US embassy cable - 04MAPUTO83

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 MAPUTO 000083 
 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR AF/S, AF/EPS, INL/AAE 
JUSTICE FOR OPDAT AND ICITAP 
TREASURY FOR FINCEN 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, KCOR, KCRM, EAID, MZ 
SUBJECT: CORRUPTION IN MOZAMBIQUE 
 
REF: A. 03 MAPUTO 1530 
B. 03 MAPUTO 1532 
Classified By: Amb. Helen La Lime, reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Any discussion of Mozambique's political 
and economic development needs to take into account 
corruption. The steady decade-long progress since the end of 
the civil war could be slowed or even reversed if corruption 
is not checked. Senior Mozambicans in fact cite corruption 
as the greatest single impediment to future development. 
Corruption is not an easy topic to analyze. By their nature 
the worse forms of corruption are hidden from view. Corrupt 
practices occur at all levels of society to the point that 
many practices are considered "normal." U.S. ideas of 
conflict-of-interest do not exist here resulting in some 
politicians who have greatly enriched themselves through 
government positions seeing themselves as legitimate 
champions against corruption. The Mozambicans say the right 
things about corruption. They have also taken serious 
efforts to lay the institutional and legal framework to 
attack the problem. The fundamental question, however, is 
whether in a country where none is without sin the 
Mozambicans really mean what they say. This cable, which 
represents a mission-wide effort, surveys GRM efforts to 
combat corruption and USG assistance in those efforts, 
placing the issue in Mozambican and regional context, and 
identifying criticisms we have encountered from our 
interlocutors. Elections scheduled for December could prove 
to be a watershed in current and future GRM efforts. End 
summary. 
 
Everybody Recognizes the Problem 
-------------------------------- 
2. (SBU) Mozambique is losing its image as the darling of the 
donor community as the corruption issue takes a more central 
role. After eleven years of peace, reconciliation, and rapid 
economic growth, the shine of Mozambique's (and the donor 
community's) success story is beginning to tarnish. Concern 
is growing among donors that corruption is not being 
adequately addressed by the country's leadership. Corruption 
is the biggest campaign issue for the opposition as 
Mozambique approaches presidential elections in 2004; indeed, 
the ruling party candidate is also forced to play a political 
dance of condemning corruption in government while distancing 
himself from the very party structure that has resulted in 
corruption. Businesses cite corruption (particularly petty 
corruption) as the biggest hindrance to investment. Polls of 
Mozambican citizens of all economic strata cite corruption in 
one form or another as a constant in day-to-day life. 
Despite the formation of a special unit in the Attorney 
General's office and numerous public statements by key 
figures in the GRM and FRELIMO, a concerted effort has been 
slow to gain momentum. Positive developments have been the 
creation of the Anti-Corruption Unit, passage of new 
legislation, the GRM public sector reform, and improvement in 
public finances; these can be considered first steps in 
combating corruption. One watershed event, especially in 
terms of pubic perception, was the Carlos Cardoso murder 
trial, which led to the sentencing in January 2003 of six 
involved in killing the crusading anti-corruption journalist. 
The entire populace followed the trial closely and were 
taken aback (though not surprised) by testimony that detailed 
the world of criminal corruption in Mozambique. The trial 
might not have happened if it were not for pressure on the 
GRM from the Nordics. 
 
Then and Now 
------------ 
3. (SBU) The days of Samora Machel: Concerning corruption, 
much of the population looks back nostalgically to the early 
independence period and the Presidency of Samora Machel from 
1975-1986. Stories abound of Machel's intolerance for 
corruption and his public shaming and sacking of officials 
found to be corrupt. At that time, idealism and enthusiasm 
for FRELIMO policies was sincere in most quarters of the 
population. It is common to hear "this wouldn't have 
happened under Samora" when allegations of corruption are 
discussed. The yearning for "the good old days" under Machel 
ignores the fact that money wasn't worth stealing because 
there was nothing to buy in shops and food shortages were 
common. Only government officials and diplomats had access 
to hard-currency shops actually supplied with goods. The 
grinding civil war, compounded by drought, brought enormous 
suffering to most Mozambicans. Machel was, however, an 
undeniably charismatic and popular leader and his personal 
example of a humble lifestyle can be juxtaposed with the 
lavish fortunes of many current and former government 
officials who enriched themselves during privatization. 
 
