US embassy cable - 04JERUSALEM171

C O N F I D E N T I A L  JERUSALEM 000171 
 
 
NEA FOR BURNS/SATTERFIELD 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, KDEM, KPAL, KWBG, IS 
SUBJECT: HOW HAMAS IS WORKING TO REPLACE THE PA AND THE PLO 
 
Classified By: Consul General David D. Pearce. Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
This cable has been cleared by Embassy Tel Aviv. 
 
1. (C) Summary:  A range of Palestinian thinkers and 
activists are reporting  that Hamas is moving with 
unprecedented boldness to establish itself as an alternative 
leadership to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and PLO.  Hamas 
leaders are publicly arguing that stalled roadmap 
implementation, the weakening of the PA, and the building of 
the separation barrier all vindicate the movement's long-held 
position that a negotiated two-state solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not possible.  PA ministers 
have told us in January and December that Hamas effectively 
controls several strongholds in the Gaza Strip.  Hamas 
representatives at cease-fire talks in December refused to 
recognize the PLO and PA as institutions representative of 
the Palestinian people.  They called for an entirely new 
political leadership.  Meanwhile, Hamas has won significant 
victories in student council and syndicate elections across 
the West Bank over the past several months.  Hamas leaders 
also appear to be emphasizing an ability to conduct 
Palestinian foreign policy on their own.  Hamas leaders in 
Gaza have made a point of receiving Egyptian envoys in 
meetings that paralleled those the Egyptians are holding with 
the PA.  The Hamas foreign policy -- based on a rejection of 
any final peace agreement with Israel -- is aimed at 
escalating the Intifada, burying the roadmap, and undermining 
the PA.  End summary. 
 
Hamas Throws Down the Gauntlet in Cairo 
--------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) A range of Palestinian thinkers and activists are 
reporting to us that Hamas is moving with unprecedented 
boldness to establish itself as an alternative leadership to 
the Palestinian Authority and PLO.  Fatah contacts raised the 
first alarm bells on this subject in December when they 
returned, shocked, from failed cease-fire talks in Cairo. 
Fatah negotiator Ahmad Ghnaym told us he was unnerved that 
the Hamas delegation had not only rejected the PA's 
cease-fire plan, but also announced that it did not consider 
either the PA or the PLO to be institutions representative of 
the Palestinian people.  For years, Hamas had said it would 
compete with secular, nationalist parties like Fatah if it 
were allowed to stand on equal footing within the confines of 
existing institutions.  Hamas leaders said they wanted to 
join the PLO, but they insisted upon 40 percent control of 
the PLO National Council as their price.  This time, Hamas 
delegates in Cairo refused to approve a statement that would 
have confirmed the authority of the PA and the legitimacy of 
the PLO.  When one left-wing activist suggested adjusting PLO 
decision-making to give Hamas a greater voice, Hamas 
delegates countered that the Palestinian people needed a new 
leadership body altogether, with a new charter and political 
program. 
 
Hamas Establishes 
Bases of Control in Gaza 
------------------------ 
 
3. (C) PA ministers have told us that Hamas effectively 
controls several strongholds in the Gaza Strip.  PA Minister 
of Local Government Jamal al-Shobaki recently exclaimed in a 
conversation with Poloff, "I just visited Gaza.  Hamas is in 
control there.  There is no Authority in Gaza."  Prime 
Minister Abu Ala'a mentioned to visiting Senator Bill Nelson 
on January 7 that his aides had advised him against even 
attempting to visit Rafah.  In an audacious challenge to the 
PA, masked and armed Hamas militants on December 29 waylaid 
PA Housing Minister Abd al-Rahman Hamad and Arafat office 
director Ramzi Khuri as they rode in a convoy toward the 
Rafah crossing in southern Gaza.  The militants held Hamad 
and Khuri for about four hours and took them on a forced tour 
of IDF damage inflicted on the Rafah area, demanding to know 
why the PA had failed to defend and provide aid to its 
constituents. 
 
Establishing Itself As 
The Mainstream Palestinian Representative 
----------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Throughout December and January, Hamas has worked to 
assert itself as a representative of the entire Palestinian 
people, not just one Islamist faction. 
 
-- Leading the Resistance:  Hamas delegates in Cairo 
deliberately staked out a position for the movement as the 
leader of Palestinian resistance.  Hamas delegates rejected 
the PA and Fatah's cease-fire plan in Cairo, and then, when 
the talks foundered, returned home implying that they held a 
deeper commitment to the Intifada than other factions. 
 
-- Making Independent Foreign Policy:  Hamas leaders in 
recent weeks appear to be emphasizing an ability to conduct 
Palestinian foreign policy on their own.  Hamas leaders in 
Gaza made a point in December of receiving Egyptian envoys in 
meetings that paralleled those the Egyptians are holding with 
the PA.   An Egyptian embassy official told DPO on January 15 
that Hamas envoys in Egypt are attempting to discuss 
cease-fire issues independently of the PA.  Hamas political 
leader Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi claimed January 15 to have 
rejected what he said were secret U.S. contacts calling for a 
cease-fire.  Hamas political leader Musa Abu Marzuq similarly 
recently claimed that the movement had secret contacts with 
the U.S. in the past. 
 
