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| Identifier: | 04HOCHIMINHCITY76 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04HOCHIMINHCITY76 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Consulate Ho Chi Minh City |
| Created: | 2004-01-28 00:34:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |
| Tags: | PHUM SOCI PREL PGOV OTRA KIRF VM RELFREE HUMANR |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 HO CHI MINH CITY 000076 SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV, DRL/IRF, H E. O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PHUM, SOCI, PREL, PGOV, OTRA, KIRF, VM, RELFREE, HUMANR SUBJECT: CIRFDEL SURVEYS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN VIETNAM: CATHOLICS AND UBCV BUDDHISTS IN HUE Summary ------- 1. (U) Dr. Scott Flipse, senior policy analyst at the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) traveled through Hanoi, Hue, the Central Highlands, and Ho Chi Minh City on an official fact-finding mission from January 7-16. He was joined by Mr. George Phillips, from the office of Rep. Chris Smith (R- NJ), and Ms. Hannah Royal, from the office of Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS), who traveled in their personal capacities under the sponsorship of a U.S.-based NGO, the Committee for Religious Freedom in Vietnam, which was represented on this trip by Vietnamese-American Catholic priest Tam Tran. Septels report on their meetings in Hanoi, the Central Highlands and HCMC. 2. (SBU) While in Hue on January 10, the CIRFDEL held official discussions with the Chairman of the Provincial People's Committee and the Archbishop of the Hue Archdiocese. The delegation declined a number of other official appointments suggested by the People's Committee in favor of arranging their own meeting with the highest-ranking Buddhist monk of the local branch of the outlawed UBCV. They were less successful in attempts to meet secretly with a local dissident Catholic priest at his home, where SIPDIS they were turned away close to midnight by a large security detail. The meetings produced mixed messages on the situation for the large Catholic and Buddhist communities in the province (there are very few Protestants in Hue). While their private meetings confirmed the very real problems faced by the underground Buddhist church and a small number of Catholic dissidents, the official meetings sounded a much more positive note on the overall freedom to practice religion in Thue Thien-Hue. People's Committee Cites Overall Improvements, but Slams Dissenters --------------------------------------------- --------------------- - 3. (SBU) In their meeting with Chairman Nguyen Van Me of the Thua Thien-Hue Provincial People's Committee, the CIRFDEL outlined the potential for the human rights/religious freedom situation in Vietnam to slow down an otherwise growing bilateral relationship with the U.S. Citing the weight of the evidence from a large number of similar complaints as proof that the situation was deteriorating, they affirmed they were seeking nothing more than for Vietnam to adhere to the standards it had already acceded to in various international agreements and lift the restrictions on religious practice and organization. Raising the continued harassment of local monks from the banned Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV), they questioned what threat a small group of elderly monks could pose to Vietnam's national security. Noting that central government officials in Hanoi blamed local officials for any unintended violations of Vietnam's constitutional protections of religious freedom, they asked Chairman Me for his views on the situation in Hue. 4. (SBU) Chairman Me hoped that the United States would see the human rights/religious freedom issue in Vietnam through a wider and more culturally sensitive lens, and stressed that American values, unlike American products, could not be exported wholesale without regard to the cultural values of the receiving state. He also focused heavily on the importance of preserving national unity and social stability, accusing a small group associated with the former southern regime of using religion to regain power. Drawing frequently on the legacy of the war and the misdeeds of his former adversaries, the Chairman stressed that the GVN had chosen not to punish their old foes in the interest of national reconciliation, the latest example of which was the visa just issued to former Republic of Vietnam Prime Minister and later Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky to celebrate Tet with family and friends in his homeland for the first time in almost 30 years. The Chairman said he was well aware of the regular Internet traffic reporting on alleged violations of human rights/religious freedom from both inside and outside the country, but pointed to greater economic freedom and the GVN's focus on improving living conditions overall as proof of the government's good intentions. 