US embassy cable - 04AMMAN728

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 000728 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CPA BAGHDAD FOR DIR OPO RON SCHLICHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, KDEM, KISL, ECON, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: IRAQI SUNNIS VISIT AMMAN, SEEK TO ENGAGE U.S. IN 
IRAQ 
 
REF: CPA HQ 05130261830Z JAN 04 
 
Classified By: CDA David M. Hale for reasons 1.5 (b) (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (S)  A group of Sunni Iraqis representing the Iraqi Peace 
Party told PolCouns January 22 that they want to cooperate 
with the CPA and Coalition Forces in Iraq, but are put off by 
tough security measures there.  The group said that anti-U.S. 
violence in the Sunni triangle does not represent support for 
Saddam Hussein, but the fear of average Sunnis that their 
interests are not being taken into consideration.  It is 
also, they argued, the result of high unemployment among 
working age Sunnis who previously had held government and 
military jobs.  The group made an unexplained plea for good 
treatment and resettlement in the U.S. of MEK members in 
Iraq.  While we cannot vouch for their bona fides, the 
members of group seemed genuine in their desire for direct 
contact with CPA.  END SUMMARY 
 
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SEARCHING FOR A SYMPATHETIC EAR 
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2.  (C)  PolCouns met January 21 and 22 with a group of Iraqi 
Sunnis representing the Iraqi Peace Party (Hizb as-Salam). 
The party's Secretary General and group leader, Sheikh Saleh 
Abu Khumrah, explained that the group had decided to travel 
to Amman to talk to USG representatives because they believe 
they could not get a fair hearing from Americans in Iraq, 
particularly because they do not want to undergo the 
"demeaning" security procedures required to visit Coalition 
officials. 
 
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SUNNIS POORLY REPRESENTED ON IGC 
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3.  (C)  Abu Khumrah asserted that anti-coalition violence in 
the Sunni triangle is not due to residual support for Saddam 
Hussein:  the vast majority of Sunnis realize that the era of 
Saddam and the Baath party are over forever.  Rather, the 
violence is a reaction of the Sunni population to Iraq's 
humiliating military defeat, continuing harsh Coalition 
security practices (including arrests and raids on homes), 
and the strong feeling that Sunnis are not properly 
represented on the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC).  The Sunnis 
on the IGC, he said, have no constituency within the Sunni 
triangle, and do not speak for most Iraqi Sunnis.  This gives 
Iraqi Sunnis the feeling that, in the wake of a military 
defeat, the U.S. is imposing a political leadership on them. 
The group urged the CPA to consult more closely with them and 
other organized Sunni groups in the run-up to the June 30 
handover of power to ensure that Sunnis feel better 
represented in the new transitional Iraqi government.  Abu 
Khumrah also asked for monetary assistance for his party, 
which he promised would work to further Sunni relations with 
the Coalition.  He also suggested that he and other Sunni 
tribal and political leaders should travel to the United 
States (at U.S. expense) to start building bridges, and to be 
able to explain the U.S. to their constituents. 
 
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SECURITY PRACTICES MAKING ENEMIES 
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4.  (C)  All in the group complained that Coalition security 
practices were strengthening ill-will toward the U.S. among 
Sunnis.  U.S. soldiers, they asserted, do not respect Iraqis 
or their traditions, saying that an American soldier should 
not be permitted to search an Iraqi police chief -- it causes 
the police chief to lose face, the respect of his community, 
and therefore, effectiveness.  They also complained that lack 
of local knowledge caused many indiscriminate arrests.  One 
sheikh cited an example from Kirkuk where one son of a family 
had attacked Coalition forces, but Coalition forces -- unable 
to convince the family to identify and turn over the guilty 
individual -- had arrested all five of the family's sons.  If 
the Coalition had worked with local tribal leaders, the 
sheikh asserted, they could have worked out surrender of the 
guilty son, saving the others from arrest.  As it is, all 
sons remain in prison, and the U.S. forces have won the scorn 
of an entire clan.  There are currently "more than 30,000 
Sunnis" in Coalition custody, the group claimed, and each one 
has "a family that will react against the U.S." because of 
the arrest of its family member;  "these arrests breed only 
hatred."  PolCouns outlined the Coalition's new conditional 
release program for some detainees and asked the group to 
check with local Coalition officials about the program when 
they returned to Iraq. 
5.  (C)  Several of the members also said that, while they 
desire dialogue with the U.S. and Coalition, they expect 
dialogue to lead to concrete changes in Coalition practices. 
Several members of the group said that they had spoken with 
local U.S. military commanders, but their complaints and 
suggestions had not been translated into any change in 
practice on the ground.  Abu Khumrah said that he understands 
that Coalition forces come under attack daily, but argued 
that Coalition security practices increase resentment and 
will make stability in the Sunni triangle harder to achieve. 
 
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UNEMPLOYMENT, LACK OF SERVICES GROWING PROBLEMS 
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6.  (C)  Abu Khumrah stressed that another issue that is 
growing in importance is unemployment.  Many Sunnis from 
prominent families who previously worked for the government 
or military were now unemployed.  (Two of those present 
identified themselves as unemployed former Iraqi army 
officers).  Under the old regime, many Sunnis from "good 
families" joined the military or Baath party to cement their 
family or tribe's position of prominence.  The Coalition 
needs to reach out to such Sunnis, provide them with 
dignified employment, and bring them into the new system.  In 
addition, Abu Khumrah said, economic activity in Sunni areas 
has not yet started to pick up, and government services -- 
including electricity, water, and sewerage -- are sporadic, 
when available at all.  The Coalition needs to work to remedy 
these issues as quickly as possible, the group argued, to 
show Sunnis that they have gained something from the 
departure of Saddam.  "Thus far, nothing you promised us has 
come to pass," accused Sheikh Abdullah al-Jabouri from 
Kirkuk.  "Painting schools is not enough." 
 
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A PITCH FOR THE MEK? 
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7.  (C)  Midway in the conversation, Abu Khumrah made a pitch 
for lenient treatment for the members and family of the 
Mujaheddin-e-Khalk (MEK), the Iranian opposition/terrorist 
group that had large numbers of supporters and militants 
based in Iraq under Saddam.  Abu Khumrah said that the goals 
of the MEK closely track those of the USG in Iran, and that 
the U.S. should work to convince the ICG not to expel them 
from Iraq or, alternatively, to accept them into the U.S. 
Abu Khumrah backed off a bit after PolCouns explained the 
terrorist history of the MEK and its legal designation by the 
U.S. as a foreign terrorist organization. 
 
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COMMENT 
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8.  (C)  We cannot vouch for the bone fides or motivations of 
this group or the Iraqi Peace Party.  We note, however, that 
this group's complaints and suggestions were remarkably 
similar to ref conversation between OPO Director Schlicher 
and the head of the Council of Sunni Communities in Iraq 
(ref).  The members of this group appeared to us to be 
sincere in their desire to work with the U.S., but also want 
to be reassured that the Coalition will act on at least some 
of their recommendations. 
 
9.  (U)  CPA Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
Visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at 
 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ 
 
or access the site through the State Department's SIPRNET 
home page. 
HALE