US embassy cable - 04SANAA148

S E C R E T SANAA 000148 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS, 
DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2014 
TAGS: ASEC, AMGT, PREL, PTER, EAC 
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - JANUARY 14, 2004 
 
REF: REF: MISENHEIMER - S/S-O TELCONS 
 
Classified By: RSO Tim Laas, for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C)  Begin Summary:  The Ambassador convened a core 
Emergency Action Committee on 1/14 to discuss a shooting 
incident in Aden involving Yemeni security personnel and 
SOC/Yemen personnel.  EAC members agreed, following initial 
investigation of the incident and apology offered to the 
Ambassador by the commander of Yemen's Special Forces, that 
the incident: (a) did not indicate a heightened threat for 
Amcits in Aden and (b) did not appear to justify cancellation 
of SOC/Yemen training for Yemeni security elements in Aden 
scheduled later this week.  EAC members attending the meeting 
included AMB, DCM, RSO, MO, POL/ECON, POL/MIL, DAO, OMC, and 
SOC/Yemen. 
 
2.  (C)  An Emergency Action Committee meeting was convened 
at 1700 hours on 01/14/2004 to review a security incident 
which occurred that same day at approximately 1445 hours, 
when two members of the SOC/Yemen training unit were shot at 
in Aden while traveling in a three-vehicle convoy consisting 
of two rental vehicles and a Yemeni military security 
vehicle.  An initial investigation by Embassy Force 
Protection Units in Aden determined that the vehicles in the 
attacking motorcade contained uniformed members of Yemen's 
elite Presidential Guard, and that BG Ahmed Ali 
Saleh--commander of the Yemeni Special Forces (YSOF) and a 
son of President Saleh---was a passenger in the lead vehicle. 
 Both motorcades stopped after the shooting and the 
Presidential Guard stated that they viewed the SOC/Yemen 
motorcade as a possible threat because it did not immediately 
pull over to the side of the road, and had Yemeni security 
personnel (actually YSOF personnel) in plainclothes who were 
carrying arms. 
 
3.  (C)  During the EAC meeting the Ambassador advised 
committee members that BG Ahmed Ali Saleh, had called to 
apologize and offer an explanation of the event. BG Saleh 
claimed that due to the fact that the armed YSOF military 
escorts were not properly dressed and therefore were not 
easily identifiable by the Presidential Guards, they were 
perceived as a threat.  Saleh also relayed to the Ambassador 
that the ROYG would determine the cause of the error and take 
measures to prevent any reoccurrence of this kind. 
 
4.  (C)  The EAC decided that this was not a terrorist 
attack, and it was agreed that Americans need not be warned 
against travel to Aden.  The EAC also determined that 1) The 
threat to Americans has not increased 2) Yemeni government 
officials have reacted in an appropriate and timely manner to 
this incident, and 3) That joint training exercises in Aden 
between American and Yemeni military units scheduled for 
later this week should continue as planned. 
 
5.  (C)  The Regional Security Office is in contact with the 
Ministry of Interior regarding ROYG's ongoing investigation 
of the incident, which will include a meeting of all 
concerned U.S. and Yemeni organizations on the morning of 
January 15th.  Members of the DAO, FPD, and SOC/Yemen will 
conduct further inquires into the matter through liaison with 
members of the Yemeni security apparatus, and will 
participate actively in the ROYG investigation. 
 
HULL