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| Identifier: | 04MAPUTO112 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04MAPUTO112 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Maputo |
| Created: | 2004-01-23 08:56:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |
| Tags: | CVIS KFRD MZ KCOR KCRM |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MAPUTO 000112 SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CVIS, KFRD, MZ, KCOR, KCRM SUBJECT: IMMIGRATION & VISA FRAUD IN AND OUT OF MOZAMBIQUE 1. (U) Summary: Visa fraud in Mozambique continues to be less prevalent than the otherwise high level of corruption throughout the country would suggest. New anti-fraud investigation and validation studies at post indicate, however, that attempted non-immigrant visa fraud among third country nationals is a growing problem, specifically among the South Asian, West African and Cuban communities. Visa fraud among emigrants to Mozambique and South Africa is also on the rise, creating secondary effects at our visa window. Post has, in response, altered its visa issuance practices for certain third country national groups, and maintains a watchful eye for further illegal immigration trends in Mozambique. 2. (U) US Embassy Maputo experiences relatively low levels of visa fraud at the consular window, particularly among Mozambican applicants. Mozambicans within the United States number less than 5,000 - the closest thing resembling a Mozambican community can be found in New York/New Jersey - and only a few nationals see non-immigrant visas as a ticket to emigrate illegally to the U.S. To verify this assumption, post conducted unofficial validation studies in late 2003 on 50 of that year's Mozambican B1 and J1 visa recipients who we considered to be high flight risk candidates. Of these, 47 are confirmed returnees and only one is a confirmed overstay - at least a 94% returnee rate. 3. (U) Mozambicans who wish to emigrate in search of economic opportunity almost always target South Africa, occasionally Portugal. The South African High Commission consequently has a visa fraud problem very similar to what U.S. Embassies see throughout much of Latin America and West Africa, including false passports, residency documents, identity cards, letters from employers, and bank account statements. Much of the traffic place takes place in full view of their gates. We see no signs of organized NIV document fraud at our embassy, though we do see the occasional false residency document or bank account statement. 4. (U) The high rate of return and relatively low levels of fraud among Mozambican NIV applicants contrast with patterns detected among third-country national applicants. Unofficial validation studies at post in 2003 have verified the return of 5 of our last 20 approved Cuban NIV applicants scheduled to return in the past year, 12 of 20 West Africans (Nigeria 6/7, Guinea 2/7), and 13 of 20 Pakistanis. Based on these results, post has become much more stringent on issuing NIVs to Cubans, who formerly had a relatively high approval rate based on the fact that most applicants were doctors or engineers with long-term residency in the country. 5. (U) (It should be stressed that prior to this validation study, Post already had a long history of NIV approval rates below 50% for West African applicants and, post 9-11, the NIV approval rate for South Asians also had fallen into the 35% range. Due to our already-low approval rates, it was necessary to conduct our validation study on all third-country applicants who had returned in the past 12- 16 months in order to have a viable sample size. Since our timeframe for contacting returned TCN NIV applicants is much longer than we used for Mozambican NIV applicants, it likely increases and somewhat exaggerates the rate of non-response among TCNs.) 6. (SBU) At the same time that Post has confirmed a high rate of non-return among third-country applicants, it has detected increased signs of organized immigration fraud by third-country nationals within Mozambique. Since November 2003, Post has been approached three times by members of a group of recent Indian and Pakistani immigrants to South Africa/Mozambique, inquiring about the possibility of acquiring U.S. non-immigrant visas for the group, which numbers at least 33 strong. Background checks on the handful of passports secured from our sources indicate that the applicants received NIVs for South Africa or Mozambique from Mumbai and Karachi. Many have applied for NIVs to the U.S. in the past and been turned down. The leader of the group has been identified as Hanifo Shiraz (sp?), a Pakistani exporter-importer with residency in Nampula, Mozambique and business interests in Pretoria. Mr. Shiraz has been tied to the drug trade by various sources, but his name does not show up on INK, and our knowledge of him is limited. 