US embassy cable - 04ANKARA226

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000226 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, SY, TU, IS 
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ASSAD'S VISIT TO TURKEY 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Edelman, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.5 
(b) and (d). 
 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Assad's January 6-9 visit to Turkey was the 
first by any Syrian President.  Assad met one-on-one with PM 
Erdogan and President Sezer, and also met FM Gul, TGS Chief 
Ozkok, Parliament Speaker Arinc, and main opposition CHP 
leader Baykal.  Turkish contacts say GOT raised terrorism, 
WMD and Syrian-Israeli relations, without any notable 
response from Assad.  The two sides signed agreements on 
double taxation, mutual foreign investment incentives, and 
tourism. The visit, another step forward in bilateral 
relations, is a piece in FonMin Gul's desire for a foreign 
policy more oriented toward the Islamic world.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
 
Iraq 
 
 
2. (C) According to MFA Middle East DG Tahsim Burcuoglu, 
Assad expressed concern (Burcuoglu described him as 
"panicked") about the current situation in Iraq, including 
worries about a separate Kurdish state in the north.  Assad 
claimed Syria is trying to control border crossings into 
Iraq, but mainly expressed hope for early elections and a 
swift end to U.S. occupation. 
 
 
Terrorism 
 
 
3. (C) Turkish interlocutors assert to us that they pressed 
Assad and his delegation on three terrorism-related issues: 
suspects in the November Istanbul bombings believed to be at 
large in Syria; Syrian support for anti-Israel terrorist 
groups; and terrorist infiltration to Iraq from Syria. 
According to DG Burcuoglu, Assad expressed a willingness to 
work with Turkey on the Istanbul bombing suspects but 
requested more information from the Turks first.  The Turks 
also asked Assad to stop supporting Hezbollah, HAMAS, 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine.  According to Burcuoglu, Assad 
merely repeated "the usual things" and claimed Syria is 
trying to control its Iraqi border to prevent terrorist 
infiltration.  Israeli DCM Nahshon told us the Turks say they 
still await the Syrian response. 
 
 
WMD 
 
 
4.  (C) Burcuoglu told us Assad raised WMD on his own, saying 
he does not want to see any WMD in the region.  Assad worried 
that, at the UK's behest, the EU will re-open the WMD article 
of Syria's EU partnership agreement.  Ali Sarikaya, an aide 
to PM foreign policy advisor Ahmet Davutoglu, claimed to us 
that Assad denied Syria has WMD but affirmed its "right" to 
possess them "in light of Israeli WMD." 
 
 
Syria's Relations with Israel 
 
 
5.  (C) The Assad visit also allowed Turkey to portray itself 
as a peace mediator between Israel and Syria.  Israeli DCM 
Nahshon said he had spent the month before the visit working 
with GOT officials on issues to raise with Assad, and PM 
Erdogan personally debriefed the Israeli Ambassador on the 
visit January 8.  Spinning the visit as "extremely 
constructive", Nahshon said the Turks claimed Israeli issues 
were at the top of the agenda.  In addition to urging Syria 
to stop supporting anti-Israel terrorist groups, Erdogan and 
Sezer reportedly raised the issue of accounting for missing 
and dead Israeli citizens in Syria and Lebanon; Assad was 
noncommittal.  According to Burcuoglu, Assad said he could 
not make concessions on the Golan Heights but is ready to 
discuss other issues.  On January 12, Israeli President 
Katsav invited Assad to visit Jerusalem; Nahshon said this 
gambit is "of course" related to Assad's Turkey visit. 
According to media reports, the Syrians quickly rejected the 
offer. 
 
 
Economic Issues 
 
 
6.  (C) The GOT and the Syrians also signed agreements on 
double taxation, foreign investment incentives, and tourism. 
According to Burcuoglu, the agreements had been in the works 
since 2002.  Language that referred to the long-disputed area 
of Hatay (called Alexandretta by the Syrians) hung up the 
agreements until the last minute.  However, just before the 
visit, the Syrians accepted the Turkish language.  In 
Istanbul, Assad also paid a visit to the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange and despite looking slightly bewildered (according 
to Burcuoglu, the visit was Mrs. Assad's idea), promised to 
create one in Damascus. 
 
 
7.  (C) Comment:  At Assad's request, his meetings with 
Erdogan and Sezer were one-on-one, according to Burcuoglu, so 
that Assad could get away from his "entourage."  According to 
Burcuoglu and Israeli DCM Nahshon, the GOT perceived Assad as 
"sincere" and believes he has had a "change of mentality." 
Islamist-oriented contacts who are close to FonMin Gul, for 
instance journalist Fehmi Koru, have insisted to us that the 
visit was immensely positive and that Assad is an agent of 
democratic change.  The Turkish press fawned over Assad in a 
manner rarely seen.  However, the results of the visit appear 
modest at best.  Bilaterally, the visit is another step in 
relations that have steadily improved since 1998, when the 
two nations almost went to war over Syria's harboring of PKK 
leader Ocalan.  Assad appears to have bowed to reality on the 
Hatay/Alexandretta dispute, ameliorating a bilateral 
irritant.  However, the visit seems to have contributed 
little to regional issues.  Although the Turks are fond of 
seeing themselves as regional brokers and apparently worked 
closely with the Israelis on the visit, they seem to have 
gotten little movement out of Assad.  End Comment. 
 
 
8.  (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN