US embassy cable - 04ANKARA348

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000348 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKISH P.M. ERDOGAN GOES TO WASHINGTON: HOW 
STRONG A LEADER IN THE FACE OF STRONG CHALLENGES? 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: 1.5 (b,d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: P.M. Erdogan expects Washington to focus on 
Cyprus, economic reform, and anti-terrorism cooperation among 
other issues.  In turn he will press for (1) concrete U.S. 
actions to block what Turks believe is the formation by 
accretion of a de facto Kurdish state in n. Iraq; (2) 
concrete U.S. actions against the PKK in Iraq; and (3) clear 
USG support for his government.  While the Turkish side sees 
the visit as mainly about developing our broad common 
strategy, Erdogan is also looking for a public outcome he can 
characterize as concrete results.  At the same time, although 
Erdogan is currently unchallenged as the paramount political 
figure in Turkey, he and his party face deep challenges 
which, if he cannot rise to them, will affect his longevity 
in government, Turkey's democratic development, and 
U.S.-Turkish cooperation.  End summary. 
 
 
2. (C) P.M. Erdogan appears to be riding a political high and 
uncommon luck as he prepares for his Jan. 28-29 visit to 
Washington, where he hopes to demonstrate the Administration 
recognizes him as an equal partner. 
 
 
3. (C) Erdogan has been primed to hear plainspoken 
expressions of U.S. interest in Turkish action (1) to reach a 
Cyprus settlement by May 1; (2) to hew to credible economic 
reform and macro policies; (3) to cooperate unreservedly 
against terrorist groups of all stripes, including Islamist 
ones (he rejects the term "Islamic terrorism"); (4) to 
cooperate on Iraq; (5) to open the border with Armenia; and 
(6) to reopen the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Halki seminary in 
a way acceptable to the Patriarchate. 
 
 
4. (C) In turn Erdogan will argue that raising U.S.-Turkish 
relations to a higher level depends directly on (1) clear USG 
political and diplomatic actions to dispel the conviction and 
consequent resentment among Turks of all political stripes 
that the U.S. is tolerating step-by-step formation of a de 
facto independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq; (2) 
concrete USG actions to remove the PKK threat from Iraq; (3) 
high-level, sustained USG support for the GOT's new Cyprus 
initiative; and (4) the clearest possible signal that the 
U.S. stands behind the democratically-elected government. 
 
 
WHO ARE WE DEALING WITH? 
------------------------ 
 
 
5. (C) Charismatic, and possessing a common touch and 
phenomenal memory for faces and functions of thousands of 
party members across the country, Erdogan has a strong 
pragmatic core.  His pragmatism has led him away from the 
radical Islamist milieu of his past, a point noted to us 
unhappily by his (radical) former spiritual leader Kemal 
Hoca.  His pragmatism has also led him to avoid precipitously 
pushing Islamic agenda items such as the wearing of Islamist 
headscarves while using his outstanding preacher skills and 
persona as someone persecuted by the secularist Establishment 
to maintain his hold on the hearts of his more religious 
supporters. 
 
 
6. (C) In short, a natural politician, Erdogan has a common 
touch and an ability to communicate his empathy for the 
plight and aspirations of the common citizen.  He projects 
the image of the Tribune of Anatolia, ready to take on 
corruption and privilege and to defend conservative 
traditions.  As a result his AK Party won a two-thirds 
parliamentary majority in Nov. 2002 national elections. 
Owing to AK's image as the party of change at the national 
level, good record in providing services at the municipal 
level, and lack of viable political alternatives, AK could 
gain around 50% of the vote in March 28 nationwide local 
elections.  Party insiders project that such a result would 
give AK control of 65% or more of the 3,200 municipalities in 
Turkey, including probably Istanbul and Ankara and perhaps 
even Izmir, where AK has not done well to date, plus most of 
the other large cities.  Every step by the Turkish 
Establishment to try to diminish him -- whether by blocking 
legislation or attacking his motives -- cements his 
popularity in Turkey's urban sprawls and across the Anatolian 
heartland.  While opposition to him remains bitter in various 
loci of the State apparatus, Erdogan currently faces no 
credible political opponent or party. 
 
