US embassy cable - 04ANKARA549

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TURKEY GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF BERLIN PLUS

Identifier: 04ANKARA549
Wikileaks: View 04ANKARA549 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2004-01-28 14:16:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: MARR PREL TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

281416Z Jan 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000549 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
FOR EUR/SE, EUR/RPM 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2014 
TAGS: MARR, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF 
BERLIN PLUS 
 
 
(U) Classified by Pol-Mil Counselor Timothy Betts, reasons 
1.5, b/d. 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: PolMilOff met with MFA's new DDG for NATO and 
WEU Affairs Fatih Ceylan January 23 to get a readout of the 
GOT's latest thinking on ESDP.  Ceylan, a longtime NATO 
policy wonk, was generally satisfied with progress on Berlin 
Plus, insofar as it was implemented in "Operation Concordia," 
but noted that Turkey still sought increased prior 
consultations and better representation in the EUMS.  Ceylan 
seemed lukewarm about a handover of SFOR to the EU, 
particularly in that Turkey's participation in the Balkans 
was not certain.  End Summary. 
 
 
2. (C)  New MFA DDG for NATO Affairs Fatih Ceylan expressed 
to PolMilOff January 23 the GOT's belief that implementation 
of Berlin Plus in "Operation Concordia" had some "bumps in 
the road," but the GOT remained optimistic that these can be 
worked out. In particular, the Turks believed that there were 
not adequate consultations with non-EU Allies prior to the 
operation, a belief held by even some EU members.  But the 
operation had proved to be a "good test" and the GOT believed 
that a joint lessons learned process would be useful. 
 
 
3. (C) Ceylan also expressed concern that representation of 
non-EU officers in the EUMS was still uncertain.  The GOT 
would like these officers to have permanent passes and a 
small room within EUMS based on the parameters of the Nice 
Implementation Document.  Because the four non-NATO EU 
members enjoy more generous involvement in NATO's affairs, 
Ceylan asserted that the situation was not reciprocal.  In 
fact, he cited this as the only aspect of the Nice 
Implementation Document that remained unfulfilled.  He 
emphasized that the liaison arrangement in the EU cell at 
SHAPE was a different thing entirely, and, in fact, Turkey 
needed both. 
 
 
4. (C) Ceylan acknowledged the US belief that SFOR should be 
terminated and the mission handed over to the EU. 
Nevertheless, he believed a common political will for this 
event had not yet developed at NATO and should be discussed 
under Berlin Plus, as the EU mission would have recourse to 
NATO assets.  Ceylan asserted that "consultations and 
modalities" for a handover remained to be discussed.  He 
expressed hope that the US would support Turkey's desire to 
maintain a battalion in any follow-on mission.  Turkey was 
frustrated that, on one hand, Turkey was criticized for not 
contributing more to peacekeeping, and on the other, some EU 
allies were reluctant to accept Turkey's contribution. 
 
 
5. (C) Comment: The GOT remains suspicious that the EU wants 
to cut Turkey out of issues that affect Turkey's national 
security and undermine the Berlin Plus agreement. 
Nevertheless, Ceylan was notably sanguine about the progress 
of Berlin Plus so far. End Comment. 
DEUTSCH 

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