4. (U) The Down Side of Economic Development: Mozambique 
has enjoyed growth rates of more than 8% for the last decade, 
albeit from a very low base. Before the 1992 Rome Peace 
Accords, the country was torn by destructive civil war and 
the neighboring South African economy was isolated under 
anti-aparteid sanctions. Visitors to Maputo who have not 
seen the capital for years are astounded at the level of 
construction and development. In addition to private foreign 
investment and large donor-financed infrastructure projects, 
numerous luxury villas have recently sprung up in Maputo's 
more upscale neighborhoods. Deteriorated buildings from the 
Portuguese era are either being renovated or replaced with 
modern structures. Many state enterprises and parastatal 
companies have been fully or partially privatized. 
High-ranking FRELIMO party members are generally thought to 
have benefited from the privatization program, in which 
previously nationalized companies were sold off under a less 
than transparent bidding process. With large investments 
from South Africa, United Kingdom, and Portugal, the Maputo 
Corridor has produced a dynamic economic environment and 
increased opportunities for corruption. A growing pie and 
weak institutions opened the door for corruption, and the 
former revolutionary leaders were the first in line as 
newly-converted free marketers. 
 
The Three Forms of Mozambican Corruption 
-------------------------------------------- 
5. (C) Criminal Corruption: The most serious, and perhaps 
most unsettling, type of corruption in Mozambique involves 
potential involvement with organized crime by government 
officials. Even if guilty of acts of omission rather than 
commission, the tolerance of activities such as trafficking 
in drugs and stolen vehicles, contraband smuggling, 
trafficking in persons, and money laundering are seen as the 
worst forms of corruption, along with outright pilferage. 
Those involved in shady dealings do not shrink from 
contracting for the murder of potential witnesses to thwart 
prosecution. The collusion of low level officials with 
transborder crime provides a conducive environment for 
international crime. The role of the country as a transit 
point for narcotics, aliens, and stolen goods has grown 
rapidly in the last five years. The murders of investigative 
journalist Carlos Cardoso in 2000 and of bank auditor 
Siba-Siba Macuacua in 2001 demonstrate the ruthlessness of 
criminals involved in this type of corruption. Additionally, 
the Assistant Attorney General heading up the UAC was the 
victim of an assassination attempt in late 2002. 
 
6. (SBU) Corrupted Elites and "Legal" Corruption: This type 
of corruption has become more prevalent and, to some extent, 
has become socially accepted in the Mozambican context, 
despite public disdain for government officials widely seen 
as increasingly corrupt. It is expected that ministers will 
have a Mercedes and a large home and family members, friends 
and associates of those in high positions expect to also 
benefit, and pressure any relative with access to resources. 
Considering low government salaries, even for ministers, 
fringe benefits, such as free housing or the use of a car are 
an accepted fact of life. Even anti-corruption advocates 
like prominent members of the NGO Etica have profited from 
positions such as university dean or former parliamentary 
committee chairman. LINK, the domestic NGO consortium, noted 
that less than twenty percent of their members meet their 
transparency criteria. Not only NGO's budget decisions are 
unduly controlled by their leaders. RENAMO leader Afonso 
Dhlakama is not known for his transparent handling of the 
main opposition party's finances. There are signs, however, 
that the public has become less accepting of business as 
usual. For example, after the government confirmed on 
January 16 that President Chissano will be provided the use 
of a new two million dollar home upon leaving office, as 
provided by a 1992 law, media reaction included public debate 
questioning the appropriateness of building a mansion at 
great expense when so many other pressing needs exist. 
 