5. (SBU) Falling back on statistics to demonstrate what he described as an ever improving religious freedom situation, he said there were currently 500 Buddhist monks and nearly as many pagodas in Hue, a number of which had been recently constructed or renovated to serve the province's 440,000 Buddhists (nearly 50 percent of the population). The Hue Institute of Buddhism, established just five years ago, had trained over 500 monks and scholars, some of whom had been sent overseas for post-graduate study. The Buddhists were able to publish religious materials and organize charitable activities, such as kindergartens for orphans and health care facilities for the poor. The Chairman described similar developments for the province's 55,000 Catholics. Nearly all of Hue's 115 churches -- staffed by 110 priests and hundreds of lay workers -- had been rebuilt since the war, and the Hue seminary was set shortly to receive 40 new students for its sixth incoming class. Like the Buddhists, the Catholics were able to operate orphanages and health centers for the disabled and poor. 6. (SBU) Returning to the war legacy and national reconciliation, Chairman Me stated repeatedly that the GVN did not want to arrest religious leaders, but was forced to do so when they flagrantly violated Vietnam's laws. Even then, he said, they arrested only the "soldiers," and only after giving them numerous chances to cease their political activities. He noted that the UBCV's own leadership had chosen to integrate with the Vietnam Buddhist Sangha (VBS) -- an organization that now represented 99 percent of the country's Buddhists -- in 1981. Dismissing the notion of the UBCV as a separate entity, he questioned why the GVN should allow a few dissident monks to break away and form an independent church when they represented only troublemakers waving the flag of the former regime from overseas. Softening his stance just a bit, he observed that the UBCV would not have had any problems if they had just operated quietly, without openly declaring their hostility and opposition to the government. Citing the example of Le Quang Liem -- a former Hoa Hao militia leader during the war and now a vocal critic of the government recognized Hoa Hao religious organization -- he claimed that supporters of the old regime had simply replaced their military uniforms with clerical robes to continue the fight against the current government under the guise of religion. 7. (SBU) Chairman Me made it quite clear that individuals who used the cloak of religion to fight against the government would not be tolerated. He noted that dissident Catholic priest Thaddeus Nguyen Van Ly was in prison because he had ignored repeated warnings to cease his political activities, not for practicing his faith. He criticized the delegation for attempting to visit Father Ly's associate, Father Phan Van Loi, the previous evening, and asked why they would want to meet with an underling if they had already met with Father Ly in Hanoi. Asked directly if he could give his approval for the delegation to meet with him later in the day, he claimed not to even know where Father Loi lived, (despite the fact that close to 20 security officials were posted outside his home the previous evening when the delegation stopped by unannounced). He did, however, seem to know enough about the case to raise doubts as to whether Father Loi had ever been ordained as a priest (he was apparently ordained in secret in a northern diocese and did not have the Church's permission to serve as a priest in Hue). Noting that Father Loi represented no one but himself, he directed the delegation to the materials the dissident priest had himself placed on the Internet for insight into why his movements might currently be restricted. 8. (SBU) Chairman Me quickly dismissed the question of confiscated Catholic properties in the province as one of eminent domain, although he admitted that some land had been redistributed immediately after the war. Regarding the Shrine of Our Lady of Perpetual Help, claimed by the Redemptorist Order, he said the former Archbishop of Hue had donated the property to the government. He attributed more recent allegations of government intrusion on the grounds of the Thien An Benedictine Monastery and the Ke Sung Church to the routine development of necessary infrastructure projects (although he made sure to point out that the grounds around Thien An had been confiscated originally due to their use by former South Vietnamese President Diem as a base for anti-communist activities). Other Catholic properties had been turned into much needed schools and health care facilities. Hue Archbishop Guarded but Mostly Positive ------------------------------------------ 9. (SBU) Sounding a relatively more positive tone, Hue Archbishop Nguyen Nhu The characterized the fundamental issue as conflicting definitions of religious freedom. While the government viewed freedom to worship as the overriding goal, the Catholic Church saw it as encompassing much more. He hoped the views of the two sides would merge over time. He already believed that things were getting better every year, and hoped that the international community would advocate for his church in a sensitive way that respected the Asian mentality. Anything more direct would be counterproductive to the goals of the Church. While they still needed government approval to ordain priests, those approvals were getting easier to obtain, and he had personally ordained 53 priests in his 10 years at the Archdiocese. The seminary, meanwhile, was able to draw seminarians from the Archdiocese of Hue, Danang, and Kontum. 