US embassy cable - 04HARARE171

C O N F I D E N T I A L HARARE 000171 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR SDELISI, LAROIAN, MRAYNOR 
AF/PD FOR DFOLEY, CDALTON 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR JFRAZER, DTEITELBAUM 
LONDON FOR CGURNEY 
PARIS FOR CNEARY 
NAIROBI FOR TPFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2009 
TAGS: PREL, CASC, PGOV, ZI 
SUBJECT: RULING PARTY PROTESTS TRAVEL ADVISORY, RAISES 
POSSIBLE DC VISIT 
 
REF: (A) STATE 15219 (B) 03 HARARE 2236 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5(b)(d) 
 
1.  (C) Deputy Director of ZANU-PF's Bureau of External 
Relations Itai Mach called poloff on January 27 to protest 
the text of the travel advisory issued by the Department on 
January 22 (ref A).  He charged that it was a politically 
motivated effort to disrupt Zimbabwe's "recovering" economy 
with a view to discrediting the ruling party.  International 
media had seized on the advisory to damage Zimbabwe's 
international image for purposes of tourism and investment. 
He asserted that the country's security situation was 
improving and that the government was attaching priority to 
fostering a favorable atmosphere for tourism and investment. 
Poloff explained the apolitical purpose of travel advisories 
generally, highlighted the indisputable facts in the 
advisory, and noted that the advisory was essentially 
identical to one issued in January 2003. 
 
2.  (C) Mach then renewed his inquiry about the possibility 
of a ZANU-PF delegation visiting Washington to engage with 
the USG, members of the Congress, and others interested in 
Zimbabwe.  He did not elaborate on details of the party's 
intended activities or message other than to convey the 
party's "side of the story."  He asked if waivers would be 
granted to party members who were subject to travel 
restrictions but did not name the members wishing to travel. 
 
3.  (C) COMMENT:  After CNN's treatment of the travel 
advisory as news, government and independent papers alike 
played the advisory up here to considerable interest among 
the public and diplomatic community.  For their part, 
government papers generally parrotted Mach's analysis and, 
weaving in mischaracterizations of Morgan Tsvangirai's 
treason trial testimony as evidence of CIA involvement in a 
coup plot, lately have increasingly projected a USG bent on 
regime change.  We view the portrayal more as coincident 
opportunistic propaganda driven by Information Minister 
Jonathan Moyo than a concerted effort to alienate the USG 
further.  Nonetheless, suspicions about USG motives remain 
deep among many ruling party members, and most continue to 
keep their distance from Americans out of concern for 
"political correctness" in their insecure liberation party. 
 
4.  (C) COMMENT (CONT'D): Mach's approach follows an initial 
more tentative inquiry last month (ref B).  The effort 
probably reflects more interest in manufacturing trappings of 
legitimacy for the ruling party than in moving toward 
resolution of the country's political crisis.  There have 
been signs that the party is interested in rehabilitating its 
international image -- vocal support among prominent party 
members for RBZ Chairman Gono's interest in reengaging the 
IFIs, for example.  While we doubt the depth of this 
interest, we hope to use it in this instance to provoke a 
more substantive effort on the ruling party's part. 
Accordingly, we propose to pour cold water on Mach's inquiry 
with a vague response -- reiterating our seriousness about 
the travel restrictions and noting the existence of a waiver 
process without indicating that waivers would be granted in 
this case.  While deflecting the visa issue, we would 
reiterate our interest in facilitating resolution of 
Zimbabwe's political crisis but emphasize that meaningful 
actions by the ruling party indicating its seriousness on 
that front would enhance prospects for any meaningful 
dialogue involving the USG.  Poloff is scheduled to meet Mach 
on February 2. 
SUL