7. (U) In discussions with contacts and among mission staff, 
the trend of sophisticated corruption was identified. 
Individuals involved in corruption exhibit sufficient 
subtlety to avoid the appearance of outright theft and 
embezzlement. It is considered normal to take advantage of 
position to garner kickbacks for oneself and family members. 
In addition, the privileged elite, with their access to or 
influence within government, can peddle influence to enrich 
themselves, while still remaining technically within the law, 
since no conflict of interest rules exist. A 1992 law 
permitted government ministers to have business interests in 
their areas of oversight, enabling many to get in on the 
ground floor of private sector activity. While the new 
anti-corruption law requires high-ranking officials to 
declare their assets, this information will remain archived 
and out of the reach of the public. Most government 
officials have profited from privatization, most notably 
former Transport and Communication Minister Guebuza. The 
fact that government officials can enrich themselves without 
technically breaking the law, compounded by cultural 
expectations, makes it possible for officials to publicly 
rail against corruption with a straight face. They can 
define corruption to solely include collusion with organized 
crime or petty everyday extortion, conveniently leaving out 
their own actions. 
 
8. (U) Petty Corruption: As opposed to high-level corruption 
aimed at personal enrichment, most day-to-day corruption can 
be described as "subsistence corruption." Civil servants, 
police, teachers, and health care workers receive extremely 
low pay. Often, government employees do not even receive 
their salaries on time. Considering the high number of 
points in the overly-bureaucratic state where a bribe can be 
demanded, it is commonplace to pay small "fees" to expedite 
paperwork, such as that for mandatory identity cards or 
permits. The lingering cultural effects of Portuguese 
colonial bureaucracy and previous dependence on the state 
during Marxism-Leninism make transactions with corrupt 
low-level officials frequent, exacerbating the problem. 
Small-scale extortion in this "household sector" 
disproportionately burdens the poorest Mozambicans. This 
type of corruption is endemic and is prevalent in the police 
(in particular the extortionate traffic police), health 
clinics (where payment is often demanded for free services), 
and schools. In the 2001 Corruption Survey published by 
Etica Mocambique, 34 percent of respondents had been asked 
for money in the health care service, and 25 percent by 
police or teachers. Only fifteen percent had any trust in 
the police, and between 80 and 90 percent believed that 
judges, police, and customs officials, along with teachers 
and health workers, demand bribes. In the schools, low-payed 
teachers often demand cash, or even bags of rice, for posting 
student exam results. Unfortunately, this situation also 
leads to some teachers demanding sexual favors from students 
for good or passing grades. 
 
Saying all the right things 
--------------------------- 
9. (U) Public statements by the President, Prime Minister, 
and FRELIMO Secretary General all indicate a desire on the 
part of FRELIMO to show progress in the fight against 
corruption. A key aspect of the GRM's anti-corruption 
campaign has been the high-profile launch of an 
Anti-Corruption Unit (UAC) within the Attorney General's 
Office. It has become a centerpiece of GRM efforts. 
Attorney General Joaquim Madeira shook up the political 
establishment shortly after coming into office in 2001 by 
announcing his intention to combat corruption, starting in 
his own office, which was rife with corrupt prosecutors. The 
UAC has had some successes in arrests of provincial level 
officials engaging in corruption, but has also faced 
challenges in staffing and resources. After moving slowly in 
hiring and training staff (with USG training assistance), 
they are preparing to expand their efforts. Speaking on the 
occasion of the UAC's one-year report, PM Pascoal Mocumbi 
encouraged the unit to continue making progress and exhorted 
them to "show us the faces" of the corrupt. President 
Chissano has repeatedly linked combating corruption with the 
GRM centerpiece Strategic Plan for the Reduction of Absolute 
Poverty (PARPA). Secretary General Guebuza, in his early 
campaigning for 2004 (under the official auspices of the 2003 
municipal election campaign) has promised to crack down on 
corruption in the public sector, causing some unease among 
his fellow Frelimistas as to how far he is willing to go. 
 