 
7. (C) Moreover, Erdogan knows his government has gained 
credit well beyond AK supporters, as well as in the EU, for 
political reforms which, if fully implemented, will 
substantially strengthen democracy in Turkey.  His 
government's inability to pass legislation or regulations 
favored by AK supporters -- land registry reform, Supreme 
Education Board (YOK) reform, Koran course reform -- has not 
eroded support.  Indeed, even right-of-center Turks who 
remain wary of AK readily tell us the Establishment's 
opposition to such reforms is counterproductive.  Even if one 
can attribute Turkey's lowest inflation and interest rates in 
30 years to luck, Central Bank skill, and global emerging 
market trends rather than to the AK government's actions, 
Erdogan has reaped the political benefit. 
 
 
8. (C) Taking a high-profile approach in pursuing Turkey's EU 
candidacy through direct campaigning in EU capitals, Erdogan 
has relished being feted by EU leaders for the past year.  He 
will have had positive visits by EU Commission President 
Prodi and German FonMin Fischer before his Washington trip 
and looks forward to the February visit by German Chancellor 
Schroeder.  He sees himself at this point as one of (if not 
the) most important leaders of the Muslim world. 
ERDOGAN'S VIEW OF RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
9. (C) Erdogan recognizes that U.S. support can be important 
for Turkey's economy and EU aspirations.  He sees his task as 
managing Turks's ambivalence toward us; at the same time he 
wants to avoid being labeled pro-American.  From the low 
point in bilateral relations in March 2003 he has taken 
several supportive steps, while being careful not to be too 
closely associated with us since opening Turkish airspace for 
the Iraq war.  Erdogan agreed to a ground line of 
communication for Coalition forces in Iraq.  He pushed 
through authorization for a Turkish deployment in support of 
the Coalition.  He agreed to U.S. troop rotation through 
Incirlik airbase.  In line with long-standing U.S. desires, 
he took a bold step in Nov. 2002 to try to move Turkey away 
from its no-solution stance on Cyprus and may be prepared now 
to do more.  He seems to be more open than any previous Prime 
Minister to a re-opening of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's 
Halki seminary. 
 
 
10. (C) On the other hand he has made public his discomfort 
with what most fellow Turks also see as American complicity 
in creation of a de facto independent Kurdistan in northern 
Iraq and lack of concrete U.S. action against the 
PKK/KADEK/KHK.  He has not controlled anti-American 
suspicions among the AK parliamentary group or within the 
Cabinet (DefMin Gonul told us recently on the margins of a 
symposium in Istanbul that in closed meetings FonMin Gul 
continues to praise the Parliament's March 1, 2003 turndown 
of U.S. deployment and to advocate a more Arab/Islamic 
foreign policy orientation as a counter to relations with the 
U.S.).  Nevertheless, Erdogan and Ministers like Gonul and 
Justice Minister Cicek see U.S. support for his government as 
essential to his survival, and he wants a successful visit. 
 
 
 
 
THE DEEPER CHALLENGES FOR ERDOGAN 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
11. (C) Erdogan, AK, and his government face half a dozen 
serious domestic challenges which, if he does not manage them 
well, will begin to put a severe strain on his ability to 
govern by late 2004 and on his and our ability to maintain 
dynamic, deep U.S.-Turkish cooperation: 
 
 
--Erdogan's character: Erdogan has traits which render him 
seriously vulnerable to miscalculating the political dynamic, 
especially in foreign affairs, and vulnerable to attacks by 
those who would disrupt his equilibrium.  First, overbearing 
pride.  Second, unbridled ambition stemming from the belief 
God has anointed him to lead Turkey (Mustafa Bilginer, a 
close confidant of Erdogan and his wife Emine from 1997-2003, 
has analyzed this trait in a draft book on Erdogan's 
character; Erdogan used Koranic allusion in his speech to the 
AK Congress in Oct. 2003 to make the point about his 
God-appointed mission).  Third, an authoritarian loner streak 
which prevents growth of a circle of strong and skillful 
advisors, a broad flow of fresh information to him, or 
development of effective communications among the party 
headquarters, government, and parliamentary group.  This 
streak also makes him exceptionally thin-skinned.  Fourth, an 
overweening desire to stay in power which, despite his macho 
image, renders him fearful and prone to temporizing even at 
moments which call for swift and resolute decisions.  Fifth, 
a distrust of women which manifests itself not only in 
occasional harsh public comments but also in his 
unwillingness to give women any meaningful decision-making 
authority in AK. 
 