10. (SBU) Describing the Father Ly case as complicated, he said that he had often counseled the priest on his behavior and even worked out an agreement to move him to a new parish without any prodding from the government. Unfortunately, Father Ly had continued his activities at the new parish, despite the Archbishop's frequent warnings that priests should not be involved in politics. The Archbishop noted that he had sent a delegation of clergy and lay workers to visit Father Ly after his arrest and that he had found God in prison. He knew that Father Loi had at one time been under government restrictions after Father Ly's arrest in April 2001, but thought the recent presence of security agents outside his home the previous night might have been related to the fact that police knew the delegation was in town. He stated plainly that Father Loi had no canonical relationship with the Hue Archdiocese and had never sought his permission to join. (Note: According to the CIRFDEL's unofficial interpreter, local officials had once told Father Loi that he could become part of the Hue Archdiocese if he renounced Father Ly. The interpreter also described Father Loi as one of four Catholic priests to call for the complete overthrow of the GVN. End note.) 11. (SBU) The Archbishop said they hadn't asked for the return of any confiscated properties because government limitations on charitable works left them with little use for the old hospitals and schools. He claimed not to know the status of the Thien An property, but said the monks were in dialogue with the government on the issue. He didn't think the monks wanted all of the original 107 hectares back -- just enough for a buffer zone to maintain a spiritual environment. He was even less sure of the status of the Redemptorist property, although he thought the government had already built a clinic on the site. He had heard of a physical altercation involving the police and several church workers trying to stop road construction outside the Ke Sung Church, but didn't think it was very serious. Looking at the case from a legal standpoint, he said the Church was fine with building a new road if it was open to the general public and didn't affect the spiritual environment. Nevertheless, the Church had also prepared a proposal for an alternative road to be funded by the Archdiocese. As for the Marian Shrine at La Vang -- a property located outside the provincial border in neighboring Quang Tri Province, but within his Archdiocese -- the Archbishop said that while there had been complete freedom for pilgrims over the last five to six years, the local district People's Committee still refused to recognize the Church's ownership, despite recognition at the provincial level. Overall, he thought relations were better with Thua Thien-Hue than with Quang Tri. UBCV Monks Resist GVN Control ----------------------------- 12. (SBU) The CIRFDEL made an unannounced stop at Tu Hieu Pagoda to visit with Thich Thien Hanh, leader of the influential Hue branch of the UBCV. As with the attempted visit to Father Loi, the local authorities seemed to know the delegation was planning to visit, and two individuals loitering outside the premises entered the monk's chamber bearing wrapped Tet gifts just ahead of the delegation. Those apparent security agents, and another two or three who arrived as the meeting began, eavesdropped visibly from just inside the door for the first 20 minutes, until Thich Hien Hanh rose from his chair and ushered them out the door. Although he whispered quite a bit, Thich Hien Hanh did not seem uncomfortable speaking in the presence of security officials. He told the group he was feeling well after his hunger strike in late October, but was not allowed to leave the pagoda without permission. He had been able to send a monk to visit Thich Huyen Quang in Quy Nhon five days earlier and confirmed that the UBCV Patriarch's health was good and he was getting adequate medical attention. Unfortunately, there was a large police presence at his pagoda, and he appeared to be living under the threat that he would be moved to a pagoda near Nha Trang if he did anything to attract attention. For that reason, Thich Thien Hanh asked that USG officials refrain from attempting to visit the Patriarch for the time being. The Hue Buddhist leader also acknowledged that he was in telephone contact with UBCV Deputy Thich Quang Do, currently under unofficial pagoda detention in HCMC, and that he was also in reasonably good health. 13. (SBU) Thich Thien Hanh blamed the problems of the UBCV on the fact that the communists simply didn't like religion and wanted to eliminate groups it could not control, but vowed that the UBCV would never submit to GVN influence. He attributed the GVN's seemingly schizophrenic treatment of the UBCV, from the spring 2003 releases of the UBCV's top leadership to the autumn 2003 crackdown, to a split within the GVN and the Party over how to deal with the religious issue. Under the current restrictions, it was difficult to groom young leaders and communicate the basic message to UBCV followers, especially when believers could be punished simply for visiting monks like him. Fortunately, he was able to maintain contact with the outside world, including to the International Buddhist Information Bureau in Paris, through Internet hookups hidden inside the pagoda. He hoped foreign governments would use official development assistance to pressure the GVN and the Communist Party -- the real beneficiaries of such aid -- to change their policies, despite the economic impact on the general populace. The poor, he said, would suffer anyway. 14. (U) The delegation did not have an opportunity to clear this cable before leaving Post. YAMAUCHI
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