US embassy cable - 04HARARE99

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000099 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
AF/S FOR SDELISI, LAROIAN, MRAYNOR 
AF/PD FOR DFOLEY, CDALTON 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR JFRAZER, DTEITELBAUM 
LONDON FOR CGURNEY 
PARIS FOR CNEARY 
NAIROBI FOR TPFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2009 
TAGS: PGOV, EAGR, ECON, KPAO, ZI, Land Reform 
SUBJECT: LAND REFORM SURVEY ILLUMINATES POLITICAL CHALLENGES 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5(b)(d) 
 
1.  (U) SUMMARY: A recent survey by the Mass Public Opinion 
Institute reconfirms land reform's central importance in 
Zimbabwean politics.  Advocates and critics of GOZ land 
reform each will find data in the survey to support their 
respective causes.  The survey bears out wide support for the 
central tenet of land reform -- that land should be 
redistributed from a white minority to the black majority. 
On the other hand, a majority of respondents viewed the GOZ's 
land reform exercise as a cynical political maneuver to woo 
votes while centralizing economic power in the hands of 
ruling party supporters.  Land reform will continue to pose 
special policy and public relations challenges to each party 
and to the USG.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (U) Zimbabwe's Mass Public Opinion Institute (MPOI, an 
NGO that receives funding from a variety of sources, 
including USAID) in December 2003 published a 68-page booklet 
entitled "Zimbabwe's Land Reform Programme: An Audit of the 
Public Perception."  The publication recounts results of a 
survey involving 1445 questionnaires.  Respondents were drawn 
from across the country - 62.8 percent from rural areas, 37.2 
percent from urban areas.  The effort was funded by the 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation.  The paper noted that fear was 
apparently a limitation in some areas, as respondents in 
parts of Midlands, Mashonaland East and Mashonaland Central 
in particular declined to be interviewed or terminated 
interviews prior to completion. 
 
Broad Support for Land Reform 
----------------------------- 
 
3.  (U) The open-ended question "What is your opinion of land 
reform in Zimbabwe?" elicited a variety of responses.  A 
general consensus felt that land reform was and is necessary 
in Zimbabwe.  More than two thirds -- 69.7 percent -- agreed 
that land reform was justified.  A strong majority -- 65.5 
percent -- agreed or strongly agreed that the present land 
reform program would lead to the empowerment of the 
Zimbabwean people.  This sentiment was weakest in 
Matabeleland North and South, traditional opposition 
strongholds, where less than 50 percent of respondents agreed 
or strongly agreed it would have an empowering effect.  58.5 
percent of all respondents thought that the reform exercise 
would effectively address colonial imbalances.  A plurality 
of slightly less than half thought that the present land 
reform program would lead to the eradication of rural 
poverty; a minority felt that it would lead to the overall 
recovery of the economy.  Respondents were evenly split on 
land reform's success, 48.5 percent regarding it as a 
success, 50 percent viewing it as not. 
 
Cynical View of Reasons and Implementation 
------------------------------------------ 
 
4.  (U) Respondents identified the ruling party's votes 
strategy as the strongest reason for embarking on land 
reform.  Other reasons cited included (in order of frequency) 
reviving the economy, eradicating rural poverty, redressing 
colonial imbalances, and punishing white farmers.  Those 
respondents who had received land under the reform program 
had a somewhat different view, naming indigenization and 
revival of the economy as the top two reasons, and votes 
strategy as the weakest reason. 
 
5.  (U) Elaborating on dissatisfaction over the process, many 
respondents asserted that land reform was carried out too 
late, too hurriedly, and in a chaotic manner.  Many 
complained that the exercise was meant to enrich principally 
top politicians and those to whom they were connected. 
Roughly three quarters agreed that violence had been employed 
in the program's implementation.  64.1 percent agreed that 
the government had failed to provide resettled farmers with 
the financial and technical support sufficient to make them 
productive.  A substantial majority of 58.9 percent thought 
that the program would have benefitted from broader 
consultation among stakeholders prior to implementation 
(vis-a-vis 29.6 percent who thought it would have made no 
difference), and 54.7 percent felt that greater involvement 
of the international community would have helped (vs. 32.5 
percent who said it would have made no difference). 
 