7. (SBU) We became aware of this potential NIV fraud ring at the same time that a Beira-based newspaper, Zambeze, ran an article detailing NIV fraud at the Mozambican Consulate in Karachi. According to the author, the Mozambican consul, Abdul Kalid Tawab, by some accounts a Pakistani national and by others a Mozambican of Pakistani descent, had been detained for selling non-immigrant visas at a rate of $500- $800 per visa, presumably on every visa issued. The Karachi Consulate typically issues about 400 visas per month. No names of the offending officials were listed, and subsequent Embassy contact with the newspaper was unable to unearth any further information. Contacts within the Mozambican Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Immigration confirmed that visa fraud had been a problem in Karachi, probably for a few years, but insisted the level was greatly exaggerated, and said that the offending official had been removed. Immigration officials at the Maputo airport insist that they have turned away many travelers with false visas from Karachi, but offered no proof. 8. (SBU) Over the past two years, the South Asian (especially Pakistani) community has grown considerably in Mozambique. The Director of Immigration indicated to us that his offices have been receiving up to 500 new Pakistani applicants for residency per month over the past several months. (He did not know the specific number.) Nampula city has seen a particularly large spike; local officials estimate that the Pakistani community has doubled in population in the past 2-3 years. The city has also become a hub for African immigrants from a wide range of countries, particularly Nigeria. New South Asian residents generally enter the country through Maputo airport and then migrate to Nampula. Land routes from Malawi and Tanzania have been noted as the most common means of illegal entry for Africans. In addition, post has noticed that the Nampula Immigration office has become increasingly corrupt, issuing improper visas and residency documents to South Asians and West Africans at a price (and also forcing Americans to pay bribes for their residency documents). Some of these TCNs have appeared at our visa window in recent months, and much of the relatively limited NIV fraud found in Mozambique originates from the Nampula area. 9. (SBU) Many of these TCNs are content to live and work in Mozambique, and Indians and Pakistanis are particularly active in trading a wide range of goods. They have also made inroads into the money exchange and banking sphere in Nampula. Others are looking to move onward. The South African High Commission in Maputo estimates that NIV applications from Pakistanis and Indians have grown by about 10% in each of the past two years. Applications from third- country Africans have risen at a slower rate. 10. (SBU) Larger numbers of South Asians and West Africans (and Mozambicans) bypass the visa route to South Africa altogether, traveling illegally by land. Many pass straight through the border at Ressano Garcia-Komatipoort in vans, via smugglers who may be South African, Mozambican, or, in some instances, recent South Asian immigrants tied to Mr. Shiraz or others. The typical fee involves 500R to 800R to the smugglers, with some of that money paid to border guards. (The International Office for Migration reports that traffickers in women and children will pay 150R to border guards in order to allow a group of Mozambican women to crawl under a fence 2-3 kilometers away from the border. Bribes to drive a group straight through the border run much higher. This same price range probably holds for smuggling of South Asians.) The Swaziland border at Naamacha is equally porous for those wishing to cross in vans, and perhaps easier to cross on foot, but requires a second crossing into South Africa, and is therefore less favored. Other more creative methods of entry have been noted, such as driving to the beaches of Ponta do Ouro, and crossing to South Africa by foot. It is very likely that South Africa is the end destination for the vast majority of these desperate migrants; very few appear to have the financing or the inclination to attempt a jump to the United States. 11. (U) The patterns of migration from Mozambique to South Africa resemble those used by traffickers in women and children, with an apparently lesser emphasis on Ponta do Ouro as a migration point. It should be pointed out, however, that we have no indication that South Asian and West African immigrants have been the perpetrators or victims of trafficking in women and children. In addition, post has not seen any evidence that intending illegal immigrants from South Asia, West Africa, or Cuba have engaged in any anti-American activities, per se. The worst that can be said is that the leaders of the illegal immigration rings are allegedly involved in the drug trade and other forms of contraband. 12. (U) Post continues to be vigilant of intending NIV fraud, especially as our percentage of NIV applicants from TCNs continues to rise, from 20% in 2002 to 28% in 2003 - with an especially high percentage in the later months of the year. (This spike is due in part to the Department's decision in April 2003 to extend the validity of Mozambican visas from three-month, single-entry visas to one-year, multiple-entry, which has stopped the growth rate in Mozambican NIV applications.) We have already taken measures to significantly curtail NIV issuance to TCNs, and to nearly prohibit issuance of NIVs to any third country national that has not proven long-term residency within the country. Finally, post has made strengthening of Mozambique's border security a mission-wide priority, which will be reflected as one of the top goals within our Mission Performance Plan. LA LIME
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