US embassy cable - 04TEGUCIGALPA236

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 000236 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CEN, EB, DS, AND INR 
STATE PASS TO USTR 
DOL FOR ILAB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, ELAB, SOCI, ETRD, PREL, ECON, ASEC, PINR, HO 
SUBJECT: TEGUCIGALPA PROTEST PLANNED FOR FEBRUARY 5: IMF 
DEAL, CAFTA/FTAA, IRAQ, AND MINIMUM WAGE LIKELY THEMES 
 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Francisco Plamieri; 
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary: The leftist organization Popular Block is 
planning a large protest march for February 5 in Tegucigalpa. 
 The protest, which may include over a thousand 
demonstrators, will focus on controversial domestic 
legislation linked to the recent IMF agreement and various 
U.S. foreign policy issues, such as Iraq, CAFTA, and the 
FTAA.  According to congressional and Presidential House 
insiders, President Maduro's decision not to dismiss some key 
ministers, such as Education Minister Carlos Avila and Health 
Minister Elias Lizardo, is also exacerbating the situation. 
The Popular Block may be joined by all three labor 
confederations who are demanding a 30 percent increase in the 
minimum wage, vice the seven percent offered by private 
business.  The march is planned to end at the Presidential 
Palace, but may also include a demonstration outside the 
Embassy.  Post does not expect the protest to be 
destabilizing for the GOH.  End Summary. 
 
2. (U) The leftist organization Popular Block is planning a 
large protest march for February 5 in Tegucigalpa.  The 
Popular Block is led by Carlos H. Reyes, leader of the union 
at the beer company and a galvanizing force in Honduran 
protests.  The protest is likely to focus on the following 
issues: recent controversial actions by Congress to meet 
stringent IMF terms for a letter of intent, including 
reductions in pay and benefits for public sector teachers and 
doctors and an increase in gas prices; the recently 
negotiated U.S.-Central American Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA); the planned Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA); 
Iraq and the unpopular deployment of Honduran Task Force 
Xatruch to Iraq; Plan Pueblo Panama; and other globalization 
issues. 
 
3. (C) According to congressional and Presidential House 
insiders, President Ricardo Maduro's decision not to dismiss 
some key, but controversial, ministers, such as Education 
Minister Carlos Avila and Health Minister Elias Lizardo, is 
also exacerbating the situation.  Apparently President Maduro 
or his negotiators agreed to the dismissal of the Education 
and Health Ministers as part of the deal to win congressional 
approval in late December 2003 of legislation that was a 
precursor to an IMF letter of intent. 
 
4. (U) The three labor confederations, CGT, CTH, and CUTH, 
may join the protest to voice their demand for a 30 percent 
raise in the minimum wage for 2004.  Tripartite negotiations 
(GOH, private sector (COHEP), and the three union 
confederations) have failed thus far, with business offering 
only a 7 percent raise.  (Note:  Inflation in 2003 was 
approximately 7.7 percent.  In 2003, the minimum wage was 
raised 12 percent for workers in small agriculture, but only 
nine percent for most other workers.  Inflation in 2002 was 
approximately 8.1 percent.  End Note.)  Minister of Labor 
German Leitzelar has called for another tripartite meeting 
February 5, which may not happen if the union confederations 
take to the streets instead. 
 
5. (SBU) The latest information the Embassy has is that the 
protest march will start in the old section of Tegucigalpa 
known as Comayaguela and end at the Presidential Palace. 
However, it is possible that demonstrations may occur at the 
Congress and even outside the Embassy. 
 
6. (C) Comment:  While most protests in Tegucigalpa are 
peaceful and number no more than a few hundred protesters, 
some protests lately have involved over a thousand 
protesters, and have had a tendency to lurch out of control 
at the end, with vandalism, Molotov cocktails, and clashes 
with police.  Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the protest 
will be destabilizing for the GOH.  Nor is it likely that it 
will have any effect on GOH policy.  According to his private 
secretary, President Maduro appears to have dug in his heels 
 
SIPDIS 
and is loath to fire ministers whom he believes have done a 
good job implementing his reform program.  End Comment. 
PALMER