US embassy cable - 04TEGUCIGALPA209

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000209 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR P, INL, L/LEI, WHA, WHA/PPC, AND WHA/CEN 
SOUTHCOM FOR GENERAL HILL 
JIATF-S FOR RADM SIROIS 
SECDEF FOR EFROTHINGHAM 
NSC FOR JBJOSTAD 
DOJ FOR MLWARREN AND DKOFFSKY 
ONDCP FOR BCRANE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2014 
TAGS: SNAR, MOPS, PINS, PREL, MCAP, PINR, HO 
SUBJECT: MINISTER OF DEFENSE REITERATES NO SHOOT-DOWN 
POLICY AND SHARES AIR DEFENSE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES 
 
REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 203 
 
     B. TEGUCIGALPA 193 
     C. STATE 15961 
     D. TEGUCIGALPA 179 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Larry Palmer; 
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C)  SUMMARY:  Minister of Defense (MOD) Frederico Breve 
delivered a document to the Ambassador on January 27 which 
explains the Honduran Air Force's (HAF) standard operating 
procedures for intercepting intruding civil aircraft 
violating Honduran airspace and the use of live ammunition, 
including warning shots, against suspected narcotrafficking 
aircraft or other suspect aircraft flying in Honduran 
airspace.  The Government of Honduras (GOH) also provided 
copies of the incident reports for the 1/20 plane crash in 
the department of Lempira.  The MOD and the Chief of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff stated unequivocally, and in writing, 
that the GOH has a strict policy of not shooting down civil 
aircraft.  Breve welcomed the possible visit of a U.S. team 
to discuss air interdiction policy issues.  He stated 
forthrightly that the GOH has nothing to hide in this case. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C)  At a luncheon with the Ambassador on January 27 
Minister of Defense (MOD) Frederico Breve delivered a 
document to the Ambassador on January 27 which explains the 
Honduran Air Force's (HAF) standard operating procedures for 
intercepting intruding civil aircraft violating Honduran 
airspace and the rules of engagement for the use of live 
ammunition, including warning shots, against suspected 
narcotrafficking aircraft or other suspect aircraft flying in 
Honduran airspace.  The GOH had provided on January 26 copies 
of the incident reports for the 1/20 plane crash in the 
department of Lempira, which will be reported septel.  Breve 
presented the information as a matter of fact and entertained 
follow-up questions from the Ambassador, Deputy Chief of 
Mission, USMILGP Commander and Defense Attache. 
 
3. (C)  The 2-page document, which is signed by General 
Isaias Barahona, the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of 
the Honduran Armed Forces (HOAF), explains HAF air defense 
intercept policy and reiterates that the HAF has discarded 
any procedure which would result in the firing on a civil 
aircraft with the intention of shooting it down.  The 
document begins by explaining that the HAF uses the ICAO 
international procedures for the interception of unidentified 
aircraft.  (Independently, the HAF Command Staff provided the 
Embassy with the specific pages from the ICAO Annex A that 
they use to signal intruding aircraft in Honduran airspace.) 
The document then adds that the HAF has established standard 
operating procedures (SOP) for this type of operation. 
 
4. (C)  According to the document, the HAF SOP employs a 
series of established tasks from its First Air Defense 
Squadron's Normal Operations Plan prior to a HAF aircraft 
intercepting another aircraft.  In Chapter B--The Procedure 
for Unknown/Suspicious Aircraft, the SOP establishes the 
following procedure (informal translation): 
 
A. In the case of having to detain or having information 
about unknown/suspicious aircraft. The Watch Officer in the 
HAF Operations Center (aka COFAH) shall take the following 
steps: 
 
1.    immediately shall inform the HAF General Command, the 
Chief of the Air Force Staff (aka JEMGA), and the Commander 
of the First Air Defense Squadron (aka PEDA), 
2.    shall place on alert all air bases or the air base on 
stand-by alert according to its role, and 
3.    shall contact air control agencies about transiting 
aircraft and flight plans in order to obtain information 
about the aircraft. 
 
B. In the case of issuing orders from the HAF General Command 
for the take-off of interceptors, all necessary coordination 
shall be done in order to provide tactical air control of the 
intercepting aircraft within the air defense system. 
 
C. If the unknown/suspicious aircraft proceeds towards 
another neighboring country, the Watch Office in the COFAH 
shall contact the respective operations center of that 
country or the Liaison Officer and shall facilitate relevant 
information about said aircraft, such as velocity, flight 
path, altitude, time, actual position, and characteristics of 
the aircraft, if there was a visual identification. 
 
D. In the case of the interception of the unknown/suspicious 
aircraft, the Watch Officer shall give this information to 
the appropriate DEA agent, according to the list of names 
provided and to the U.S. Air Force Area Mission Chief. 
 
5. (C)  The document explains further "during their execution 
of an interception, the air crews will faithfully observe the 
regulations established by the ICAO Annex 2 and the HAF's air 
regulations manual."  Only after completing all of the ICAO 
signals and procedures, the document states, may the air 
crews consider, in consultation with the COFAH, the option of 
firing warning shots from along side of (parallel to) the 
intruding aircraft without putting at risk either the life or 
safety of the occupants of the intruding aircraft. 
 
6 (C)  Finally, the document closes with a series of 
observations and policy statements.  First it notes that the 
actual violations of Honduran airspace are not coming from 
other States and are incompatible with civil aviation norms, 
such as drug-trafficking and other illicit flights without 
corresponding flight plans.  It says that, given this 
situation, Honduran pilots are obliged to make visual 
contact, to comply with all established procedures, and to 
try to visually check, if possible, if the illicit aircraft 
is carrying cargo.  The document further explains it is 
important to emphasize that these intruding aircraft are not 
on commercial routes but on routes that are utilized by 
drug-trafficking aircraft as identified by JIATF, which 
through its intelligence systems has been able to define a 
very constant pattern to the routes being used by 
drug-trafficking aircraft. 
 
7. (C)  The closing paragraph states that the GOH has 
discarded any policy of opening fire with the intention of 
shooting down an illicit aircraft.  It reaffirms that the 
policy of the HOAF high command is based on the agreement 
between our two nations to confront drug trafficking.  The 
last sentence maintains the right of the State of Honduras to 
protect its security in the face of a threat from an illicit 
flight connected to international terrorism. 
 
8. (S)  COMMENT:  This document tracks closely other 
conversations with HAF base commanders and pilots and cites 
specific confidential HAF SOPs.  Breve welcomed the possible 
visit of a U.S. team to discuss air interdiction policy 
issues.  He stated forthrightly that the GOH has nothing to 
hide in this case.  Post invites State and DOD to send an 
inter-agency team to Honduras to confirm the GOH's written 
assurances and to further discuss the GOH's air interdiction 
policy.  However, the team should be prepared to respond to 
specific questions from the GOH about the specific 
counternarcotics intelligence sharing arrangements in place 
with its other Central American neighbors.  END COMMENT. 
PALMER