  Once 
agreement had been sealed on key issues, formalized talks 
would provide a process by which the parties would sell the 
deal to key constituencies. 
 
5.  (C) According to Ncube, the two had discussed the 
division of portfolios in a coalition government in a 
hypothetical "brainstorming" exercise.  The MDC remained open 
to the idea of a government of national unity, depending on 
preconditions -- the shorter the government's duration, the 
better, for example.  ZANU-PF was insisting that the MDC "be 
involved" in the government in some way, and sought to defer 
consideration of problematic issues such as POSA, AIPPA, and 
political violence until a new government was in place. 
Ncube asserted that transition arrangements would be 
addressed in a new constitution that would be ratified by the 
parliament, although Chinamasa sometimes seemed reluctant to 
take the parliamentary route of ratification.  Ncube noted 
that certain opposition elements could be expected to 
criticize the parliamentary approach in any event. 
 
ZANU-PF Politicking Not Expected to Disrupt Talks 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
6.  (C) Ncube indicated that Chinamasa had been candid about 
the pressures he was facing within the ruling party. 
Chinamasa said that Information Minister Jonathan Moyo, 
Parliamentary Speaker Emmerson Mnangagwa, retired General 
Solomon Mujuru, and general-turned-politician Josiah 
Tungamirai were among those pressing him on talks.  Chinamasa 
said he took instructions directly from Mugabe, who he saw 
regularly though not daily.  He confirmed that State Minister 
for National Security Nicholas Goche, who did see Mugabe on a 
daily basis, also played a substantial role in the talks. 
Chinamasa had explained to Ncube that he often had to appear 
"radicalized" toward the opposition in order to maintain his 
"mainstream" ZANU-PF credentials. 
 
7.  (C) Ncube predicted that the ruling party's latest 
bloodletting over Chiyangwa (ref C) would not have any direct 
implications for prospects on talks.  He observed that 
Mnangagwa's camp (which had included Chiyangwa) was under 
"intense pressure", in part because they had abused 
state-connected funds to finance Mnangagwa's ill-fated 
succession campaign.  Ncube reported that as Speaker, 
Mnangagwa of late had been uncharacteristically hostile to 
him and slected other MDC MPs, and speculated that he may see 
them as part of the cabal arraying against him. 
 
8.  (C) Elaborating further on ruling party dynamics, Ncube 
commented that ZANU-PF's membership generally recognized that 
internal political settlement would have to precede effective 
international re-engagement.  The membership was eager for 
progress but extremely anxious about talks because all but a 
few were out of the loop.  Ncube reported that ZANU-PF MPs he 
encountered on a regular basis always asked him about 
progress in his talks with their Justice Minister, from whom 
they uniformly said they got no information.  That the 
Finance Minister waited 15 minutes to query him after he 
emerged from a bank queue Ncube took to indicate both how 
tight the ZANU-PF information loop was and how little the 
Minister has to do at his Ministry. 
 
Diplomatic Engagement 
--------------------- 
 
9.  (C) Turning to the international front, Ncube said his 
party continued to be in close contact with the South 
Africans on process and had advised them about the lack of 
concrete progress on substantive issues.  He noted that 
Ambassdor Ndou had indicated that the sooner elections were 
held, the better -- 2005 was too far off.  Ncube reported 
that the Namibian mission in Harare had become increasingly 
engaged with the party leadership and other diplomatic 
missions on the issue of talks.  He said that Tanzania was 
much more positive privately than their public stance would 
indicate.  During their meeting with President Mkapa in 
October, he informed them that he had selected his new 
Ambassador to Harare because of his stature as former 
Secretary-General of the OAU's Committee on Liberation at the 
 
SIPDIS 
OAU -- he was not one to be pushed around easily.  Indeed, 
the new Tanzanian ambassador had met with MDC officials three 
times and seemed genuine in his stated desire to be helpful 
in stimulating momentum on interparty dialogue. 
 
10.  (C) Ncube emphasized MDC interest in the prospective UN 
elections mission to evaluate prospects for involvement in 
Zimbabwe's next parliamentary election (ref B), and reported 
that the party had been communicating with local UN 
representatives on the matter.  He was encouraged that the 
office's discussions with Chinamasa had gone well and not 
surprised that engagement with election administrator Mudede 
had been negative. 
 
Party Doing Well 
---------------- 
 
11.  (C) Addressing the health of his party, Ncube asserted 
that party planning generally was improving.  The party's 
various committees were active developing action programs, 
with attention recently being devoted to party organization; 
voter education; and diplomatic strategies, especially with 
respect to Africa.  The Information Department was 
spotlighting the party's so-called "RESTART" economic 
program, which had been launched officially January 29 
despite a clumsy government attempt to thwart the associated 
public event.  (The event commenced an hour late when party 
lawyers had to obtain an urgent court order quashing police 
attempts to close the meeting over lack of a permit.)  In 
some detail, Ncube denied reports in this week's edition of 
the Financial Gazette that he had been involved in a secret 
effort in 2002 to link up with Mnangagwa and then Armed 
Forces Chief Zvinavashe to create a coalition to sideline 
both Mugabe and MDC Party President Morgan Tsvangirai. 
 
Litigation Vexes 
---------------- 
 
12.  (C) Ncube observed that Tsvangirai's treason trial was 
proving to be even more politicized than expected.  The 
prosecution was seeking gratuitous details on the party's 
functioning and strategies, and emphasizing things that 
Tsvangirai did not know in an effort to undermine his 
 
SIPDIS 
stature.  Ncube was scheduled to testify for the defense when 
the trial resumes on February 11. 
 
13.  (C) Elsewhere on the legal front, Ncube said he 
understood that the report on Harare's MDC Executive Mayor 
Elias Mudzuri (ref D) reached negative conclusions and 
recommended criminal proceedings against the beleaguered 
politician.  He implied that the process would take 
considerable time, noting that Local Government Minister 
Chombo wanted to make sure he had an "airtight" case and that 
Mudzuri would not be able to respond legally. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
14.  (C) MDC officials have previously confided to us 
cautious openness to a government of national unity but this 
is the first confirmation that portfolios actually have been 
dicussed with the ruling party.  Ncube and his party may view 
such conceptualizing as hypothetical, but it may fuel ZANU-PF 
expectations for a coalition and put the MDC on a slippery 
slope.  Ncube's expectation that most important issues will 
be nailed down before formal talks are announced may prove 
elusive.  Historically, ZANU-PF interlocutors often indicate 
tentative agreement or flexibility, only to be snapped back 
on a short, rigid leash. 
SULLIVAN