US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE248

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000248 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2014 
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PREL, PTER, IZ, AF, NL 
SUBJECT: DUTCH MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS:  IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: A. 03 THE HAGUE 3060 (NOTAL) 
     B. 03 THE HAGUE 3002 (NOTAL) 
     C. 03 THE HAGUE 2726 (NOTAL) 
     D. 03 STATE 318096 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARY DALY FOR REASONS 
1.5 (B AND D). 
 
1. (S) Summary:  In anticipation of new Dutch FM Ben Bot's 
travel to Washington February 9 for meetings with the 
Secretary and at NSC and DOD we offer a snapshot of several 
 
SIPDIS 
aspects of Dutch military participation in the Global War on 
Terrorism presently under discussion in the Netherlands.  The 
GONL is reviewing its role in Operation Iraqi Freedom, NATO 
ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom to include extending 
current deployments and possibly initiating new ones.  We 
judge FM Bot's visit a good opportunity to press the Dutch to 
make and/or renew strong contributions to all of these 
missions.  The contributions are valuable in their own right 
and would also bolster Defense Minister Kamp's position in 
supporting the need to maintain capable, deployable forces in 
the face of budgetary pressures and to use those forces in 
support of our shared goals.  Asking clearly for what we 
want, especially if we want the Dutch to lead a PRT or 
contribute forces to OEF, (or both), helps those in the 
Netherlands who support robust Dutch participation. 
Otherwise, the legacy of Srebrenica can lead to the Dutch 
looking to undertake less difficult responsibilities.  End 
Summary. 
 
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Iraq 
---- 
 
2. (C) The Cabinet renewed the deployment of Dutch troops in 
Iraq on November 28, 2003 and parliament concurred with the 
decision on December 11 (ref A).  The Dutch presently have 
approximately 1100 personnel, mostly infantry, conducting 
stabilization operations in Al Muthanna province as part of 
the UK's Multi-National Division Southeast.  (Note:  In 
addition to its military contributions, the GONL committed at 
Madrid to provide 10 million Euros for the Humanitarian 
Multilateral Trust Fund and set aside three million Euros to 
facilitate Dutch business opportunities in Iraq.  The Dutch 
have funded establishment of an Iraqi missing persons bureau, 
and are considering assisting in exhuming mass graves.  The 
Dutch have also made available a Dutch air force Fokker 
transport aircraft to support the UN World Food Program's 
efforts in Iraq.  End note.)  The current military deployment 
Al Muthanna is now scheduled to expire July 15.  We 
understand from UK sources that the British intend to request 
the Dutch to extend their deployment beyond July.  MFA and 
MOD sources advise the GONL intends to start looking at this 
issue in earnest in April and Defense Minister Kamp has been 
floating trial balloons in the press that a renewal may be 
coming.  We judge it would be helpful to stress to FM Bot the 
continued importance of Dutch participation in stabilization 
operations in Iraq and urge renewal of that deployment in due 
course.  Amb. Sobel will begin this process in his February 3 
call on FM Bot. 
 
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ISAF 
---- 
 
3. (C) The Cabinet approved deployment of six Dutch air force 
Apache attack helicopters to Afghanistan in support of NATO's 
ISAF mission (ref B) on January 30.  Since the conclusion of 
their co-leadership of ISAF III with Germany last August, the 
GONL has been exploring options for further Dutch involvement 
on the ground in Afghanistan.  MFA sources advise the Dutch 
are considering making a nominal contribution of personnel to 
the German PRT in Konduz.  Separately, the GONL is 
particularly focused on current NATO deliberations on taking 
over additional PRTs in Afghanistan and there is an 
expectation that former Dutch FM and new NATO SYG Jaap de 
Hoop Scheffer will be eager to get Dutch participation in a 
PRT.  MFA and MOD sources note there are considerable 
operational, logistical and security questions that would 
need to be addressed to satisfy the exhaustive requirements 
of the GONL's approval procedure for deployments.  (Note:  We 
judge the most important of these to be provisions for in 
extremis extraction -- a legacy of the Dutch experience in 
Srebrenica -- as well as assurances that an area is stable 
before Dutch troops are deployed.  End note.)  There is a 
certain level of enthusiasm for the PRT concept both in 
parliament and in the MFA given that PRTs involve elements of 
two Dutch fortes -- stabilization and development.  At the 
same time, there is considerable skepticism and/or budding 
opposition to PRTs in the military which is concerned about 
the force protection required, but also has a strong 
preference to involve the Dutch armed forces in what it 
perceives to be more combat-oriented operations.  We 
recommend that it would help the GONL internal political 
dialogue to emphasize to FM Bot the importance we attach to 
PRTs as part of achieving success for NATO's mission in 
Afghanistan. 
 
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OEF 
--- 
 
4. (S) The Dutch air force's participation in the EPAF F-16 
squadron flying out of Manas, Kyrgyzstan, ended in October 
2003, and Dutch naval assets (a frigate, a submarine and a P3 
maritime patrol aircraft) have also returned from the region. 
 The Dutch have been considering for more than a year a 
possible deployment of Dutch army special operations forces 
to serve with CJTF-180 (ref C).  The leadership of the Dutch 
Army is very eager to undertake such a deployment and further 
to ref D, post facilitated a dialogue between MOD and SOCCENT 
to discuss possible options for employment of Dutch SOF 
assets in CJTF-180.  A key political concern expressed by 
both MFA and MOD sources is the possibility that Dutch SOF 
may detain Al Qaeda and/or Taliban members who may in turn be 
sent to the U.S. facility at Guantanamo Bay.  While we 
understand MOD lawyers have approved Dutch use of a practice 
employed by other coalition partners (detaining suspects and 
calling for U.S. personnel to arrest them), concerns remain 
as to the political viability of such an approach and whether 
ministers would be prepared to defend it in parliament.  That 
said, in addition to the utility of Dutch SOF assets to 
CJTF-180, we judge the political benefit of such a deployment 
would be to get a well-trained/equipped ally involved in 
combat operations as opposed to only peacekeeping and 
stabilization (Note:  the Dutch Army has not been involved in 
combat operations since 1962 in the former Dutch New Guinea. 
End note.)  The GONL advises they have received enough 
information from CENTCOM further to consultations arranged as 
per ref D in order to make a recommendation to Ministers.  We 
believe it would help the Dutch decision-making process to 
underscore the value of a Dutch SOF contribution to OEF. 
 
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Conclusion 
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5. (S) We do not accept the assertion of some of our Dutch 
interlocutors that their participation in various military 
operations is a zero-sum game.  When asked to fill a pressing 
need (such as with the Apaches, or with the dispatch of the 
Dutch Navy's LPD to Liberia) a way has been found.  The Dutch 
have a good record of contributions to the GWOT both in Iraq 
and Afghanistan and we think FM Bot's visit is a useful 
opportunity to both acknowledge the value of these 
contributions and to urge the Dutch to do more.  Defense 
Minister Kamp has laid out an ambitious program for 
restructuring the Dutch military along more deployable lines 
in the face of significant mandated budget cuts and is 
contemplating using the Dutch military for more offensive 
missions.  Strong expressions to FM Bot of U.S. interest in 
continued and new Dutch deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan 
will help in the Dutch decision-making process as well as 
assist Kamp in defending the need to maintain capable Dutch 
forces and to employ them in pursuing our shared priorities. 
RUSSEL