GRM efforts to combat corruption 
-------------------------------- 
10. (SBU) The Anti-corruption Unit: The UAC began 
operations in November 2002. During their first year, 116 
denunciations were received by the unit, 26 anonymously, with 
11 resulting in charges and 3 cases reaching trial, but still 
no convictions. The unit's Maputo office covers the entire 
country; regional offices in Beira and Nampula opened in 
December 2003. Major accomplishments of the UAC to date 
include the selection and training of core staff. In Maputo, 
there are currently only five prosecutors and one 
investigator, with prosecutors selected and being trained for 
the regional offices. The painstaking staff screening 
process has had the personal involvement of Attorney General 
Madeira and has resulted in selection of a professional, 
dedicated staff with an excellent public reputation for being 
uncorrupted. AG Madeira informed us in early January that 
the Council of Ministers approved a budget that included more 
funds than he had asked for, and includes salary incentives 
for the UAC. This is one key test of political will to 
support Madeira and the UAC. The UAC enjoys such public 
confidence that denunciations and complaints involving 
complex crimes not directly related to corruption are brought 
by citizens to the UAC, in light of their reputation for 
responsiveness. This situation, however, prevents the unit 
from focusing on cases that require their attention, by 
diverting their limited staff and resources to evaluating and 
forwarding on cases that should be dealt with elsewhere. The 
fact that the population does not trust the police or any 
other entity as much as the UAC is gratifying, but distracts 
the prosecutors from investigating higher priority cases. 
The few successes that the unit can point to involves 
time-consuming embezzlement cases in Sofala and Cabo Delgado 
provinces. 
 
11. (SBU) The growing backlog and the UAC's isolation within 
the judicial sector translate into the lack of successful 
prosecutions. Many of the cases investigated by the unit's 
prosecutors have been shelved or dismissed by judges for 
alleged lack of convincing evidence. With the UAC seen as an 
elite group and the Attorney General publicly criticizing the 
Investigative Police (PIC), the animosity of the police is an 
impediment to the UAC. In light of the Attorney General's 
moves to create a judicial police (PJ) to investigate complex 
crimes due to the widespread perception that the PIC is 
highly corrupt, police investigators are less than helpful. 
With the discussion of the accomplishments and challenges of 
the first year, the UAC laid out its goals for the next five 
years. These include construction of permanent offices in 
Maputo, Beira, and Nampula (vs. rented space), staffing 
levels of ten prosecutors and five investigators for each 
office, hiring of accountants, auditors, and other technical 
experts and support staff, development of an efficient 
case-tracking system, procurement of investigative equipment, 
and improved coordination with other GRM agencies. The UAC 
cannot fight corruption on its own, it needs to be part of a 
multi-level effort involving different sectors of the 
government, including each ministry. 
 
12. (U) Public Sector Reform: The GRM is undertaking a 
comprehensive reform of public services, with the goal of a 
creating more efficient and less corrupt environment for 
economic development. An inter-ministerial working group has 
approved a good governance program with the goal of improving 
each ministry's internal controls and reforming public sector 
hiring, salaries and advancement, to modernize the public 
service and prevent corruption. In November 2003, the Prime 
Minister officially launched an national survey, based on 
World Bank Institute standards, to identify the extent of 
corruption in government services. 
 
13. (SBU) Finance Ministry Inspector General's Office: 
Minister of Planning and Finance Luisa Diogo has received 
high marks for the donor community and IFIs for her attempts 
to develop more accountability in the GRM budget. A key 
potential ally of the UAC is the MPF's Inspectorate General 
for Finance (IGF). The IGF has powers to audit all 
government entities, including the Presidency, and to make 
unannounced inspections, which have uncovered cases of fraud 
in provincial administration. They have a staff of 100, and 
regional offices in Beira and Nampula. They chair the 
Coordinating Council of Inspectorates, comprising around 
twenty ministerial internal inspection units. The Ministry 
of State Administration's inspection unit supervises civil 
servants throughout the public sectors, but only has three 
inspectors. 
 