 
--Rival centers of power: Cabinet Ministers, Erdogan advisors 
and a raft of M.P.s constantly tell us of the tensions 
between Erdogan and Gul, with the latter appearing repeatedly 
to try to undercut Erdogan.  Parliamentary Speaker Bulent 
Arinc, who has a strong following among more Islamist AK 
M.P.s, has also caused problems for Erdogan on controversial 
questions like pushing the right to wear headscarves at State 
functions.  Although Arinc has kept a low profile for the 
past seven months, he remains a locus of troublemaking, 
especially on questions involving the U.S. (e.g., troop 
rotation through Incirlik). 
 
 
--Lack of technocratic depth: While some AK appointees appear 
to be capable of learning on the job, others are incompetent 
or seem to be pursuing private or lodge (cemaat) interests. 
AK is far from bringing the bureaucracy under control or 
making it work efficiently.  We hear constant anecdotal 
evidence, not only from those on the secularist left who have 
deep prejudices against AK but also from contacts on the 
right, that AK appointees, at the national and  provincial 
levels, are incompetent or narrow-minded Islamists.  AK 
officials -- from Cabinet Ministers to local-level party 
activists across the country -- admit to us that the party's 
choice of competent and broadly acceptable candidates for the 
March local elections will be exceptionally difficult and the 
election of controversial or inept AK candidates would 
complicate AK's ability to govern both at the local and 
national level. 
 
 
--Weakness of public relations and the image of hidden 
agendas: Erdogan lacks advisors who are able to pre-empt or 
handle the news cycle; none of his advisors has good working 
relations with the Turkish military.  His government has 
failed continually to consult broadly and openly or to 
prepare public opinion for legislative initiatives, 
long-overdue reforms, or foreign policy steps (e.g., pre-war 
U.S. troop deployment or troop rotation).  As a result AK 
creates the impression, exploited by the Establishment, that 
it harbors an anti-republican, deep Islamist agenda or is 
selling out the country, leading to Establishment 
(dis)information campaigns which cause the government to 
retreat. 
 
 
--Corruption: AK rode to power on the common citizen's 
revulsion against corruption.  Charges that Erdogan amassed 
his fortune through kickbacks as mayor of Istanbul have never 
been proven but we now hear more and more from insiders that 
close advisors such as private secretary Hikmet Bulduk, 
Mucahit Arslan, and Cuneyd Zapsu are engaging in wholesale 
influence peddling.  Aksam Ankara bureau chief Nuray Basaran 
told us Zapsu admitted to her Jan. 13 that Erdogan and he 
benefited "directly" from the award of the Tupras (state 
petroleum refinery) privatization to a consortium including a 
Russian partner.  Erdogan's direct acquisition of a 
significant interest in a food distribution company has 
become a public controversy. 
 
 
--Islamist complexes and prejudices: Some appointments, such 
as Prime Ministry Undersecretary Dincer (who stands by his 
1995 article calling into question the relevance of the 
Republic), Education Ministry Undersecretary Birinci (who in 
the past called himself an "ummetci", i.e., a follower of a 
greater Islamic order and an opponent of the Republic), and 
head of State-run Turkish Radio and Television Demiroz (who 
once paid homage to Afghan fundamentalist Hekmatyar), have 
made the core of the State Establishment -- Armed Forces, 
Presidency, and Judiciary -- profoundly uneasy.  Erdogan's 
refusal to condemn these positions, the question of the level 
of influence of Islamic brotherhoods and groups (including 
the followers of Fethullah Gulen) on the government, and the 
presence of Turkish Hizbullah supporters in AK Party 
provincial structures in the Southeast have also raised deep 
concerns among many long-standing Embassy contacts who 
themselves are pious.  Erdogan himself recognizes the 
pernicious effect of a "closed brotherhood mentality" 
(cemaatcilik) in political affairs, as reflected in his Jan. 
10 speech to a symposium in Istanbul, but how well he can 
control the phenomenon remains a very open question. 
 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
 
12. (C) As Erdogan rides the twin desires for reform in 
Turkey and for wider prosperity, he challenges those who have 
traditionally reserved power and wealth for themselves at 
least to yield pride of place to a different elite.  While 
his ultimate direction and success remain to be seen, at this 
time Erdogan is the only partner capable of advancing toward 
the U.S. vision of a successful, democratic Turkey integrated 
into Europe. 
EDELMAN