6.  (U) Respondents were split on the extent to which land 
reform had contributed to the nation's food shortage.  A 
plurality of 37.6 percent attributed the food crisis to 
drought, 32.6 percent to the GOZ's land reform program, and 
25.9 percent to a combination of drought and land reform. 
Pluralities in Harare, Bulawayo, Matabeleland North, 
Matabeleland South, Manicaland, and Mashonaland East blamed 
land reform alone for the food crisis.  (Note: Except for 
Mash East, these provinces represent the areas of greatest 
support for the opposition MDC.) 
 
Who Benefited? 
--------------- 
 
7.  (U) Nearly twice as many respondents (57.9 percent) 
thought that land reform only benefited top politicians and 
their cronies than thought it benefited a majority of people 
(30.7 percent).  A slightly smaller majority (53.6 percent) 
of rural elements - land reform's principal intended 
beneficiaries -  shared the view that only political elites 
benefitted.  49.8 percent agreed that land reform benefitted 
men more than women while 32.8 disagreed. 
 
8.  (U) Fourteen percent of those polled had been allocated 
land under the government's program.  Curiously, the 
percentage of respondents from urban Harare and Bulawayo who 
received land exceeded the national figure (16.3 and 16.0 
percent, respectively).  Conversely, the figures for 
residents of Mashonaland West and Mashonaland Central, two 
provinces that boast some of the country's most productive 
farmland, including many farms that were seized violently, 
were the lowest in the survey (6.7 and 5.7 percent, 
respectively).  (COMMENT: This may be explained in part by 
the allocation of these prime farms, many of which are easily 
accessible from the capital, largely to urban/political 
figures instead of the local population.) 
 
9.  (U) Of those allocated land, only 64.9 percent actually 
were in occupation of their land and 69.4 percent were 
producing on their land.  (Note: The figures allude to the 
presence of absentee landlords.)  The report attributed 
failure to occupy allocated land to lack of resources, poor 
infrastructure, drought, poor land use match, legal 
complexities/court challenges, and rampant courruption 
resulting in shortages of fuel and inputs.  Not surprisingly, 
non-occupation of allocated land was highest among urban 
dwellers, for whom agricultural pursuits were more likely to 
be a part-time occupation. 
 
Media Reaction 
-------------- 
 
10.  (U) In keeping with tradition, local press has made 
selective partisan use of the survey's results. 
Government-controlled outlets trumpeted the report in 
prominent but brief pieces as conclusive evidence of the 
public's strong support for land reform, omitting any nuance 
or reference to critical details.  The independent press gave 
most prominent focus to the survey's indicia of public 
dissatisfaction. 
 
COMMENT: Political Challenges for Parties, USG 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
9.  (SBU) The survey is pregnant with implications for each 
political party.  To ZANU-PF it reinforces the imperative of 
maintaining ruling party possession of the land reform issue. 
 Aside from its historical role as liberator and 
anti-colonial vanguard, the party has no other political drum 
to pound to the electorate.  Land reform as a means to 
empower Zimbabwe's black majority and to redress colonial 
injustices has always been an indispensable and jealously 
guarded plank of the party's platform.  Historical 
commentators characterized the sudden unleashing of 
fast-track land reform, for example, in part as Mugabe's 
response to apparent efforts by "Hitler" Hunzvi and the 
Zimbabwe Liberation War Veterans Association essentially to 
hijack the issue from the ruling party.  Indeed, land reform 
appears to be thread central to Mugabe's ego, one that adds 
to his stature not just in Zimbabwe but throughout Africa and 
the wider developing world.  As a reflection of the popular 
will, the issue offers Mugabe and his party a final shred of 
claimed legitimacy at home, and sustaining the centrality of 
land reform as an issue is critical to ZANU-PF's prospects 
for victory in any free and fair election.  A local 
commentator's assertion that all ruling party members wake up 
each morning with the mantra "land reform" on their lips is 
only a slight exaggeration. 
 
