US embassy cable - 04ANKARA362

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000362 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2014 
TAGS: CY, IZ, PGOV, PINS, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S LUNCH WITH DSHOD BASBUG, JANUARY 19, 
2004 
 
REF: A) STATE 012103 B) STATE 010120 
 
 
(U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR ERIC EDELMAN. REASONS:1.5(B) AND 
(D) 
 
 
1.  (S)  AMBASSADOR HOSTED TGS DEPUTY CHIEF GENERAL ILKER 
BASBUG TO DISCUSS THE PM'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO THE U.S., 
NORTHERN IRAQ AND CYPRUS ON JANUARY 19.  BASBUG WAS SUFFERING 
FROM A PROLONGED HEAD COLD AND EXPRESSED RELIEF THAT HIS 
JANUARY 16 (FIRST OF ITS KIND) OPEN PRESS CONFERENCE WAS 
BEHIND HIM.  AMBASSADOR THANKED BASBUG FOR HIS HANDLING OF 
THE TROOP ROTATION ISSUE AND THE U.S. USE OF INCIRLIK AIR 
BASE FOR THAT PURPOSE DURING THE PRESS CONFERENCE.  BASBUG 
NOTED THAT HE HAD SAID THAT THE U.S. HAD ONLY REQUESTED TROOP 
ROTATION OUT OF IRAQ NOT IN.  IN REVIEWING THE DOCUMENTATION 
EARLIER ON JANUARY 19 HE HAD NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAD 
REQUESTED RIGHTS FOR "DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT." 
AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT SO FAR OUR REQUESTS HAVE ONLY BEEN FOR 
REDEPLOYMENT FROM IRAQ. 
 
 
2. (S) GENERAL BASBUG NOTED THAT VCJCS GENERAL PACE HAD 
INDICATED THAT THE TGS MIGHT EXPECT A GROUP TO VISIT AND 
DISCUSS POSSIBLE ACTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE PKK IN EARLY 
JANUARY.  AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT WASHINGTON COLLEAGUES WERE 
WORKING HARD ON THE ISSUE AND THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED 
TO ADDRESS THIS LONG-STANDING TURKISH CONCERN IN THE CONTEXT 
OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT.  HE DREW GENERAL BASBUG'S ATTENTION 
TO THE FACT THAT THE U.S.G. HAD DESIGNATED KONGRA-GEL AS A 
TERRORIST ORGANIZATION LAST WEEK.  BASBUG NOTED HE WAS AWARE 
OF, AND PLEASED BY, THE DESIGNATION.  HE EXPRESSED IMPATIENCE 
WITH THE FAILURE OF EU COUNTRIES TO MOVE FORWARD ON 
DESIGNATING KADEK. 
 
 
3. (S) BASBUG MOVED QUICKLY TO A DISCUSSION OF IRAQI 
FEDERALISM WHICH HE HAD ADDRESSED IN HIS JANUARY 16 PRESS 
CONFERENCE.  HE NOTED THAT HE HAD EXPRESSED A TURKISH VIEW 
THAT FEDERATION WAS NOT A DESIRABLE OUTCOME IN IRAQ, BUT THAT 
IF FEDERALISM WAS NECESSARY IT SHOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE 
ETHNICALLY OR RELIGIOUSLY BASED.  IF IRAQ WENT DOWN THAT PATH 
HE FEARED THAT THE OUTCOME WOULD BE 'BLOODY.'  AMBASSADOR 
POINTED OUT THAT U.S. SHARED THE VIEW THAT ANY FEDERATION 
SHOULD BE BASED ON GEOGRAPHIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS. 
BASBUG AGREED BUT SAID, "IT IS A VERY TRICKY ISSUE BECAUSE 
ETHNIC AND GEOGRAPHIC LINES TEND TO OVERLAP A LITTLE IN 
IRAQ."  BASBUG ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. HAD CONCLUDED THAT SOME 
SORT OF FEDERATION WAS DESIRABLE. 
 
 
4. (S)  AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. BELIEVED THAT 
IRAQIS NEEDED TO WORK OUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND 
THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM THAT THEY WOULD ALL HAVE TO LIVE 
UNDER.  GIVEN KURDISH DEMANDS AND THE REALITIES THAT EXISTED 
IT WAS HARD TO SEE AN OUTCOME THAT DID NOT INVOLVE SOME KIND 
OF FEDERATIVE ARRANGEMENT.  BASBUG RELUCTANTLY CONCEDED THE 
POINT BUT NONETHELESS SAID THAT WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS WERE 
AGREED MIGHT HAVE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES THAT COULD THREATEN 
TURKEY'S INTERESTS.  BASBUG SAID HE WAS PARTICULARLY WORRIED 
THAT TENSIONS WOULD INCREASE AS THE MARCH MILESTONE FOR A 
TRANSITIONAL FUNDAMENTAL LAW APPROACHED.  AMBASSADOR 
CAREFULLY REVIEWED POINTS IN REF B ON KIRKUK AND 
RESPONSIBILITY THAT ALL PARTIES HAD TO MAINTAIN CALM.  BASBUG 
SAID HE APPRECIATED U.S.G. ACTIONS DESCRIBED IN REF B POINTS 
AND UNDERSTOOD THAT ALL SIDES NEEDED TO ACT RESPONSIBLY. 
 
