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| Identifier: | 04AMMAN401 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04AMMAN401 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Amman |
| Created: | 2004-01-19 17:21:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PTER KPAL IS SA IZ JO |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 000401 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2014 TAGS: PREL, PTER, KPAL, IS, SA, IZ, JO SUBJECT: KING ABDULLAH ON IRAQ, MEPP, SAUDI ARABIA WITH SENATE STAFFDEL Classified By: Ambassador Edward Gnehm for reason 1.5d -------- Summary --------- 1. (C) King Abdullah addressed his concerns on Iraq, the Palestinian-Israeli peace process and Saudi Arabia in a meeting with Staffdel Nordquist on January 13. The King voiced concerns over the U.S. timetable in Iraq, in-fighting in the Palestinian Prime Ministry, and extremists in Saudi Arabia. End Summary. ------ Iraq ------ 2. (C) King Abdullah asked that the U.S. be "realistic" in assessing its planned timetable in Iraq leading to a transfer of sovereignty by July 2004. He feared that this timetable and an early withdrawal of U.S. forces may increase instability. He believed that the U.S. has a "false sense of security" in the south, while shi'a are quietly organizing for the future. In addressing the issue of Iraqi leadership, he was not convinced that the Iraq Governing Council (IGC) is working in the best interests for the future and that some IGC members are serving for personal reasons. He described the prospects for liberal democracy as a "bit unrealistic" and reiterated his desire to see Iraqi police trained and serving in Iraq as quickly as possible. ---------------- Israel/Palestine ---------------- 3. (C) The King described Jordan's current strategy in the peace process as "damage control". He criticized PM Qurai for the in-fighting in the PNA. He said that Sharon wants peace and a Palestinian state but criticized Sharon's delaying tactics. The GOJ's role is to "push the envelope" to strengthen PM Qurai to make negotiations more even-handed. He believes that President Bush is engaged but needs something tangible to work with. -------------- Saudi Arabia -------------- 4. (C) The King expressed deep concern over extremism in Saudi Arabia and questioned whether the Gulf states could handle instability there. He characterized Crown Prince Abdullah as very sincere in his efforts to combat extremists, but said the extremists are better-organized and have the sympathy of the majority of the population. He wondered if the recent assassination attempt against a Saudi intel service head was the "next stage of confrontation" and if the situation could deteriorate into open rebellion or civil war. He pledged his continued support for the Crown Prince. ---------------------------------- More on Israel/Palestine and Iraq ---------------------------------- 5. (C) In separate meetings, House Speaker Abd al-Hadi Majali told the Senate staffers that the U.S. is to blame for injustice in the peace process, and that he did not understand why the Isrealis have the "full backing" of the U.S. in building "the wall". Senate President Rifai seconded the King's desire to have Iraqi police serving in Iraq and Majali's criticism of the security wall in Israel. Visit Embassy Amman's classified website at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ or access the site through the State Department's SIPRNET home page. GNEHM
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