10.  (C) For its part, the MDC must seize or at least 
neutralize land reform as an issue if it is to undercut 
allegiances of traditional ruling party constituencies.  To 
date, it has had limited success.  Its public posture has 
been "an end to the status quo, with no return to the status 
quo ante."  A historical difficulty for the party has been 
accommodating the demands of aggrieved white commercial 
farmers (a major source of party funding) with Zimbabwe's 
demographics and land reform's popularity.  Tilting toward 
the latter, the approach set out in the party's draft 
"RESTART" economic agenda circulated publicly last month was 
a thoughtful effort built on establishment of a non-partisan 
commission and transparent process; a nationwide inventorying 
exercise; and a matching of land titles and farmers based on 
need, ability, and equitable considerations.  The system 
would not require all existing beneficiaries of land reform 
to surrender land.  It would, however, disrupt traditional 
rural power structures, which could be expected to generate 
resistance.  The establishment of a title deed system would 
be controversial: it would appeal to farmers who see it as a 
key to accessing capital and credit; it would alarm those 
convinced it would open a back door to the return of 
centralized commercial farmers.  Compounding substantive 
difficulties of the party's message is the challenge of 
getting the message out.  Party President Morgan Tsvangirai 
told the Ambassador recently that the independent media's 
effective demise leaves the party no option but to rely 
heavily on human interaction in getting its land reform 
proposals to the rural masses. 
 
11.  (SBU) In the current environment, ZANU-PF retains the 
upper hand on land reform, especially in view of its virtual 
monopoly over the national media.  It can be expected to 
continue its substantially effective campaign to portray the 
MDC (and the West) as "opposed to land reform."  The survey 
bears out, however, the seeds of public disaffection with GOZ 
land reform -- seeds that will likely grow on their own even 
without aggressive MDC cultivation.  In an effort to counter 
wide perceptions of cronyism, the GOZ has been publicizing a 
redistribution of properties allocated to those who received 
more than one -- to questionable effect.  The government's 
publicized efforts to distribute tractors and inputs seem 
patently inadequate and almost desperate; certainly, the 
unused land and anemic agricultural production is apparent 
and the frustration palpable among rural masses and 
beneficiaries alike.  The country's woeful budget situation, 
hellish investment climate, and non-existent credibility with 
donors assure that meeting public expectations will be 
impossible. 
 
12.  (C) Finally, the survey raises potentially important 
implications for the USG: 
 
-- Although USG officials on numerous occasions have 
articulated support for land reform in Zimbabwe -- albeit not 
in the violent, corrupt, unsustainable form undertaken by the 
GOZ -- the point bears repeating privately and publicly in 
view of widespread Zimbabwean misconceptions that the USG 
opposes it.  Any USG official engaging with a ZANU-PF 
interlocutor must be prepared for the land reform lecture 
that invariably commences the exchange.  In this regard, the 
Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, which 
conditionally authorized (but did not appropriate) no less 
than USD 20 million for land reform, may offer a potentially 
useful rhetorical departure point.  Private and public 
acknowledgements by USG officials that land reform addresses 
colonial injustices could be constructive without in any way 
projecting support for ruling party excesses and 
maladministration. 
 
-- Land reform poses a special dilemma for our objective of 
inter-party talks.  Even though the two parties' objectives 
for land reform are not irresolvably different on paper, the 
issue's importance to ZANU-PF compels it to exaggerate the 
differences so as to preserve its vanguard identity and 
substantiate its value to traditional constituencies.  On the 
surface, land reform is an end for the ruling party; more 
signficantly, it is a means to its power.  Our approach here 
must accommodate both realities.  Fostering talks, thus, 
will require an internally contradictory task: addressing 
fears that the MDC (supported by the West) will undo land 
reform, without undoing ZANU-PF's retention of the "moral 
high ground" on land reform among its constituencies (at 
least in the short term). 
 
-- The survey indicates broad public support for more 
international involvement, and ruling party members have 
quietly made clear their interest in USG assistance, albeit 
on their own terms.  Regarding future USG assistance to 
Zimbabwe, we should devote serious attention to our potential 
role in land reform, at least as it evolves under a 
transition/new government. 
 
-- Public opinions aside, in the near term the most important 
opinion in Zimbabwe on land reform is Robert Mugabe's. 
Nobody knows what position land reform occupies on Mugabe's 
list of priorities.  It certainly occupies a prominent place 
in his public rhetoric and in that respect is closely 
intertwined with his "legacy" -- a euphemism for a 
face-saving exit strategy.  Thus, to facilitate 
transition/succession, it may be tactically expedient for the 
MDC support the land reform scheme in some nominal sense even 
as a foundation is laid for the Herculean task of 
reorganizing it into a more sustainable, transparent and 
equitable model. 
 
SULLIVAN