US embassy cable - 04TEGUCIGALPA179

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000179 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR P, INL, L, WHA, WHACEN AND WHA/PPC 
SOUTHCOM FOR GENERAL HILL 
JIATF-S FOR RADM SIROIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2014 
TAGS: SNAR, MOPS, PINS, PREL, MCAP, PINR, HO 
SUBJECT: DRUG PLANE CRASHES AFTER INTERCEPT BY HONDURAN AIR 
FORCE; GOH INSISTS PLANE WAS NOT SHOT DOWN 
 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Francisco L. Palmieri 
for reason 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  Honduran Air Force Commander insists 1/20/04 
crash of a drug-trafficking civilian aircraft was not a 
shoot-down.  According to published statements and 
conversations with U.S. mission military members, Colonel 
Caceres stated that Honduran Air Force (HAF) interceptors 
twice contacted the aircraft and ordered it to land. 
Finally, following established HAF procedures, Caceres 
explained that the HAF pilots, flying at the side of the 
aircraft in question, fired warning shots on a parallel track 
to the flight path.  He maintains that the plane was not shot 
down.  Post has sought, but been unable to confirm, any other 
information which contradicts Col. Caceres' account.  Post 
continues to press Government of Honduras (GOH) and Honduran 
Armed Forces (HOAF) sources for additional details of the 
circumstances of the crash of this aircraft, including 
authorization to visit the crash site.  Post will obtain a 
copy of the incident report as soon as one is prepared.  Post 
recommends that the U.S. continue to share intelligence with 
the GOH until or unless information is received that 
indicates that the Hondurans actually shot down the aircraft. 
 Halting intelligence sharing could be counterproductive to 
U.S. national interests and counternarcotics efforts in 
Honduras.   END SUMMARY 
 
2. (C) On 1/20/04, Honduran authorities were alerted by U.S. 
sources of the intrusion of its airspace over the Gulf of 
Fonseca by an unidentified, suspicious aircraft.  According 
to HAF sources, the aircraft entered Honduran airspace around 
1430 hours.  In response to this information, the HAF 
scrambled two planes to intercept the intruding airplane, 
which had not filed a flight plan for Honduras.  The HAF 
planes (Tucanos) signaled for the white, twin-engine plane to 
land at Toncontin International Airport.  The pilot ignored 
this request and evaded the HAF aircraft.  Sometime later, 
the same plane was relocated and was again approached near 
Comayagua in central Honduras.  The HAF pilots then directed 
the plane to land at Soto Cano Air Base.  Their instructions 
were ignored.  Finally, after the plane changed course and 
began heading toward the El Salvador-Honduras border, the HAF 
pilots, flying at the side of the aircraft in question, fired 
warning shots on a parallel track to the flight path. 
 
3. (C)  HAF sources reported that shortly after those shots 
were fired packages of presumably drugs or fuel were tossed 
from the suspicious plane prior to the crash.  HOAF sources 
said that the plane then took a series of aggressive, evasive 
measures, descending rapidly, before finally stalling, 
crashing and burning.  The weather was bad at the time, and 
the crash took place in mountainous and forested terrain in 
isolated Lempira Department.  Honduran Air Force Chief 
Caceres openly admitted that warning shots were fired; 
however, he insists that the HAF pilot did not shoot the 
plane down.  Caceres reiterated that the HAF pilots followed 
established HAF procedures in this incident. Embassy will 
request that the HAF provide copies of its intercept and live 
ammunition policies. 
 
4. (C)  Post continues to press GOH and HOAF sources for 
additional details of the circumstances of the crash of this 
aircraft.  Mission requested and received authorization to 
visit the crash site.  It will be visited on 1/23/04 and we 
will report results septel.  Post has sought, but been unable 
to confirm, any other information, which contradicts Col. 
Caceres' account.  MILGP and DAO expect that a report of the 
incident will be prepared, noting a report was prepared 
within days of the April 2003 shoot down incident.  Mission 
will obtain a copy of it as soon as received. 
 
5. (C)  Police sources informed post that on the morning of 
1/21 police reached the site of the plane wreckage.  The 
plane had tail number N95L (fictitious), which belongs to a 
Cessna 142, a different kind of aircraft.  More than 19 kilos 
of presumed cocaine were reportedly found at the crash site, 
as well as the charred bodies of the pilot and one crew 
member. 
 
6. (U)  Separately, the media reported today that the motor 
and serial number of the plane were: 642080, Model Fiuring, 
order 145236.  The other motor number was 642081, series 
TMD516TT, Continental.  The tail had an American flag on it. 
The two bodies have been moved to the morgue in San Pedro 
Sula.  We understand that both bodies were completely 
charred.  Identification of the remains is impossible. 
 
7. (C)  In another development, on afternoon of 1/21/04 
around 1500 hours, Honduran sources reported that another 
suspected drug plane entered Honduran airspace.  The HAF 
scrambled aircraft to intercept it.  They were able to spot 
the plane over Olancho traveling in the direction of San 
Pedro Sula.  When the drug plane saw the Hondurans it was 
able, due to superior instrumentation, to fly into heavy 
clouds and evade the HAF interceptors.  Apparently the HAF 
aircraft do not have radar that allows them to "see" in cloud 
cover.  The Hondurans radioed info about the plane to 
Guatemalan authorities.  The plane was a twin engine King Air 
with tail number N89K (probably false).  When relaying this 
information, HAF sources shared their concerns that, when HAF 
aircraft have approached these drug airplanes in the past, 
the suspect airplane's crews have aimed AK 47s at the HAF 
pilots.  The HAF also reported that, on previous occasions, 
pilots of drug planes execute aggressive, evasive measures, 
including attempts to collide in mid-air, endangering HAF 
planes and crews. 
 
8. (C)  COMMENT:  We do not believe, based on the current 
available information, that a cut-off of intelligence sharing 
appears to be warranted.  Post recommends that the U.S. 
continue to share intelligence with the GOH until information 
is received that indicates that the Hondurans actually shot 
down the aircraft on January 20.  Post notes the GOH made 
enormous strides in its interdiction efforts during 2003, 
interdicting almost 6,000 kilos of cocaine, which was more 
than in the previous five years combined.  The GOH is going 
to considerable lengths and expense to assist the U.S. in our 
joint fight against narcotics trafficking.  U.S. has to date 
provided token financial support for HOAF military 
operations.  The HOAF is doing most of this work at its own 
initiative and cost.  Halting intelligence sharing could be 
counterproductive to U.S. national interests and 
counternarcotics efforts in Honduras.  Significant quantities 
of drugs are passing through Honduras.  If the U.S. cuts off 
intelligence sharing based on the current information, the 
GOH and HOAF will feel they are being unfairly punished. 
Future counternarcotics cooperation could be jeopardized. 
END COMMENT. 
PALMER