14. (U) Anti-corruption law: The National Assembly passed 
the new Anti-Corruption Law in November 2003 (reftel B). The 
law is seen as a good first step, in particular concerning 
increased protection for whistle-blowers and higher fines for 
official found guilty of corrupt practices. However, the law 
lacks teeth in other areas, and if the anti-money laundering 
legislation passed two years ago is any indication, it will 
be some time before implementing regulations are promulgated. 
The legislation provides for the formation of a Central 
Office for Combating Corruption (GCCC) with broad powers, 
chaired by the Attorney General, which will more than likely 
be a re-named UAC. 
? 
15. (SBU) The Cardoso and BCM Trials: The Cardoso murder 
trial, which ended in January 2003, and the ongoing BCM bank 
fraud trial, which began in December 2003, have helped to 
improve the image of the beleaguered judiciary. The 
conviction and long sentencing of six organized crime figures 
for the murder of investigative journalist Carlos Cardoso 
prompted several newspapers to name the judge presiding over 
the cases as "man of the year." The trial was broadcast live 
and was followed with great interest. The judge currently 
leading the trial of the 14 million dollar BCM fraud case has 
not won over the public, but a successful completion of the 
case would further strengthen the image of the court system. 
The courts and judiciary are also seen as highly corrupt, 
with only the poor ending up facing trial. Most people 
believe that judges can be bought, putting those with enough 
money above the law. The Portuguese-based legal system 
invests broad discretion in judges to dismiss cases before 
the trial stage. 
 
Para os Ingleses ver? 
--------------------- 
16. (SBU) In recent discussions, prominent civil society 
figures, business consultants and government officials told 
Ambassador and other embassy officers that GRM 
anti-corruption efforts are not sufficiently far-reaching, 
and often can be described as efforts to simply present the 
appearance that something is being done, "for the English to 
see." The most commonly heard complaints involve the 
argument that the creation of the Attorney General's 
Anti-Corruption Unit (UAC) is merely for show and they will 
not be given resources or the required room to maneuver to go 
after high-level government corruption. Beyond being called 
a "Potemkin" operation, the UAC is considered a convenient 
way for other government departments to deflect any 
responsibility for fighting corruption, by simply stating 
that the UAC is the appropriate entity to do so, despite 
their small and inexperienced staff that is quickly becoming 
deluged with cases. The UAC has now been operating for one 
year and is beginning to increase their capacity. Despite 
their courage and dedication and the sound progress made to 
date, they face a daunting task. 
 
USG Assistance in the Fight Against Corruption 
--------------------------------------------- - 
18. (U) The Anti-Corruption Unit: USAID support pays for 
rental of the UAC's office space and provision of all office 
equipment, computers, and vehicles. INL has funded three 
trips of OPDAT short-term advisors to assist the UAC in 
developing skills and tracking cases. PD funds have arranged 
for the OPDAT advisor to return with his SEC supervisor in a 
speakers program and permitted travel of seven UAC staff to 
the U.S. Two groups of seven prosecutors participated in the 
six-week ILEA Botswana LEED Program in January 2002 and 
October 2003. Training was also conducted in Maputo in June 
2002 and June 2003 involving experts from OPDAT, FBI, and 
Treasury. 
 
19. (U) Police Sciences Academy (ACIPOL): INL funding has 
provided an intermittent long-term ICITAP advisor to assist 
ACIPOL in management and curriculum development and to 
coordinate specialized training courses that have been 
conducted at ACIPOL by ICITAP law enforcement experts. 
Courses have included crime scene response, investigative 
skills, criminal data base management, investigation of 
sexual crimes, and problem based learning instructor 
development. INL funds are also paying for improved 
facilities at the academy and an assessment of developing a 
training forensics lab. 
 
