US embassy cable - 04TEGUCIGALPA234

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TASK FORCE XATRUCH UPDATE: MADURO RESOLUTE IN CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

Identifier: 04TEGUCIGALPA234
Wikileaks: View 04TEGUCIGALPA234 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Tegucigalpa
Created: 2004-01-30 22:53:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: MOPS MARR PREL PGOV IZ HO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000234 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR PM, WHA/CEN, AND WHA/PPC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2014 
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PREL, PGOV, IZ, HO 
SUBJECT: TASK FORCE XATRUCH UPDATE: MADURO RESOLUTE IN 
CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
 
REF: A. REF: TEGUCIGALPA 1724 
 
     B. TEGUCIGALPA 2846 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Larry L. Palmer; 
Reasons 1.4 (A), (B) and (D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  In face of overwhelming domestic opposition 
and high costs to his own political popularity, President 
Maduro reaffirmed Honduras' commitment to send the next 
contingent of troops to Iraq and indicated those troops are 
likely to be deployed there beyond the initial one-year 
period.  In fact, the second contingent departs Honduras 
early next week.  Maduro's decisive public comments were made 
immediately in the face of local media coverage of 
Nicaragua's reported decision not to send its second 
contingent to Iraq because of financial difficulties.  Recent 
polls show that between 67 to 80 per cent of the Honduran 
public is opposed to the presence of Honduran troops in Iraq. 
 Minister of Defense Federico Breve has repeatedly 
highlighted the desire for the USG to provide concrete 
assistance to the Honduran Armed Forces in response to strong 
Honduran support for Operation Iraqi Freedom.  In particular, 
Breve is seeking parity for FMF with other Central American 
countries.  President of Congress Pepe Lobo told the 
Ambassador he believes he can win Congressional approval for 
an extension of the Honduran deployment for another year. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U) On January 22, when much of the local media gave 
prominent coverage to reports that Nicaragua would not be 
sending its second contingent to Iraq because of financial 
difficulties, President Ricardo Maduro declared that "there 
would be no change of policy."  "Honduras," he reaffirmed, 
"is planning to rotate its first battalion for a second one." 
 He indicated that the rotation would take place in 
mid-February.  Maduro also reiterated that Honduras would 
continue to support international efforts aimed at the 
pacification, reconstruction, and democratization of Iraq. 
 
3. (C) A clear sign of the political price to President 
Maduro is reflected in comments made by his Nationalist Party 
Deputy, Pompeyo Bonilla, who chairs the Congress's Defense 
Committee.  Separately the same day, Bonilla, who is 
generally pro-U.S. and supportive of our interests, told 
reporters that it would not be convenient to extend the 
presence of Honduran troops in Iraq.  Bonilla stressed that 
the Congress had approved a one-year deployment to Iraq which 
had always indicated a rotation of a second battalion to 
replace the first.  However, Bonilla made clear the Executive 
Branch would have to seek congressional approval to prolong 
Honduras' military participation in Iraq.  With a clear eye 
on recent public opinion polls, Bonilla then added that he 
"did not believe it would be most convenient (for Honduras) 
and did not believe that extending (the Honduran presence) 
was a policy shared by the United Nations and other involved 
countries."  (COMMENT: President of Congress Pepe Lobo told 
the Ambassador he believes he can win Congressional approval 
for an extension of the Honduran deployment for another year. 
END COMMENT.) 
 
4. (U) A recent poll published on January 13 in El Heraldo 
newspaper showed that 77.8 percent of the residents of 
Tegucigalpa opposed the deployment of Honduran troops to 
Iraq, while only 22.2 percent of Tegucigalpa residents 
supported the deployment.  The poll had a margin of error of 
five percent. 
 
5. (C) Ambassador and EmbOffs met January 27 with the new 
commander and deputy commander of Task Force Xatruch. 
Ambassador thanked the Task Force for its bravery and 
dedication and wished them a safe deployment in Iraq.  The 
second contingent departs Honduras for Iraq early next week. 
The Commander remains very concerned about the security at 
the base housing the Honduran deployment, in particular the 
problem of having the troops' meals picked up and delivered 
on a regularly scheduled basis three times a day. 
 
6. (SBU) At a January 27 luncheon at the Ambassador's 
residence and in other recent discussions with EmbOffs, 
Defense Minister Federico Breve and Chief of the Joint Staff 
Isaias Barahona underscored Honduran resolve in support of 
reconstruction efforts in Iraq.  They especially noted the 
positive impact the deployment was having on the troops in 
Iraq.  The troops strongly support their mission and the 
public comments of those soldiers who have returned early due 
to injuries have been unequivocally positive about the role 
and conditions in Iraq.  Breve and Barahona expressed 
satisfaction that there had been no serious injuries or 
fatalities involving Honduran troops, despite the two mortar 
attacks on their compound.  Barahona believes the troops are 
well trained, noting a recent joint Honduran/Iraqi capture of 
a suspected Iraqi terrorist outside the base.  Breve, 
however, also highlighted the budgetary impact the deployment 
is having on the Armed Forces budget given the increased 
costs of salaries and benefits. 
 
7. (C) Breve also echoed security concerns due to the fact 
that the Hondurans must make three food runs a day to pick up 
their food.  While the time of each pickup could be varied 
somewhat, this was still an unnecessary risk in Breve's eyes. 
 This concern has also been reported in military channels. 
 
8. (C) Breve has also repeatedly highlighted the desire for 
the USG to provide concrete assistance to the Honduran Armed 
Forces in response to strong Honduran support for Operation 
Iraqi Freedom.  In particular, Breve is seeking parity for 
FMF with other Central American countries.  Honduras wants 
financial assistance for such priorities as airplane fuel for 
intercepting narcotrafficking planes, helicopters to support 
counternarcotics efforts, vehicles and spare parts for their 
aging fleet, and other key needs. 
 
9. (C) Comment.  It is ironic that a task force providing 
support to a key U.S. foreign policy objective is named after 
the leader of the Honduran effort to defeat the American 
filibuster William Walker in Central America in 1856-7. 
Honduras has not wavered in having Task Force Xatruch fulfill 
its commitment to Operation Iraqi Freedom, despite political 
and budgetary costs.  However, Honduran officials are 
cognizant of the disparity in FMF assistance in the region, 
and are seeking to end this imbalance as a stalwart ally of 
the U.S. in Iraq.  End Comment. 
 
10. (U) Minimize considered. 
PALMER 

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