 
5. (S)  ON CYPRUS, BASBUG MAINTAINED THAT PRESS STORIES ABOUT 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TGS AND MFA ON THE ISSUE HAD BEEN 
GREATLY EXAGGERATED.  CERTAINLY THERE WERE DIFFERENCES OF 
EMPHASIS BETWEEN THE TWO THAT REFLECTED THEIR DIFFERENT 
FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES BUT THE EFFORT WAS BEING 
UNDERTAKEN TO REACH A CONSENSUS IN A THOROUGHLY PROFESSIONAL 
WAY.  HE AGREED THAT A "JUST AND LASTING SOLUTION" TO CYPRUS 
WAS AN IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE AND THAT THE MAY 1 CYPRUS EU 
ACCESSION WOULD MAKE EVERYTHING MORE DIFFICULT.  HE SAID THE 
TGS HAD TWO DIFFICULTIES.  THE FIRST WAS THE COMMITMENT TO A 
REFERENDUM.  HE NOTED THAT THIS WAS SOMETHING TO WHICH 
PRESIDENT PAPADOPOULOS HAD NOT AGREED.  THE SECOND WAS THAT 
IT WAS NOT CLEAR HOW, IF NEGOTIATIONS RESUMED, THE UN SYG 
WOULD DEFINE "FINALIZING THE PLAN WITHOUT REOPENING THE BASIC 
PRINCIPLES OR ESSENTIAL TRADE-OFFS" AS HE HAD REPORTED TO THE 
UNSC.  TURKEY'S CONCERNS (MORE BIZONALITY, THE PERCENTAGE OF 
GREEK CYPRIOTS RETURNING TO THE NORTH, THE NUMBER AND 
TIMETABLE FOR TURKISH TROOPS) DID NOT IN THE TGS VIEW REOPEN 
BASIC PRINCIPLES BUT HOW COULD THEY KNOW WHETHER OR NOT THE 
UN SYG WOULD AGREE? 
 
 
6.  (S)  AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT IT WAS PRECISELY PAPADOPOULOS' 
RETICENCE ON A REFERENDUM THAT GAVE TURKEY AN OPENING TO GET 
ITSELF OUT OF A CORNER AND IMPROVE ITS CASE FOR A DATE TO 
BEGIN EU ACCESSION TALKS.  BASBUG REJOINED THAT "IN THEORY 
YOU ARE RIGHT, BUT THE TRAP FOR TURKEY IS THAT IF WE ACCEPT 
HE MIGHT DO SO AS WELL.  HE WOULD THEN BLOCK ANY CHANGES IN 
THE ANNAN III TEXT AND THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WILL BE FORCED TO 
A REFERENDUM ON A TEXT THAT WAS ALREADY DEEMED UNACCEPTABLE 
TO TURKEY."  AMBASSADOR URGED THAT PM ERDOGAN RAISE HIS 
CONCERNS ABOUT HOW THE UN SYG WOULD HANDLE THE NEGOTIATIONS 
DIRECTLY IN THE MEETING IN DAVOS ON JANUARY 24.  HE NOTED 
THAT POLITICAL WILL CLEARLY WOULD BE DETERMINED ON THE BASIS 
OF WHAT TURKISH POSITION CAME OUT OF THE JANUARY 23 NSC 
MEETING BUT ALSO ON THE COMMITMENT CONVEYED TO THE UN SYG BY 
THE PM ABOUT HIS DETERMINATION TO REACH A SETTLEMENT AND TAKE 
ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY BEFORE US. 
 
 
7. (S)  BASBUG SAID THE TGS WAS VERY DISAPPOINTED AT THE 
TIMELINE THAT THEY WERE WORKING ON.  HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES 
HAD HOPED TO WORK OUT THE TURKISH POSITION AND DISCUSS IT 
WITH THE U.S. AND THE U.K. BEFORE PRESENTING IT TO KOFFI 
ANNAN.  TURKEY WAS LOOKING FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE IN REACHING A 
SETTLEMENT.  AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT U.S.G. WAS PREPARED 
TO "WORK WITH THE UNSYG AT WHATEVER LEVEL NECESSARY TO 
FACILITATE FAIR AND REASONABLE ADJUSTMENTS TO ANNAN III" BUT 
IT WAS NECESSARY TO UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WOULD NEED TO BE 
TRADE-OFFS.  BASBUG SAID HE APPRECIATED AMBASSADOR'S 
DISCUSSION WITH HIM OF PREPARATIONS FOR THE PM'S VISIT.  HE 
ASKED, AS HE DEPARTED, WHETHER AMBASSADOR HAD SHARED THESE 
POINTS WITH ANYONE ELSE.  AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT HE HAD 
COVERED THEM EXTENSIVELY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GUL AND WOULD 
DO SO LATER WITH MFA U/SECRETARY ZIYAL. 
 
 
8.  (S)  COMMENT:  BASBUG WAS, AS USUAL, QUIET, THOUGHTFUL 
AND UNDERSTATED.  NONETHELESS HIS PREOCCUPATION WITH 
DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ WAS CLEAR.  WHEN AMBASSADOR ASKED 
WHETHER CYPRUS OR IRAQ WAS THE MORE IMPORTANT CHALLENGE FOR 
THE TGS HE REPLIED "BOTH ARE IMPORTANT" BUT HE SUGGESTED THAT 
THE LONG-TERM REPERCUSSIONS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ WERE 
PROBABLY MORE SIGNIFICANT.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
EDELMAN