20. (U) Post is using PD funds to bring experts to train 
Mozambican customs, utilizing Speaker Program participants, 
as it did in September 2003 with a series of lectures on 
police ethics. 
 
21. (U) Border Security Assistance: Post has requested FY04 
INL funds for training of customs, immigration and border 
police and for necessary equipment. DAO is also working with 
the GRM to complete prerequisites for receipt of EDA coast 
guard cutters or other craft for coastal patrol. The 
Mozambican Navy currently has no capacity to secure its long 
sea border or to prevent illegal exploitation of its 
fisheries. 
 
22. (U) Etica and civil society: USAID funded the 
ground-breaking Corruption Survey conducted by Etica 
Mocambique in 2001. G-11 donors, including AID, are funding 
the planned Etica media campaign to raise public awareness 
about corruption and citizens rights. Etica is also working 
with the UAC to open reporting centers in all ten provincial 
capitals with toll-free hotlines for reporting corruption. 
These centers will play an ombudsman role and help the UAC 
with case intake. USAID mission DG program is also 
formulating its strategy to promote "corruption free zones" 
at the municipal level as part of its planned support for 
eight newly-elected local governments. 
 
Do Donors Promote Corruption? 
----------------------------- 
23. (SBU) British-based journalist Joseph Hanlon wrote in 
2002 that the donors promote corruption in Mozambique. Many 
prominent civil society figures, among them Abdul Carimo, the 
President of the NGO "Etica Mocambique," agree with certain 
aspects of his argument, and were disillusioned to see the 
GRM receive from donors more money that it asked for at the 
September 2003 World Bank Consultative Group meetings in 
Paris. These critics see the donors as afraid to tarnish one 
of their few success stories on the continent and blames the 
donor community for accepting only talk from the GRM, without 
demanding concrete action and progress against corruption. 
These watchdogs admit that they are also part of the 
privileged elite and live comfortable lives, in part 
benefiting from donor largesse in Mozambique. Themselves 
well-connected, educated elites in close-knit Maputo circles, 
they also recognize the limits of civil society and the 
reluctance of the press and NGOs to jeopardize their 
situation. Fear of retribution, since the Cardoso murder, 
also plays a part. However, in addition to funding good 
governance efforts, donor countries should receive credit for 
pressuring the GRM to move forward in combating corruption. 
Nordic countries, in particular, applied strong pressure for 
the Cardoso murder trial to finally take place. The Swiss 
Ambassador has also publicly spoken out against corruption, 
provoking a sensitive reaction from senior FRELIMO officials. 
In his annual address to Parliament in early 2003, the 
Attorney General noted particularly the support received from 
USAID following the assassination attempt on the head of the 
UAC. Internal public accounting has improved in response to 
demands from the donor community and many earnest officials, 
such as Finance Minister Diogo and former Justice Minister 
Aly Douto (now a FRELIMO deputy and key committee chair) have 
used this pressure to achieve first results in the fight 
against corruption. 
 
After 2004? 
----------- 
24. (C) Uncertainty surrounding Guebuza: With the end of 
the Chissano government less than one year away, speculation 
is rife that current high-level GRM officials will partake in 
a "feeding frenzy" to sufficiently pad their nests before 
leaving office. Candidate Guebuza has repeatedly vowed to 
tackle corruption. Guebuza also happens to be one of 
Mozambique's wealthiest businessmen. It is widely believed 
that he did very well for himself during privatizations while 
FRELIMO parliamentary leader and also earlier as Minister of 
Transport. Interlocutors have made comparisons between 
Guebuza's handling of his son's minor legal troubles (he 
actually went to jail for a short period in a dispute 
involving a land deal) and the more well-known case of 
President Chissano's son Nympine. Since Nympine's 
unconvincing and arrogant testimony in the Cardoso murder 
trial, he has actually been heckled in public resulting from 
perceptions that he was involved in the bank fraud and the 
murder, but remains certain he will not face justice. Some 
informed observers feel that Guebuza did not make the same 
efforts to shield his son from damage, perhaps indicating his 
intention to allow party colleagues and cronies to be 
punished for corrupt activities when and if they are 
revealed. Conversely, Guebuza is among those senior FRELIMO 
officials who have applied pressure on Attorney General 
Madeira to move slowly in pursuing certain cases. 
 