-- Broadening Its Ideology:  Hamas Spiritual Leader Shaykh 
Ahmad Yasin January 13 publicly revived a long-dormant 
proposal to offer Israel an extended truce in exchange for a 
withdrawal to the June 1967 lines.  The statement appeared to 
be an effort to broaden the appeal of Hamas to Palestinians 
who are reluctant to support the movement because of a 
doctrine that promises seemingly never-ending war. 
 
A Sharpened Propaganda Campaign 
Against the Palestinian Authority 
--------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Hamas is complementing these efforts to assert itself 
with a sharpening of its long-running public campaign to 
undermine faith in the PA.  Al-Risalah, a weekly Gaza 
newspaper linked to Hamas, ran an "exclusive" story on 
January 8 that offers a telling example of anti-PA 
propaganda.  The article editorialized that the PA "is absent 
from the political and the social arena."  The article quotes 
an unnamed Legislative Council official as saying, "There is 
no such thing as a government... Since the government's 
formation it has not made a single political or domestic 
decision."  The article cites the opinions of "young men" who 
allegedly believe that "charity organizations offer aid and 
assistance to the population long before the PA does."  The 
article concludes by quoting a PLC member who says that the 
current crisis necessitates more than a new cabinet, but a 
"review of the Palestinian situation as a whole, especially 
the political system." 
 
Building Influence in 
Quasi-Governmental Bodies 
------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Hamas activists also dealt a blow to Fatah, and with 
it the PA, in a series of strong showings in student council 
and syndicate elections in December.   Hamas deepened its 
control of the Bir Zeit University student council, a Fatah 
stronghold before the Intifada.  Hamas candidates won control 
of the Ramallah Mens Training Center and of the Engineers 
Syndicate Elections in Gaza.  Hamas rivaled Fatah without 
completely prevailing in several other elections where its 
influence was previously negligible.  At Bethlehem University 
-- a largely Christian institution -- Hamas rose from 
negligible support to take seven seats to Fatah's 13.  In the 
West Bank Engineers Syndicate elections, Fatah headed off a 
Hamas victory by agreeing to share power in the steering 
committee. 
 
Comment:  A Vulture Circles the PA 
---------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Hamas's effort to sideline the PA and PLO and dominate 
Palestinian politics is an evolutionary effort, not a 
revolutionary one.  "They want power, but they don't want a 
civil war," Jerusalem's Arab Thought Forum Director Abd 
al-Rahman Abu Arafah emphasized to Poloff in a meeting on 
January 15.  Hamas is aiming to perpetuate violence and 
instability and claim power as the central authority of the 
PA recedes.  This tactic has already helped Hamas build 
strongholds in Gaza.  Victories in syndicate and student 
council elections have also won it a significant foothold in 
the West Bank.  With reportedly undisputed control over most 
mosques in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Hamas is positioned 
to spread its message even as it remains outside of 
Palestinian political institutions. 
 
8. (C) Many analysts of Palestinian politics have devoted 
excessive attention to polls in assessing the power balance 
in the West Bank and Gaza.  By the polls, Hamas and Fatah are 
rivals with about 20 percent support each (but with Fatah 
almost always slightly higher).  (The vast majority of 
Palestinians register their dissatisfaction with either 
group.)  But in a Palestinian political environment that is 
increasingly anarchic, a well-organized minority like Hamas 
can exert influence far beyond its numbers.  More 
importantly, the separation barrier is proving to be an 
unexpected but crucial boon to the organization.  As the 
route of the barrier leads Palestinians to conclude that a 
two-state solution is impossible, Hamas leaders are claiming 
that their long-time opposition to accommodation with Israel 
is being vindicated.  More importantly, as the barrier and 
checkpoints isolate and divide the West Bank and Gaza, the 
PA's central institutions are losing their reach and local 
organizations are rising in importance.  Hamas has long 
devoted its efforts to building a wide network of local 
welfare services, precisely the type of institutions 
Palestinians are coming to rely upon as IDF-imposed internal 
closures deny them freedom of movement.  Meanwhile, the PLO, 
which put most of its efforts into building a centralized, 
authoritarian PA, laments it is boxed in and unable to act 
effectively. 
 
9. (C) When Abu Ala'a gave up on the Cairo cease-fire talks 
in December following Hamas's rebuff, a new political dynamic 
was born.  Hamas, long a critical outsider, had demonstrated 
an ability to veto a central plank of a PA government.  Now 
the movement is attempting to pocket that veto, press its 
advantage, and begin to actually direct Palestinian policy. 
 
 
PEARCE