25. (SBU) A possible RENAMO upset?: In the now unlikely 
event of a RENAMO victory, most commentators predict that 
corruption would be even worse. Hungry for power since the 
1992 General Peace Accord, RENAMO has failed in two elections 
to gain power, and if the November municipal elections are 
indicative, they are not sufficiently organized to win in 
2004. Considering the lack of transparency in party leader 
Afonso Dhlakama's policy and personnel decisions, public 
opinion holds that RENAMO is mainly interested in power to 
enrich themselves and their long-suffering supporters. 
 
Comment 
------- 
26. (SBU) While the UAC faces many challenges, public 
opinion is beginning to mobilize and many, if not all, 
current government officials recognize the negative effects 
of growing corruption not only to their image and 
re-electability, but also upon foreign investment and 
continued donor support. With over half of the GRM budget 
based on either direct or indirect donor support, the 
impatience of many European donors, combined with USG 
pressure on MCA criteria, has the potential to turn the tide. 
The planned Etica campaign may contribute to a greater 
awareness of ethical standards and civic ideals on the part 
of citizens. The factor of the 2004 elections and the 
imminent changes in the GRM leadership may also play a role. 
Enlightened GRM officials have indicated that they wish to do 
more to prevent future corruption, while confiding that it 
will prove difficult to go after those who have already 
benefited from corrupt dealings. Without at least one 
high-profile success on the part of the UAC, the climate of 
impunity will not be shaken. Things may get worse before 
they get better, if senior officials who assume they will 
lose their job in the new government decide to cash in on 
their positions while they can. 
 
27. (C) Comment continued: Attorney General Madeira has 
admitted to us that he faces pressure from senior FRELIMO 
members to back off certain cases involving high level 
officials. He has received telephone calls from Guebuza and 
FRELIMO Secretary General Tome pointedly inquiring into the 
status of particular cases and has been visited by Supreme 
Court Chief Justice Mangaze on numerous occasions. He has 
apparently been instructed to keep a tighter rein on the 
younger and more unpredictable Assistant AG Isabel Rupia, who 
leads the UAC. It is often rumored that she will soon be 
replaced in her position by Assistant AG Rafael Sebastiao, 
who exhibits the same caution as Madeira. It is not clear if 
the attempt on her life in December was meant to succeed, or 
merely to send her a message to back off. Some commentators 
see the UAC as an "escape valve" cleverly used by the GRM to 
shift focus away from individual ministries' deliberate lack 
of internal controls. While the UAC runs the risk of 
becoming swamped, the largest impediment to successfully 
prosecuting corruption is stalling by the courts. The 
judiciary has disproportionate responsibility for the 
inability of the GRM to bring the corrupt to justice. 
 
28. (SBU) The negative effects on investment, from the added 
costs and frustrations of doing business, will do great harm 
to continued economic development if corruption is not 
reduced. Corruption also has wider implications relating to 
grand corruption, organized crime, porous borders, and their 
possible nexus with terrorist financing. Senior GRM 
officials have publicly stated that corruption is a serious 
constraint on development. They are also very aware that 
Mozambique's efforts on corruption will be evaluated in light 
of such programs as MCA and NEPAD. In the last year, we have 
seen some glimmers of hope in the fight against corruption. 
Mozambique must now move more energetically beyond the 
rhetoric and planning to implementation of ambitious, 
visible, well-targeted actions, which span all sectors of 
government and which, over time, will reverse the current 
trend and foster a culture where good governance and 
accountability are the norm. End Comment. 
LA LIME